http://davidraymondamos3.blogspot.com/2017/12/re-warning-perhaps-you-should-review-my.html
From:
David Amos <motomaniac333@gmail.com>
Subject:
Yo Mr Bauer say hey to your client Obama and his buddies in
the USDOJ for me
will ya?
To: "RBauer" <RBauer@perkinscoie.com>,
sshimshak@paulweiss.com,
cspada@lswlaw.com,
"msmith" <msmith@svlaw.com>,
"bginsberg"
<bginsberg@pattonboggs.com>,
"gregory.craig"
<gregory.craig@skadden.com>,
"pm" <pm@pm.gc.ca>,
"bob.paulson"
<bob.paulson@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>,
"bob.rae"
<bob.rae@rogers.blackberry.net
"leader"
<leader@greenparty.ca>
Cc:
alevine@cooley.com,
"David Amos" <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com>
michael.rothfeld@wsj.com,
remery@ecbalaw.com
Date:
Saturday, November 17, 2012, 10:10 AM
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> http://online.wsj.com/article/
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---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com>
>
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2009 17:50:17 -0300
> Subject: Fwd: Re :USANYS-MADOFF
AND IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US
> ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SDNY
> To: chad.bray@dowjones.com
>
>
---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: "Olsen, Wendy (USANYS)"
<Wendy.Olsen@usdoj.gov>
>
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2009 09:21:08 -0400
> Subject: RE: USANYS-MADOFF AND
IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US
> ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SDNY
> To: David
Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com>
> <USANYS.MADOFF@usdoj.gov>,
"Litt, Marc (USANYS)" <Marc.Litt@usdoj.gov>
>
Cc: webo <webo@xplornet.com>,
vasilescua@sec.gov,
friedmani@sec.gov,
>
krishnamurthyp@sec.gov
>
>
Thank you for your response.
>
> Wendy Olsen
> Victim Witness
Coordinator
---------- Original message ----------
From: David Amos
<motomaniac333@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017 17:26:22 -0400
Subject: My calls to the
Office of the Boston Police Commissioner William B. Evans
To: internalaffairs@pd.boston.gov,
mediarelations@pd.boston.gov
Cc:
David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com>
<dean.buzza@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>,
washington field
<washington.field@ic.fbi.gov>
---------- Original message ----------
From: Póstur IRR
<postur@irr.is>
Date:
Mon, 18 Dec 2017 21:10:30 +0000
Subject: Re: Re My calls about my
conversation with your partner Alan
Reisch minutes ago
To: David Amos
<motomaniac333@gmail.com>
Þessu
pósthólfi hefur verið lokað
Þar sem innanríkisráðuneytinu hefur nú verið
skipt í tvö ný ráðuneyti hefur
netföngum verið breytt:
- Vegna erinda til
dómsmálaráðuneytis sendið póst á postur@dmr.is
- Vegna
erinda til samgöngu- og sveitarstjórnarráðuneytis sendið póst á
postur@srn.is
This
e-mail is out of orderAs two new Government ministries commenced
operation on 1 May 2017 ? the
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of
Transport and Local Government ?
which took the place of
the Ministry of the Interior the e-mail addresses
have changed:
- For
requests to the Ministry of Justice - use postur@dmr.is
- For
requests to the Ministry of Transport and Local Government - use
postur@srn.is
---------- Original message ----------
From: David Amos <motomaniac333@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017
17:06:09 -0400
Subject: Re My calls about my conversation with your partner
Alan Reisch minutes ago
To: mfantozzi@goulstonstorrs.com,
bgreen@goulstonstorrs.com
Cc:
David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com>
Kandalaw@mindspring.com,
Paul.Harpelle@gnb.ca,
Wendy.Olsen@usdoj.gov,
postur
<postur@irr.is>
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David Amos
<motomaniac333@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017
16:24:55 -0400
Subject: Fwd: A little Deja Vu for Susan Kantrowitz and her
associates
To: jason_turesky@wgbh.org,
phillip_martin@wgbh.org,
edgar_herwick@wgbh.org,
phil_redo@wgbh.org,
marilyn_schairer@wgbh.org,
Stephanie.malin@cbp.dhs.gov,
dante.ramos@globe.com,
d.medwed@northeastern.edu,
phillips@globe.com
Cc:
David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com>
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
Beat
the Press: No Names
630 views
WGBH News
Published on Dec 15, 2017
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David Amos
<motomaniac333@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017
16:10:23 -0400
Subject: Fwd: A little Deja Vu for Susan Kantrowitz and her
associates
To: wgbhnews@wgbh.org
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David Amos <motomaniac333@gmail.com> Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2017 15:51:40 -0400 Subject: A little Deja Vu for Susan Kantrowitz and her associates To: frontline@wgbh.org, web <web@wcvb.com>, "Marc.Litt" <Marc.Litt@bakermckenzie.com>, "PETER.MACKAY" <PETER.MACKAY@bakermckenzie. Joel.Garland@ci.irs.gov, "Boston.Mail" <Boston.Mail@ic.fbi.gov>, jtodd@toddweld.com, hcooper@toddweld.com Cc: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> ---------- Original message ---------- From: David Amos david.raymond.amos@gmail.com Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2009 15:28:20 -0300 Subject: RE: THE WARNING Perhaps you should review my documents and Frontline's response to me then mention my name to your boss Michael Sullivan? To: diane_buxton@wgbh.org, Michael_Kirk@wgbh.org, lenbracken@hotmail.com, frontline@wgbh.org, Barry Winters sunrayzulu@shaw.ca, vanlop1@parl.gc.ca, coderd@parl.gc.ca>, Brookes.Merritt@assembly.ab.ca producer@onsecondthought.tv, danddbroadcasting@gmail.com, press@scsdma.org, info@scsdma.org, info@cabralforsheriff.com, info@ashcroftgroupllc.com, rfowlo@comcast.net, Dean.Buzza@rcmp-grc.gc.ca Cc: Michael_Sullivan@wgbh.org, Jim_Gilmore@wgbh.org, jgilmore@kirkdocumentary.com, Mike_Wiser@wgbh.org, foreigneditor@independent.co. foreign@stockmarket.gov.ua, danf@danf.net, jacques.poitras@cbc.ca, Edith.Cody-Rice@cbc.ca, mcknight.Gisele@dailygleaner. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2009 11:18:06 -0300 Subject: Fwd: USANYS-MADOFF AND IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US ATTORNEY'S SDNY To: diane_buxton@wgbh.org Cc: postur <postur@fjr.stjr.is> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2009 13:48:28 -0300 Subject: RE: USANYS-MADOFF AND IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US ATTORNEY'S SDNY To: Marc.Litt@usdoj.gov, NesterJ@sec.gov, USANYS.MADOFF@usdoj.gov, Ministere-Finances@fi.etat.lu, Wendy.Olsen@usdoj.gov, vasilescua@sec.gov, friedmani@sec.gov, krishnamurthyp@sec.gov, "graham@grahamsteele.ca" <graham@grahamsteele.ca>, "jonathan.dean" <jonathan.dean@ producer@onsecondthought.tv, dr_taitz@yahoo.com, drbilldeagle@earthlink.net Cc: oig@sec.gov, william.zabel@srz.com, dsheehan@bakerlaw.com, mhirchfield@bakerlaw.com, ddexter@ns.sympatico.ca, "t.j.burke@gnb.ca" <t.j.burke@gnb.ca>, "rick.hancox" <rick.hancox@nbsc-cvmnb.ca>, "Fred. Pretorius" <Fred.Pretorius@gov.yk.ca>, "Dean.Buzza" <Dean.Buzza@rcmp-grc.gc.ca>, vanlop1 <vanlop1@parl.gc.ca>, jwestbrook1@bloomberg.net, nathan.olivarezgiles@latimes. sherine.elmadany@latimes.com, sbodoni@bloomberg.net, "Andrew. Krystal" <Andrew.Krystal@rci.rogers.com <injusticecoalition@hotmail. <oldmaison@yahoo.com> What kind of strange game is the US Justice Dept and the SEC playing with me now Mr Litt? Rest assured I won't play it and many people know that I never would Even though the corporate media won't talk about my concerns about your actions, others certainly do. Here is just one example that still exists on the net. Even though Danny Boy Fitzgerald hates this mean old Maritimer, at least understands the meaning of the term Integrity and detests you people more. I am merely wondering how much longer his blog will exist. You know why EH T.J. Burke? http://qslspolitics.blogspot. You dudes know as well as I that my concerns are far greater that mere matters of money and Bernie Madoff. Perhaps you should talk to your associates in the RCMP and the INTERPOL ASAP Clearly I am trying hard to make the whole world know about my concerns about the Feds' severe lack of integrity EH H. David Kotz? Veritas Vincit David Raymond Amos ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: USANYS-MADOFF <USANYS.MADOFF@usdoj.gov> Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2009 10:40:12 -0400 Subject: RE: USANYS-MADOFF AND IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SDNY To: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> -----Original Message----- From: Olsen, Wendy (USANYS) Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2009 9:21 AM To: David Amos; USANYS-MADOFF; Litt, Marc (USANYS) Cc: webo; vasilescua@sec.gov; friedmani@sec.gov; krishnamurthyp@sec.gov Subject: RE: USANYS-MADOFF AND IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SDNY Thank you for your response. Wendy Olsen Victim Witness Coordinator -----Original Message----- From: David Amos [mailto:david.raymond.amos@ Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2009 8:48 AM To: USANYS-MADOFF; Olsen, Wendy (USANYS); Litt, Marc (USANYS) Cc: webo; vasilescua@sec.gov; friedmani@sec.gov; krishnamurthyp@sec.gov Subject: RE: USANYS-MADOFF AND IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SDNY Ms Olsen Thank you for keeping me informed. Yes unseal all my emails with all their attachments immediately and make certain that the US Attorny's office finally practices full disclosurement as to who I am and what my concerns are as per the Rule of Law within a purported democracy. As you folks all well know I am not a shy man and I have done nothing wrong. It appears to me that bureacratic people only use the right to privacy of others when it suits their malicious ends in order to protect their butts from impreacment, litigation and prosecution. The people in the US Attorney's Office and the SEC etc are very well aware that I protested immediately to everyone I could think of when the instant I knew that my correspondences went under seal and Madoff pled guilty so quickly and yet another cover up involing my actions was under full steam. Everybody knows that.the US Government has been trying to keep my concerns about the rampant public corruption a secret for well over seven long years. However now that a lot of poeple and their countries in general are losing a lot of money people are beginning to remember just exactly who I am and what i did beginning over seven years ago.. Veritas Vincit David Raymond Amos 506 756 8687 P.S. For the record Obviously I pounced on these Yankee bastards as soon as the newsrag in Boston published this article on the web last night. http://www.bostonherald.com/ ormat=&page=2&listingType=biz# Notice that Nester just like everyone else would not say my name? It is because my issues surrounding both Madoff and are NOT marketing timing They are as you all well know money laundering, fraud, forgery, perjury, securites fraud, tax fraud, Bank fraud, illegal wiretappping and Murder amongst other very serious crimes. "SEC spokesman John Nester dismissed similarities between Markopolos and Scannell's cases as "not a valid comparison." He said the SEC determined the market-timing by Putnam clients that Scannell reported didn't violate federal law. Nester said the SEC only acted after another tipster alleged undisclosed market-timing by some Putnam insiders. Scannell, now a crusader for SEC reforms, isn't surprised the agency is in hot water again. Noting that several top SEC officials have gone on to high-paying private-sector jobs, he believes hopes for future employment impact investigations. "It's a distinct disadvantage to make waves before you enter the private sector," Scannell said." --- On Mon, 3/30/09, David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> wrote: From: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> Subject: Fwd: USANYS-MADOFF IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SDNY To: NesterJ@sec.gov, letterstoeditor@bostonherald. <oig@sec.gov>, Thunter@tribune.com, david@davidmyles.com, ddexter@ns.sympatico.ca, "Dan Fitzgerald" <danf@danf.net> Cc: dsheehan@bakerlaw.com, dspelfogel@bakerlaw.com, mc@whistleblowers.org, gkachroo@mccarter.com, david.straube@accenture.com, gurdip.s.sahota@accenture.com, benjamin_mcmurray@ao.uscourts. Date: Monday, March 30, 2009, 10:00 PM Need I say BULLSHIT? http://www.bostonherald.com/ ormat=&page=2&listingType=biz# ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2009 00:03:13 -0300 Subject: RE: USANYS-MADOFF IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SDNY To: Russ.Stanton@latimes.com, meredith.goodman@latimes.com, ninkster@navigantconsulting. Cc: firstselectmanffld@town. editor@whatsupfairfield.com, info@csiworld.org, jacques_poitras <jacques_poitras@cbc.ca> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2009 23:40:55 -0300 Subject: Fwd: USANYS-MADOFF FW: IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SDNY To: gmacnamara@town.fairfield.ct. "Paul. Harpelle" <Paul.Harpelle@gnb.ca>, Jason Keenan <jason.keenan@icann.org>, Kandalaw <Kandalaw@mindspring.com> Cc: info@grahamdefense.org, fbinhct@leo.gov From: "Peck,Dave" <DPeck@town.fairfield.ct.us> Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2009 22:32:32 -0400 Subject: Out of Office AutoReply: USANYS-MADOFF FW: IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SDNY To: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> I will be unavailable until 4/1/09. Deputy Chief MacNamara will be in charge while I am away. He can be reached at 254-4831 or email him at gmacnamara@town.fairfield.ct. I will not be checking emails or cell phone messages. Thank you, Chief Dave Peck ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2009 23:32:18 -0300 Subject: Fwd: USANYS-MADOFF FW: IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SDNY To: dpeck@town.fairfield.ct.us, edit@ctpost.com, bresee@courant.com ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2009 23:19:35 -0300 Subject: RE: USANYS-MADOFF FW: IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SDNY To: dtnews@telegraph.co.uk -----Original Message----- From: USANYS-MADOFF Sent: Saturday, March 28, 2009 3:06 PM To: DAVID.RAYMOND.AMOS@GMAIL.COM Subject: IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SDNY In United States v. Bernard L. Madoff, 09 Cr. 213 (DC), the Court received a request from NBC and ABC to unseal all correspondence from victims that has been submitted in connection with the case. This includes your email to the Government. If the correspondence from victims is unsealed, the victim's personal identifying information including name, address, telephone number and email address (to the extent it was included on the correspondence) will become public. The Government must submit a response to the request by NBC and ABC by Tuesday, March 31, 2009. Please let us know whether you consent to the full disclosure of your correspondence, or whether you wish to have your correspondence remain sealed for privacy or other reasons. If you wish to have your correspondence remain sealed, please let us know the reason. We will defend your privacy to the extent that we can. Thank you. I looks like the US attorney in New York finally has to unseal my emails that you dudes have been sitting on for quite some time for no reason I will ever understand other than you are just a bunch of chickenshits. I know NBC, ABC, your blogger buddies or any other media wacko will never say my name but the pissed off folks that lost a lot of money with Bernie Baby just may ask how the hell I am EH? Veritas Vincit David Raymond Amos ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2009 15:48:50 -0300 Subject: Fwd: Trust that whatever covert deal that Bernie Madoff and KPMG etc may make with the Feds they are not fooling mean old me To: Marc.Litt@usdoj.gov ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Amos <david.raymond.amos@gmail.com> Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2009 15:29:42 -0300 Subject: Fwd: Trust that whatever covert deal that Bernie Madoff and KPMG etc may make with the Feds they are not fooling mean old me To: PChavkin@mintz.com Cc: webo <webo@xplornet.com> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: "Olsen, Wendy (USANYS)" <Wendy.Olsen@usdoj.gov> Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2009 19:08:04 -0400 Subject: RE: Trust that whatever covert deal that Bernie Madoff and KPMG etc may make with the Feds they are not fooling mean old me To: david.raymond.amos@gmail.com On March 10, 2009, the Honorable Denny Chin provided the following guidance for victims who wish to be heard at the plea proceeding on March 12, 2009 at 10:00 a.m.: Judge Chin stated that there are two issues that the Court will consider at the hearing: (1) whether to accept a guilty plea from the defendant to the eleven-count Criminal Information filed by the Government, which provides for a maximum sentence of 150 years' imprisonment; and (2) whether the defendant should be remanded or released on conditions of bail, if the Court accepts a guilty plea. Judge Chin also stated that, at the hearing on March 12, 2009, he will conduct a plea allocution of the defendant and then will announce whether the Court intends to accept the plea. At that time, the Court will solicit speakers who disagree with the Court's intended ruling. Assuming the defendant pleads guilty and his plea is accepted by the Court, the Court intends to allow the Government and defense counsel to speak on the issue of bail. The Court will then announce its intended ruling on that issue. The Court will then invite individuals who disagree with the proposed ruling on bail to be heard. The Court noted that there will be opportunity for victims to be heard in the future on the subjects of sentencing, forfeiture and restitution in advance of any sentencing of the defendant. The Court also noted that it is not appropriate for victims who wish to speak concerning sentencing issues to be heard at the March 12, 2009 proceeding. A link to the a transcript of the March 10, 2009 Court hearing can be found on the website of the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York: http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys -----Original Message----- From: Olsen, Wendy (USANYS) Sent: Monday, March 09, 2009 10:56 AM To: usanys.madoff@usdoj.gov Subject: FW: Trust that whatever covert deal that Bernie Madoff and KPMG etc may make with the Feds they are not fooling mean old me -----Original Message----- From: David Amos [mailto:david.raymond.amos@ Sent: Friday, March 06, 2009 12:58 PM To: horwitzd@dicksteinshapiro.com; Nardoza, Robert (USANYE); USAMA-Media (USAMA); Olsen, Wendy (USANYS) Cc: oig Subject: Trust that whatever covert deal that Bernie Madoff and KPMG etc may make with the Feds they are not fooling mean old me horwitzd@dicksteinshapiro.com ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: "Sartory, Thomas J." <TSartory@goulstonstorrs.com> Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2009 07:41:20 -0500 Subject: RE: I did talk the lawyers Golub and Flumenbaum tried to discuss Bernie Madoff and KPMG etc before sending these emails To: david.raymond.amos@gmail.com Dear Mr. Amos, I am General Counsel at Goulston & Storrs. Your email below to Messers. Rosensweig and Reisch has been forwarded to me for response. While it's not clear what type of assistance, if any, you seek from Goulston % Storrs, please be advised that we are not in a position to help you. Please do not send further communications to any of our attorneys. We will not be able to respond, and your communications will not be protected by the attorney-client privilege. We wish you well in the pursuit of your concerns. Sincerely, Thomas J. Sartory -----Original Message----- From: David Amos [mailto: Sent: Wednesday, March 04, 2009 8:18 PM To: Rosensweig, Richard J.; info@LAtaxlawyers.com; Reisch, Alan M.; reed@hbsslaw.com Subject: Fwd: I did talk the lawyers Golub and Flumenbaum tried to discuss Bernie Madoff and KPMG etc before sending these emails |
Perhaps somebody should call me back now. EH? (902 800 0369) |
Fund Fees Denounced; Mutual Fund Whistleblower Tells of Beating
By The Associated Press
WASHINGTON (AP) -- A whistleblower was dragged from his car and beaten with a brick after confronting an investment-company superior about trading abuses in mutual funds, Peter Scannell told Congress Tuesday.
His complaint about abuses was brushed aside by federal regulators but eventually helped lead to civil fraud charges against fund giant Putnam Investments.
At the hearing where he testified on Tuesday, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer and Sen. Peter Fitzgerald, R-Ill., the head of a Senate panel, denounced what they called hidden and excessive fees that gouge millions of mutual fund investors. Spitzer also said it is unfair that mutual funds charge ordinary shareholders much higher fees than pension funds and other big investors.
Fitzgerald called the fund industry "the world's largest skimming operation ... a trough from which fund managers, brokers and other insiders are steadily siphoning off an excessive slice of the nation's household, college and retirement savings."
Putnam, meanwhile, announced that it would cut fees paid by shareholders and provide investors more information on fees and fund managers' compensation. The company, which has lost billions of dollars from investors since being charged by state and federal authorities -- knocking it from the fifth-largest to the sixth-largest mutual fund concern -- said its move was not prompted by pressure from the regulators.
Besides Boston-based Putnam, a growing number of other fund companies and executives have been accused by state regulators and the Securities and Exchange Commission of improper trading and the defrauding of investors.
The SEC has proposed new rules, and the Senate is weighing legislation to overhaul the $7 trillion mutual fund industry, following overwhelming House passage of such a measure in November.
Scannell said he met with hostility and a veiled threat from the Putnam manager and disinterest from investigators in the SEC's Boston office early last year. It took seven exchanges with his lawyer before the SEC staff met with him, for about an hour and a half, he testified at the hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee.
I "could not believe that the SEC was not acting on what I believed any reasonable regulator would consider being compelling evidence," Scannell said.
He later got a hearing from the office of Massachusetts' secretary of state, which acted on his disclosures.
In a partial settlement with the SEC in November, Putnam agreed to changes -- some of which the company had already begun to implement -- and a process for investors who were harmed to recoup losses. Putnam had already pledged to make restitution. The company neither admitted to nor denied wrongdoing in the accord.
In the Putnam case, participants in the Boilermakers union's retirement fund were accused of engaging in market-timing trades in the mutual funds, quick in-and-out trading to exploit price changes.
Scannell, who worked at a Putnam call center outside Boston, said the time between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. was called "boilermaker hour" because of the group's aggressive trading.
He said he was assaulted in February 2003, a few days after confronting his supervisor, by a large man in a sweat shirt with "Boilermakers Local 5" written across the chest. The man referred to Scannell's working at Putnam and ordered him to shut up, he testified.
Representatives of the union didn't immediately return a telephone call seeking comment Tuesday.
Scannell said he met with hostility and a veiled threat from the Putnam manager and disinterest from investigators in the SEC's Boston office early last year. It took seven exchanges with his lawyer before the SEC staff met with him, for about an hour and a half, he testified at the hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee.
He said he "could not believe that the SEC was not acting on what I believed any reasonable regulator would consider being compelling evidence."
Scannell said he later got a hearing from the office of Massachusetts' secretary of state, which acted on his disclosures.
In a partial settlement with the SEC in November, Putnam agreed to changes and a process for investors who were harmed to recoup losses.
The Watchdog, the Whistle-blower, & the Making of a $7Trillion Scandal
Nestor sat down with the whistleblower in Collora's office near South Station on Thursday morning, September 11. The man's name was Peter Scannell, and before joining Putnam he had waited tables in the North End.
The temptations of the restaurant business had threatened his recovery from alcoholism, so he'd gotten a job processing orders for mutual fund shares in a facility Putnam operates in a nondescript Norwood office park.
Soon after settling into his cubicle, Scannell told Nestor, he'd become troubled by the orders from union members-including those of the Boilermakers Local No. 5 in Floral Park, New York-that flooded the call center in the late afternoons. The trades seemed to reflect a practice known as market timing: When U.S. stocks surged, the boilermakers bought into funds composed of foreign companies-which had finished trading-before prices for those funds were set at 4 p.m. They were betting that the international markets would follow Wall Street's trajectory the next day, scoring them a quick profit.
Although market timing is legal, it can erode the gains of long-term investors. Putnam, like most mutual fund firms, has internal policies meant to prevent it. Yet Scannell told Nestor that his bosses had dismissed the concerns he raised about the practice. On January 30, 2002, he informed a supervisor he would no longer accept orders from market timers. Two days later, he attended his Sunday night Alcoholics Anonymous meeting at a church in Quincy. He arrived early and waited in his Volvo, sleet from a winter storm pinging off the hood. Suddenly, according to a report Scannell filed with police, a large, bearded man in a Yankees cap and “Boilermakers Local 5” sweatshirt emerged from the darkness, dragged him out of the car, and beat him over the head with a brick.
Undeterred, Scannell marched into the Boston office of the Securities and Exchange Commission last April. Five months went by. The agency didn't act on his tip. So here he was, turning his allegations over to Nestor. And, yes, he said: He had documents that backed up his claims.
Nestor exudes restless energy, and has a habit of drumming his fingers during conversation. He listens with equal intensity. While Scannell talked-and talked-Nestor paid attention both to what he said and how he said it. “He wasn't nervous. He wasn't agitated,” says Nestor. “I knew he was right.”
By the time the interview was over, nearly four hours had passed. Nestor thanked Scannell and headed back to his office in the McCormack Building on Beacon Hill. His investigators had already spent the previous six months checking into allegedly deceptive mutual fund sales pitches at Morgan Stanley. They'd just opened a file on improper fund trading at Prudential Securities. Now they were about to add a case against Putnam, the country's fifth-largest mutual fund firm and, after Fidelity, the second biggest in Boston. It was already starting to sink in with Nestor: This would be a blockbuster. On the walk back, he turned to his chief of enforcement, Bryan Lantagne, who'd sat in on the meeting with Scannell.
“Holy shit,” he said. When he got back to his desk, he called his boss, Bill Galvin. Before the day was out, one of the biggest legal cases in the history of the $7 trillion mutual fund industry was under way.
You can be forgiven-even if you are one of the 95 million people who invest in mutual funds-for having paid little attention to the industry until the ongoing rash of misdeeds hit the papers. Mutual funds, after all, are designed to be boring, and for most of their 80-year history they've served that purpose with aplomb. The first mutual fund, Massachusetts Investors Trust (now MFS Investment Management), was established in Boston on March 21, 1924, by three brokers looking to minimize risk, maximize returns, and diversify their holdings at a time when a single share of General Electric cost more than $230. The concept gained popularity after early funds weathered the Great Depression better than individual stocks, rode the post-World War II boom into the mainstream, and through it all remained an enterprise as punctilious as its hometown.
The seeds of the scandal that has rippled through the industry and now reached MFS itself (which also allegedly practiced market timing) were not sown until the boom years of the 1990s. While retail banks slashed savings account rates, skyrocketing tech stocks lured new investors to Wall Street, prompting families who wanted both a piece of the rally and an incubator for their nest eggs to stash their money in mutual funds. Over the past decade, the industry has nearly quadrupled in size; today, roughly 8,300 funds manage $7 trillion for investors. And along the way, the business has become less George Bailey, more Gordon Gekko. “What happened is that a small, somewhat staid industry grew into a very large industry, and the aggressive trading common on Wall Street started to be applied in mutual fund firms,” says John Sten, a Greenberg, Traurig attorney who heads the local chapter of the SEC Historical Society. “As more and more people became more and more sophisticated, they were going to take advantage of the loopholes.”
While mutual funds were changing, so too was their watchdog in Boston, which, with $900 billion in assets under management, remains the industry's hub. By a quirk of the Massachusetts constitution, responsibility for enforcing the state's securities laws falls not to the attorney general, as is typically the case, but to the secretary of the Commonwealth, a position otherwise charged with such duties as certifying voting returns and giving tours of the State House. Galvin, however, has devoted the backroom savvy, penchant for publicity, and taste for ruthlessness that marked his 16 years in the legislature-where he earned the nickname “Prince of Darkness”-to transforming the post into a platform for raising broad policy issues and, while he's at it, his own profile.
Since winning the office in 1994, Galvin has made bold and occasionally creative use of its powers. While filling in for a vacationing Paul Cellucci five years ago, the conservative Democrat used his time as acting governor to file an emergency bill meant to coerce HMOs into providing prescription drug coverage to older patients. He has gone after predatory mortgage companies and what he described as “unconscionably excessive” milk prices, and when Mitt Romney released only an online version of his 2004 budget proposal as a cost-saving measure, Galvin created an innovative new revenue source-he printed paper copies, bound them, and sold them at the State House bookstore (another operation under his purview) for $15. Throughout his two terms, Galvin has instilled the same proactive approach in his Securities Division. The revamped agency led the national crackdown on day-trading shops that lured clients with misleading promises of huge incomes, landing Galvin an appearance on 60 Minutes. It later played a vital role in New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's probe of Wall Street analysts by building the fraud charges against Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB).
When the Securities Division got a tip from a Morgan Stanley employee last March-the company was allegedly using a high-pressure sales contest to push in-house mutual funds on unsuspecting customers-Galvin was handed an opportunity for which he was ideally suited. “For many people, if not most, mutual funds are the bank of necessity. That being the case, our office has a greater responsibility,” he says. But it wasn't until Putnam stumbled into his sights that Galvin got the information he needed to turn what could have been a series of dreary regulatory inquiries into a stirring populist crusade.
After Nestor told Galvin what he'd learned about Putnam, he and his deputies raced to draft a subpoena demanding records from the firm. A clerk hand-delivered it to the company's sleek Post Office Square high-rise that same afternoon.
The Securities Division operates on a budget of $2 million and with a staff of just 29. During the CSFB case, Nestor had to hire a team of law students to sift through the 500,000 company e-mails the agency collected in search of proof that the firm's stock analysts maintained “buy” ratings on certain companies-specifically, companies doing business with CSFB's investment banking arm-even though they knew those shares were tanking. Because Scannell told Nestor exactly where to look, the Putnam documents required far less spadework. Nestor nonetheless instructed his staff to maintain a tight line of inquiry. “If you investigate everything, you wind up litigating nothing,” he says. “We regularly meet and ask 'Where are you going with this?' The person handling the case can't make that decision. They're too invested.”
What Nestor's investigators needed was confirmation that the boilermakers had indeed been market timing in violation of Putnam's prospectus. They determined that in the last three years, at least 28 of the union's members made between 150 and 500 trades, scoring gains of up to $1 million each. The investigators also zeroed in on two e-mails from the firm's internal monitors: It appeared they'd been aware of the troublesome activity since the spring of 2000. Putnam had failed to stop transactions its own prospectus purported to ban.
During his time as a state representative, Galvin had an office on the same floor as the State House bureau of the Boston Globe. Political insiders still marvel at how adroitly he works the press. On October 21 of last year, the Globe, citing “two people involved in the investigation,” reported that the Securities Division was close to filing a complaint against Putnam. The company, responding to the leak, insisted market timing within its funds was “minimal.” Galvin pounced. “We are very troubled by what we see, and their attitude is not helpful,” he told the Globe the next day. “They're still trying to mitigate instead of acknowledge what they've done.”
As Galvin smacked Putnam in the papers, his deputies were preparing the final element of their case. They knew the market timing was concentrated in Putnam's foreign equities funds. Now they wanted the trading records of the executives who oversaw those units.
Putnam shuns the celebrity-stock-picker system that made Peter Lynch a household name during his tenure at Fidelity; during the mid 1990s, this top-down approach enabled the firm to outperform its crosstown rival. But any portfolio manager who posts a 93 percent gain, as Putnam international investment chiefs Omid Kamshad and Justin Scott did with International Voyager in 1999 (a year in which they more than doubled the value of another fund), is going to attain star status. At the height of the dotcom rally, Kamshad and Scott each earned more than $10 million a year. After Putnam, weighed down by an overreliance on those now- plummeting tech stocks, started to sputter in 2000, their group emerged as one of the firm's few bright spots.
As it happened, between 1998 and 2000, Kamshad and Scott were also allegedly using their personal accounts to make short-term trades in the funds under their care. (Lawyers for both men declined to comment for this story.) One of Kamshad's trades netted a profit of $79,000, according to Putnam trading records-for him, about a month's pay. “One of the great ironies of this,” says Joseph Franco, a professor at Suffolk University Law School, “is that they put their reputations at risk for what was really just chump change.”
Putnam warned the managers in 2000 to stop their inappropriate trading, but it allegedly neither disciplined them nor ordered them to return the profits. Now the firm had received a new subpoena from Nestor pertaining to those very records. Rather than wait for the Securities Division to discover its indiscretions, Putnam forced Kamshad and Scott, along with four other employees accused of similar transgressions, to leave the firm, then launched what would prove an ineffective attempt at damage control.
On Thursday, October 23, before it had answered Galvin's subpoenas, Putnam voluntarily went to the Globe with its side of the story. The disclosure succeeded only in provoking Galvin to faster action. “The trigger for me was that they'd left these people in charge of pilfering their own fund,” says Galvin. “Once those facts were confirmed to our satisfaction, I called Stephen Cutler, director of enforcement at the SEC,” which had by then launched its own probe of the company. “I told him, 'We're going to file. If you'd like to join us, you could do so now.'” They agreed to separately charge Putnam the following Tuesday.
On the evening of Sunday, November 2-three days after the Massachusetts pension board pulled $1.8 billion out of Putnam, sparking an exodus by other states-several of the firm's senior officers huddled at the Four Seasons with board members of its parent company, Marsh & McLennan. They decided to ask Putnam's autocratic CEO, Lawrence Lasser, to step down. Next to fall was Juan Marcelino, head of the SEC's Boston bureau. The aftershocks had only just begun.
For months, the Securities Divi-sion had been putting in late nights and working weekends; one investigator's desk was so blanketed with papers, it resembled a snow fort. The grueling pace continued. In its investigation of Prudential's Boston office, which resulted in charges filed last month, the state had uncovered an apparent market-timing scheme carried out by the brokerage, two hedge funds, and wholesalers from several mutual funds. As in the Putnam case, Nestor tapped his best writer, Gina Gombar, to coauthor the complaint; the final document reads like an indictment of the mutual fund industry itself. Although the division had already taken legal action against Morgan Stanley for its mutual fund sales contest, it also sought individual sanctions against the manager of the firm's defunct Back Bay office, who in his zeal to win ran his operation like a cross between boot camp and a frat house. Between strategy sessions with Nestor, Galvin jetted to congressional hearings in Washington, where he joined Spitzer-who was in the midst of his own splashy mutual fund cases-in demanding sweeping reforms.
Meanwhile, Putnam and the SEC were working to hammer out a deal. Soon after the departures of Lasser and Marce-lino, the organizations worked out a partial settlement of the fraud charges against the firm. The agreement required Putnam to reimburse investors harmed by its employees' market-timing trades, institute tough-er safeguards, and pay a civil penalty. “The way we look at it, we got everything we wanted,” says Peter Bresnan, interim head of the SEC's Boston office, who emphasizes that the agency is still investigating Putnam. “We thought it was important to move quickly because we wanted to give shareholders restitution as soon as possible-the order provides that it's going to be paid within 195 days. We preferred not to argue it out in court for a year, so the problem gets fixed now.”
Around 7:30 on the evening of November 12, the SEC called Nestor at his home in Reading and informed him it was about to announce a deal with Putnam. Did the state want in? The news blind-sided Nestor. He conferred with Galvin, who wanted to know if the settlement included language indicating that Putnam acknowledged its wrongdoing. When Galvin learned it didn't, he gave Nestor his answer: “No. A firm no.”
The type of no-admit, no-deny settlement the SEC struck with Putnam is standard operating procedure for regulators; the Securities Division had agreed to such arrangements in other cases, including the CSFB probe. But the next day, Galvin blasted the federal regulators. “The SEC seems far more concerned about making nice with the industry than they are in protecting investors,” he told Bloomberg News. “It's the same old story: There's no admission of guilt, they're going to make some changes, and back out they go.” Galvin added that Putnam wasn't off the hook and threatened additional market-timing charges against it. Another “person involved in the investigation” fingered one potential target-Putnam's general counsel, William Woolverton-by name.
“These constant leaks of people and firms who are being subpoenaed casts a cloud before there's any finding, and that's not good law enforcement,” one highly placed critic responds angrily. “I think it's outrageous.” Appropriate or not, the disclosures kept Galvin's quarry under fire. As business columnists and lawmakers bashed the SEC and Putnam, the firm struggled to plug its leaky balance sheet. Despite a personal plea from Putnam's new CEO, Ed Haldeman, the influential California Public Employees Retirement System pulled its money out of the firm. So did pension boards in New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Iowa, and 401(k) administrators at Wal-Mart, Merck, and Revlon. When Putnam's troubles started, it was managing $277 billion. A month later, it had lost $32 billion, or a little less than the entire gross domestic product of Kuwait. The FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office in Boston are also reportedly looking into criminal charges against the firm.
Even before Putnam settled with the SEC, Galvin indicated he had no interest in a similar resolution of the case. Now he can't afford it politically. Putnam, for its part, has a powerful incentive for fighting any outcome that blames it for defrauding investors. “The reason defendants like to avoid declaring guilt is that it gives them the ability to argue in a civil case that they've never admitted they did anything wrong. Any time a defendant admits wrongdoing, it certainly helps private plaintiffs,” says Michael Pucillo, a partner in the Boston-based law firm of Berman, DeValerio, Pease, Tabacco, Burt & Pucillo, which has filed one of at least 23 class-action suits Putnam faces. Some observers worry that if Galvin squeezes Putnam long enough-a task at which he's already proven remarkably adept-the firm's 5,000 Massachusetts employees could suffer the same fate as their counterparts at Arthur Andersen, which imploded after a few of its accountants were implicated in the financial hocus-pocus at Enron. “I certainly think Galvin has taken an appropriate position going after these funds,” a prominent Democrat observes. “But I just wonder: What is the end game? How do you declare victory? In the number of headlines? By establishing policies where investors are better protected? Or is it driving a large Massachusetts employer out of business? I'm concerned you're going to see a very large company blown out of the water, and I don't know if that's in the best interest of our citizens.”
Sitting in a conference room tucked behind the State House bookstore-a room he has had specially outfitted for news conferences-Galvin says he's sensitive to the collateral economic damage his salvos on the mutual fund industry could cause. But he insists he's just doing his job. “Am I concerned? Of course I am. But if I were in charge of regulating the healthy sale of foods in Massachusetts, and a supermarket was selling rancid products, and I knew about it, I couldn't say, 'You know what? I don't want to see those cashiers put out of work, so I'd better let the store continue doing what it's doing,'” he says. “There are people of very high integrity working in the mutual fund industry, and it is capable of fixing its problems. But this industry will only survive in the long run if it operates within the principles of trust. You can't simply walk away.”
Meanwhile, up on the 17th floor of the McCormack Building, the search for the next damning document continues. Brown cardboard boxes stuffed with mutual fund records are stacked along the hallways, under desks, atop overburdened file cabinets-anywhere the Securities Division can find space. Several contain material collected in the unit's latest inquiry, an examination of mutual fund wholesalers, which began as an offshoot of its Prudential case. The wholesalers flog the funds to brokerages and other major buyers, and Nestor and Galvin think some may have tipped off those customers about the best ways to avoid their firms' market-timing detectors. If this theory proves correct, it would expose the industry to a whole new front of attack.
Nestor is still deciding whether to bring in another group of law students to dig through the material or to parcel the task out to regulators in other states, who are eager to help. He points to a box of evidence stowed in a makeshift storage area. It's still taped shut. “We haven't even cracked this one yet,” he says.Michael A. Collora, a founding member of Collora LLP, primarily practices in federal court and handles complex civil and criminal cases, as well as white-collar criminal defence. Mr. Collora has represented both plaintiffs and defendants in securities cases, including investigations by the SEC and state security offices. He has extensive experience in matters involving allegations of stock fraud, irregular accounting practices and insider trading. In addition, he has tried over 60 federal cases and recently won a state jury award of over $3 million for conversion of stolen art, including a famous Cezanne. He has been recognised by Chambers, and is listed in the International Who’s Who of Business Crime Defense Lawyers, 2013 and Best Lawyers in America.
Prior to founding Collora LLP, Mr. Collora served as an Assistant US Attorney for 7 years, heading the US Attorney’s Special Investigation Unit. He is a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers and the International Academy of Trial Lawyers.
Michael “A.” Collora (Col ’65 CM)
Michael A. Collora (Col ’65) will continue as a partner with Hogan Lovells in its Boston office following the firm's acquisition of Collora LLP, which formed in 1988 and grew to include 25 lawyers. Hogan Lovells is an international law firm based in Washington D.C.
Media: Press Releases | 15 June 2017
Hogan Lovells combines with Collora, adding Boston office
Strategically bolstering the firm’s life sciences capabilities throughout the Northeastern U.S. and globally.
BOSTON, 15 June 2017 – Global law firm Hogan Lovells announced today that it will combine with Collora, a Boston-based litigation/investigations firm with a strong focus in life sciences and healthcare, as well as financial services and technology. The combination is expected to become effective on 1 September, at which time all partners, lawyers, and business services members of Collora will join Hogan Lovells.
The addition of Collora enhances Hogan Lovells’ capabilities to serve clients in one of the most dynamic and growing markets in the US. Boston is home to global leaders in technology, life sciences, healthcare, and financial services. The area boasts elite academic and research institutions and world-class medical facilities. Economic development in the Boston metropolitan area is fuelled by an active financial services and investment community.
The new office will be focused on litigation and investigations with a particular emphasis on the life sciences and healthcare sectors; over time, Hogan Lovells expects to add regulatory, corporate transactions, and IP capabilities.
“The Boston region is a key strategic market in the United States. Although we have worked closely with clients in the area for years, it more recently became clear to us that there was a need for an office that had strong roots in the community,” said Hogan Lovells CEO Steve Immelt. “Collora is a firm that shares our values, our culture and our approach. We have worked with them for many clients over the years. It has highly regarded practices in litigation and investigations, with a particular focus in life sciences, which fits very well with our own practices. We also intend to focus on the financial services, technology industries and education sectors, where we already have strong practices in other markets. We are delighted to welcome the Collora team and look forward to working with them for the benefit of our clients.”
The combination provides Collora and its clients with access to a network of services and practitioners that seamlessly work to provide a cohesive client experience globally. Hogan Lovells is recognized as a global leader in life sciences and healthcare, with specialists in areas such as regulatory, intellectual property, transactions, and disputes. Together, the two firms have more than 500 lawyers practicing in the life sciences and healthcare industry.
Collora, which comprises 25 lawyers, including 15 partners, has several well-known trial advocates who represent both companies and individuals in government investigations, complex civil litigation, professional licensing and discipline matters and other litigation matters, with a particular focus on financial services, technology and the life sciences industry. The firm includes former federal and state prosecutors, judicial law clerks, law professors and a former chief justice of the Massachusetts Appeals Court.
“Hogan Lovells has a strong global reputation and offers us depth and reach that brings a new and exciting dimension to what we are able to offer our clients,” said Bill Lovett, currently the Managing Partner of Collora, and who will serve as the Office Managing Partner of the Hogan Lovells Boston office. “We looked very hard at making sure that the business and cultural fit would be right for us – for nearly thirty years our firm has been committed to serving our clients and contributing to our community. Based on many years of working together for some of the same clients, we know Hogan Lovells brings those qualities to the table across the entire firm. No other Boston firm has Hogan Lovells’ global reach. We look forward to making these skills available to our clients and to new Boston-area clients as well.”
Boston’s Collora and Hogan Lovells now open for business
Boston, 1 September 2017 – The combination between global law firm Hogan Lovells and Boston-based law firm Collora is now effective. The new Hogan Lovells office in downtown Boston comprises 28 lawyers and 16 business services staff.
“Our new team of lawyers in Boston is renowned for advising in complex litigation and investigations, particularly in the life sciences and financial services sectors,” said Hogan Lovells CEO Steve Immelt. “Their addition strategically bolsters our services to clients, many of whom are already part of Boston’s dynamic and growing market.”
“We are thrilled to be a part of Hogan Lovells’ global team and collaborate with lawyers in the firm’s other offices,” said Bill Lovett, the former managing partner of Collora, who is now the Office Managing Partner of the Hogan Lovells Boston office. “Our capability to offer global services in a wider array of practices is already extending our relationships with existing clients and establishing new opportunities both in and outside of the Boston area.”
According to Hogan Lovells, the Boston office offers its global, national, and regional clients exceptional resources to expand their business. The combination with Collora expands Hogan Lovells’ existing and very successful life sciences and healthcare practice, which has more than 500 lawyers worldwide, as well as its financial services practice. Boston area clients include global leaders in technology and life sciences, financial services, elite academic and research institutions, and world-class medical facilities.
About Hogan Lovells
Hogan Lovells is a leading global legal practice providing business-oriented legal advice and high-quality service across its exceptional breadth of practices to clients around the world.
“Hogan Lovells” or the “firm” is an international legal practice that includes Hogan Lovells US LLP and Hogan Lovells International LLP. For more information, see www.hoganlovells.com.
Bill J. Lovett
Partner
Boston
Email william.lovett@hoganlovells.com
Phone +1 617 371 1007
Fax +1 617 371 1037
Practice groupLitigation, Arbitration, and Employment
Bill Lovett brings over 20 years of experience representing clients in complex civil and criminal matters. An experienced trial lawyer, he focuses on a wide range of complex financial and regulatory issues that include representing clients in a variety of state and federal investigations and enforcement matters.
As an accountant and former federal prosecutor, Bill is well-positioned to provide timely and practical advice to clients whether it be in the boardroom or courtroom.
Bill represents a broad range of clients in connection with business disputes, complex state and federal tax matters, government enforcement matters, as well as state and federal licensing and regulatory matters. Clients include large corporations, executives, shareholders, and business owners in various regulated industries.
Prior to joining the firm, Bill was a federal prosecutor with the Department of Justice Tax Division, where he investigated and prosecuted financial crimes. Bill also served as a Special Assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia.
Representative experience
Represented licensed securities professional in connection with the government's criminal and civil enforcement actions in mutual fund market timing investigations.
https://www.chron.com/business/article/Putnam-whistle-blower-cites-threats-beating-with-1980432.php
Massachusetts Stiffs Putnam Whistle-Blower
He was the Putnam Investments employee in Boston who first blew the whistle on the industry market-timing scandal a few years ago. His action exposed, and helped end, a practice that was costing investors hundreds of millions of dollars.
For this, his own career in the finance industry was destroyed -- and he didn't get a dime. Scannell may have his last chance of changing that next week, when his lawyer will go before the appellate court in Massachusetts to press his claim for millions of dollars in reward money under the state's whistle-blower law.
This follows rebuffs from both the Massachusetts former attorney general, Tom Reilly, and a lower court.
"We're going to ask the appellate court to overturn the lower court's decision," says Scannell's attorney, Robert Autieri. "Statistically, not a lot of cases are overturned. We're realistic, but hopeful."
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Scannell should get his money. His treatment has been a disgrace, both to the law and to the mutual fund industry.
To recap: Scannell worked for Putnam Investments in a call center near Boston from 2000 to 2003. There he discovered that company employees, and some privileged clients in a local union, were being allowed to make short-term trades in mutual funds at the expense of long-term investors.
The practice, while arguably not illegal, was certainly unethical and was against the company's rules.
When Scannell approached managers with his concerns, they laughed at him. A few nights later he was assaulted in a parking lot by a union thug and hit over the head with a rock.
Scannell went to the local office of the
Securities and Exchange Commission
. They yawned and said they'd get back to him. He waited five months. They didn't.
Finally, in exasperation, in September 2003 he walked into the offices of Massachusetts Secretary of State Bill Galvin and spoke to his securities division chief, Matt Nestor. Galvin's office regulates the securities industry in the state.
Within hours, Nestor and Galvin had sent subpoenas to Putnam, which is a unit of
Marsh & McLennan
(MMC) - Get Report
, and soon followed those with action against other mutual fund companies.
Putnam eventually agreed to pay $193 million, including fines and restitution to investors, as a result of the market-timing scandals. A number of senior managers left the company. Investors have pulled tens of billions from Putnam in the wake of the scandal, and parent company Marsh & McLennan has agreed to sell Putnam to Canada's Power Financial for $3.9 billion"
Larry Lasser, the Putnam chief who merrily presided over this culture of corruption, walked away with tens of millions of dollars. Some of the fund managers fired in the scandal are now making millions more running hedge funds.
The mutual fund industry has enjoyed years of skyrocketing assets and profits, thanks to the bull market. And investors who had been ripped off by the scandal got hundreds of millions of dollars in restitution.
And Scannell?
"I'm writing a book, and I'm a stay-at-home dad," says Scannell. He's been shunned by the securities industry. "It cost me my career, it cost me and my family an enormous amount of stress. I got bashed over the head with a brick. I'm always looking over my shoulder."
Massachusetts has a law, passed in 2000, which says whistleblowers are entitled to up to 30% of the state fines resulting from a scandal they expose.
In the case of Putnam, those fines came to $50 million.
But Tom Reilly, who was Massachusetts' attorney general until a few months ago, refused to give Scannell a penny, on the grounds that he didn't submit the proper paperwork in the proper manner. A judge backed up Reilly. Martha Coakley, Reilly's successor, is so far taking the same line.
It's that position that Scannell and his lawyer are appealing on Tuesday. It's probably his last chance for justice.
What happens in court will say a lot.
Because this case isn't just about Peter Scannell. It's about encouraging future whistle-blowers to come forward, so we can expose scandals and protect investors.
That is, after all, the reason the law was passed.
I can positively guarantee you that right now, someone somewhere is stealing some of your savings. It's a 100% certainty. There are scandals, big and small, within public companies, public markets and investment firms all the time.
And there are people who know about them and are wondering whether to speak up. What happens in the Scannell case is going to influence them one way or another.
In keeping with TSC's editorial policy, Brett Arends doesn't own or short individual stocks. He also doesn't invest in hedge funds or other private investment partnerships. Arends takes a critical look inside mutual funds and the personal finance industry in a twice-weekly column that ranges from investment advice for the general reader to the industry's latest scoop. Prior to joining TheStreet.com in 2006, he worked for more than two years at the Boston Herald, where he revived the paper's well-known 'On State Street' finance column and was part of a team that won two SABEW awards in 2005. He had previously written for the Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail newspapers in London, the magazine Private Eye, and for Global Agenda, the official magazine of the World Economic Summit in Davos, Switzerland. Arends has also written a book on sports 'futures' betting.
https://www.metrowestdailynews.com/article/20070901/NEWS/309019942
Putnam whistleblower not entitled to part of settlement
By Denise LavoieBOSTON - A few days after Peter Scannell confronted his supervisor at Putnam Investments about trading abuses, he was dragged from his car and beaten with a brick by a man who ordered him to keep his mouth shut, according to his testimony before Congress.
A few days after Peter Scannell confronted his supervisor at Putnam Investments about trading abuses, he was dragged from his car and beaten with a brick by a man who ordered him to keep his mouth shut, according to his testimony before Congress.
Scannell believed he should receive a portion of the $193.5 million state and federal regulators later recovered in settlements with Putnam.
But on Friday, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts ruled that Scannell is not entitled to any money because he did not file a lawsuit against Putnam, as required under the state whistleblower law.
Scannell, who worked as a call center service representative and later as a broker for Putnam, testified before Congress during an investigation into improper trading by Putnam and other mutual fund companies.
The Weymouth man turned incriminating information over to Secretary of State William Galvin after the Securities and Exchange Commission failed to act on his complaint that Putnam was allowing some customers to engage in market-timing transactions despite a company policy prohibiting it.
Market timing, or quick in-and-out trading to exploit price movements, is not illegal, but the practice can be detrimental to long-term investors.
Based on Scannell’s information, Galvin investigated and filed an administrative complaint against Putnam. The SEC also filed a complaint in federal court.
Scannell later sued the state, claiming he is entitled under the Massachusetts False Claims Act to a percentage of the total amount recovered from Putnam.
In his lawsuit, Scannell claimed that as a result of his actions as a whistleblower, he suffered serious head injuries, endured emotional trauma and stress, and had a significant loss of income because he could no longer work in the securities industry.
But the Appeals Court, upholding a lower court decision dismissing Scannell’s lawsuit, said he is not entitled to a “bounty” because he failed to file a lawsuit against Putnam.
The Appeals Court said the intent of whistleblower laws is to encourage people to bring lawsuits for the common good while discouraging opportunistic lawsuits.
“These goals are promoted by the requirement that individuals seeking to recover a bounty must first file suit and be prepared to prosecute the action to conclusion,” the court said in its ruling.
Scannell’s attorney, Robert Autieri, said he is considering appealing the ruling to the state Supreme Judicial Court. Autieri said Scannell’s former attorneys never told him he had to file a lawsuit against Putnam in order to be entitled to a portion of any settlement.
“When you have somebody who comes forward and does all the right things for all the right reasons, but just didn’t file a piece of paper, it makes you wonder,” Autieri said.
Galvin declined to comment. Nancy Fisher, a spokeswoman for Putnam, also declined to comment.
Matthew Nestor, the former director of the Massachusetts Securities Division, declined comment, citing ethical restrictions in his current job as a district court judge.
But Nestor previously credited Scannell for his role in exposing trading abuses.
“This would not have started without him,” Nestor told USA Today in November 2003. “We owe him a debt of gratitude.”
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Nothing Constant at Fidelity but Change
Because lately the conservative, family-controlled Boston firm has seemed a little more like the old Chinese Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution, with Chairman Ned Johnson, 77, playing the mercurial, mysterious and all-powerful role of Chairman Mao.
Almost every other month, big shots mysteriously disappear, while others suddenly return from Outer Mongolia and are restored to favor.
The latest is Rodger Lawson. He's one of old guard who worked with Johnson back in the 80s. He was suddenly called back to the fold in July and given the role of president.
Lawson quickly unleashed a sweeping reorganization of the immense and byzantine firm, which employs more than 40,000 people and manages more than $1.3 trillion in assets.
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Yet the firm hasn't even settled down from the big revolution launched two years ago by Lawson's predecessor, Bob Reynolds. That time around, Reynolds and fellow firm veteran Stephen Jonas sought to turn around the struggling mutual-fund operation with broad changes in everything from the way fund managers were hired and promoted to the way Fidelity conducted its research.
Where are Reynolds and Jonas now? Gone.
Jonas quit suddenly in January.
Reynolds, who had been Chairman Ned's right hand man for years, left abruptly in April. That was less than a year after he had, bizarrely, angled publicly for the job of NFL commissioner.
The two men had been seen as possible successors to Chairman Ned in the inconceivable event that the old man, now 77, should ever die.
Long-time Fidelity watchers said their departure was great news for another rising star, 53-year old Ellyn McColgan, the head of Fidelity's brokerage business.
Johnson even encouraged the speculation by promoting McColgan when Reynolds left, broadening a role in which she answered only to him. fmagx
Three months later, she, too, was out, after Ned apparently reversed himself and effectively demoted her by bringing in Lawson from outside.
To lose two heirs-apparent might be considered a misfortune. To lose three begins to look like carelessness... or deliberate policy.
Above all hovers the $25 billion question: What becomes of Abby?
Fidelity has been run by a member of the Johnson dynasty since it was founded in the middle of the last century. But in recent years, questions have grown about whether Ned is willing to hand over the reins, in due course, to his eldest daughter and heir, 45-year-old Abigail, a senior executive at the firm.
Two years ago, in the summer of 2005, it didn't look good. He removed her as head of the mutual-fund business, shuffling her sideways instead to run the lower-profile employee services division.
And he brought in Stephen Jonas to turn around the division she had run for four years. (It was on Abby's watch that FMR had first fallen behind
Vanguard
and
American Funds
in stock and bond mutual fund assets.)
Shortly afterwards, Anne Crowley, Ned Johnson's spokesman, told me pointedly: "Neither Abby, nor Ned, has ever said that Abby is the heir apparent," Crowley said, adding, "It is not something she or Ned has ever stated."
Speculation about Abby rose further some months later, after she transferred some of the family's stock from her control back to her father's.
But if Abby's star were obviously waning two years ago, Ned's view today is very different. In January he promoted Abby to vice-chairman. Notably he also put another of his kids -- Edward IV -- on the seven-person board of directors.
Adding to the drama are reports that Abby, 45 and a mother of two, has more recently battled a major health issue. Fidelity declined to comment.
If all that seems confused, and confusing, you should see what's happened to Bob Stansky.
The manager of the giant
(FMAGX) - Get Report
Magellan fund was the most prominent scalp of the big shake-up launched by Bob Reynolds and Stephen Jonas in the mutual-fund business two years ago. He was dramatically ousted, after years of poor performance, shortly after Reynolds and Jonas took the reins.
Today? Jonas and Reynolds are gone and Fidelity is launching a new suite of team-managed funds, under the auspices of... Bob Stansky.
Johnson himself says he swears by the Japanese principle of "kaizen," or constant change. No kidding. But it remains to be seen if all the turmoil of the past few years is invigorating his many underlings, or just annoying them.
Mutual-fund sales continue to lag big rivals badly. Through the end of September, reports the Financial Research Corp., sales of stock and bond funds, net of redemptions, totalled just $4.1 billion.
The figure at Vanguard and American Funds? More than $50 billion each.
In keeping with TSC's editorial policy, Brett Arends doesn't own or short individual stocks. He also doesn't invest in hedge funds or other private investment partnerships. Arends takes a critical look inside mutual funds and the personal finance industry in a twice-weekly column that ranges from investment advice for the general reader to the industry's latest scoop. Prior to joining TheStreet.com in 2006, he worked for more than two years at the Boston Herald, where he revived the paper's well-known 'On State Street' finance column and was part of a team that won two SABEW awards in 2005. He had previously written for the Daily Telegraph and Daily Mail newspapers in London, the magazine Private Eye, and for Global Agenda, the official magazine of the World Economic Summit in Davos, Switzerland. Arends has also written a book on sports 'futures' betting.
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https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/jlbicksler031004.htm
MUTUAL FUND DEBACLE:
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS, FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS AND FIRST STEP GOVERNANCE REFORMS
James L. Bicksler
Rutgers University, School of Business
The Mutual Fund Industry: Historical Perspectives and Present Trends
An important function of financial markets is to channel savings from households into financial assets, such as common stocks and fixed income securities, to help individuals finance their future retirement, college expenditures, etc. Mutual funds are a popular vehicle used by many households to help achieve these goals because they offer alternative portfolios characterized by different time horizons, expected returns and assessed risks. Indeed, mutual funds are invested in by 95 million plus and by 54 million households whose fund shares have a market value of $7 to $7.5 trillion. Indeed at the end of 2002, mutual funds managed 21 percent of $10.2 trillion retirement market 1 of the U.S. and 98 percent of $18.5 billion 529 college savings plans market. However, recently, there has been increasing recognition of John C. Bogle's point that there is much that is "plain wrong" in the mutual fund industry that disadvantages the purchasers of mutual fund shares. For example, Warren Buffet has said that the mutual fund industry has engaged in "blatant wrongdoing" that has "betrayed the trust of so many millions of shareholders." Likewise, Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald, Republican from Illinois and the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, has indicated that mutual funds are "the world's largest skimming operation ... a trough from which fund managers, brokers and other insiders are steadily siphoning off an excessive slice of the nation's household, college and retirement savings."
To put the relevancy of the mutual fund debacle in perspective for the working class, Senator Daniel K. Akaka, Democrat from Hawaii and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, has stated "I have found the betrayal of trust of mutual fund investors appalling because mutual funds are investment vehicles that the average investor relies on for retirement, saving for children's college education, or other financial goals and dreams. In one example directly related to workers and retirees in the State of Hawaii, Putnam Investment had been responsible for managing $440 million for the State of Hawaii Employees Retirement system, which administers retirement and survivor benefit for over 96,000 state and country employees in Hawaii, before the company was fired due to late trading abuses that one of our witnesses Mr. Scannell helped to bring to the attention of regulators." Indeed, Professor Eric Zitzewitz of Stanford University estimates that late trading occurred in, at least, one of six mutual fund families. The economic loss to fund shareholders of late trading was $400 million per year. The economic loss to mutual fund shareholders as a result of market-timing is $5 billion per year. It should be noted that valid criticisms of the mutual fund industry and its wrong-doings and the resulting financial wealth transfer from the fund shareowners to the mutual fund investment advisory companies has come from many quarters including (1) U.S. Senators, (2) state attorneys general, (3) a former mutual fund company founder and chairman of a mutual fund complex, (4) a mutual fund whistle-blower and (5) academics, both law school professors and economics and finance professors.
Understanding the mutual fund debacle requires understanding of the economics of mutual fund companies, including the value drivers of the market price of mutual fund management companies and the potential governance conflicts between the management company and the mutual fund shareholders. In particular, there are five important, though overlapping and interrelated, economic dimensions of mutual funds that need emphasizing. They are:
- Conflicts of Interests - Agency Problems in Mutual Funds
The Investment Company Act of 1940 is quite clear that mutual funds are to be operated for the benefit of the purchasers of the mutual fund shares. Thus, the mutual fund director's sole fiduciary responsibility is to the purchasers of the mutual fund shares. John C. Bogle, the Founder and former CEO of the Vanguard Group has reminded us of "An Elementary Principle, Too Often Ignored" which is "that funds should be managed and operated in the best interest of their shareholders, rather than in the interests of advisors, underwriters, or others." Indeed, even the Investment Company Institute currently acknowledges that mutual funds should be run in the best interest of the share purchasers. Mutual funds have a number of potential agent-principal problems where questions can be legitimately raised whether the best interests of the mutual fund shareholders are being served. Among these principal-agent issues are:
- Whether the independent directors are acting in the best interests of the fund shareholders when negotiating the investment fee advisory contract?
- Whether it is the best interests of the fund shareholders to pay a commission to a marketing distributor to "grow" the fund?
- Whether the fund industry's "soft dollar" practices are in the best interests of fund shareholders?
- Firm Economies of Scale and Scope in Mutual Funds
Two important economic concepts that provide relevant economic foundations to formulate a reasoned judgment about the "fairness" or "unfairness" of investment management fees charged by mutual fund companies are (1) economies of scale and (2) economies of scope. Both concepts focus on the reduction of average costs as the fund increases the amount of money under management. The reduction in average costs means that marginal costs are below average costs. Marginal costs being below average costs, as money under management increases, could be a result of several factors such as (1) corporate efficiency, (2) declining labor market costs (3) the use of high-level capital equipment including back-office and trading technology and (4) volume discounts on the purchase of factor inputs. Of course, the specific forces resulting in a decrease in average cost per unit are very dependent on the specific industry and specific company. In the money management business, going from $100 million to $500 million to $1 billion under management does not increase expenses by a factor of 5 or 10. Indeed, incremental costs for the investment portfolio task increase minuscule particularly if the investment opportunity is the same or decreases. This means there are significant economics of scale and/or scope. Jack Bogle has referred to the economies of scale in the mutual fund industry as "staggering." In the case of the Vanguard funds the only mutual fund firm having a mutual organization, Vanguard focus is providing services on an "at cost" basis. This resulted in average expense ratio for Vanguard funds declining from 0.59% in 1980 to 0.27% in 2002 for a decrease of 54%. On the other hand, the mutual fund industry's fund assets grew from $115 billion in 1980 to $6.7 trillion in 2002 for an increase of 60 times. However, fund expenses were $0.8 billion in 1980 to $72 billion in 2002, for an increase of 90 times. Bogle appropriately questions what happened to the "staggering" economies of scale when and where there were "modest" incremental expenditures." Bogle concludes that the fees charged to mutual fund investors were excessive. Indeed, the excessive mutual fund fee schedule cost mutual fund investors hundreds of billions of dollars. No wonder Bogle concludes that the mutual fund industry's decisions are made for the best economic interests of the management company's owners and not the mutual fund shareholders. Bogle also points out two empirical truths which are the fees charged mutual fund share purchasers (1) were good for the managers and the advisory company and (2) bad for the fund shareholders.
- Lack of Investor Mutual Fund Sophistication
The standard paradigm of rational investor choice is that investors, including mutual fund investors, formulate their investment choice decisions in the context of achieving an optimal utility maximizing portfolio in expected return-assessed risk space. Further, mutual fund costs, including investment management fees are specifically integrated into expected returns and, thus, into the optimal portfolio choice analysis. This is clearly not the approach of mutual fund share purchasers. Instead, as an old mutual fund cliché states, "mutual funds are not bought, they are sold." This marketing focus of mutual funds is central to both (1) mutual fund asset growth and (2) cash flow profitability of mutual fund investment management. Surrogate empirical evidence in this regard is provided by Professors Elton, Gruber and Busse who concluded that, "investors buy funds with higher marketing costs than the best - performing funds." Further, "all that is necessary for inferior funds to exist and grow is a set of uninformed investors and a set of distributors who have an economic incentive to sell inferior products. In a market where arbitrage is impossible, we may be disappointed, but we should not be surprised when inferior products exist and even prosper." In related reasoning and anecdotal evidence Robert Pozen, the former President of Fidelity Investments, indicated that "only 19% of investors surveyed by the SEC could give an estimate of expenses for their largest mutual funds."
The importance of marketing and the business side of mutual funds adopting a marketing culture has been emphasized by both John Bogle and Michael Price. Specifically, Bogle has stated that "we have changed from a profession of stewardship into a business of salesmanship, and the conglomeration is part of that." Likewise, Michael Price has stated, "the professional managers, the marketing types were running the show, guys who succeed based on the amount of assets under management and the growth in those assets, rather than from the performance of the money which is backward. With the huge bucks at stake, you had the professional marketers taking over."
- An Absence of Competition in the Determination of Mutual Fund Investment Advisory Fees
How important are "excessive" mutual fund fees to mutual fund investors? Senator Peter J. Fitzgerald, Republican from Illinois and the Chairman of the Senate subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, has stated that "the general consensus of the panelists at the November hearing was that illegal late trading, and illicit market timing were indeed very serious threats to investors but that those fees were a even more serious threat to American investors. We heard extensive testimony from industry expert who forcefully noted that small differences in mutual fund fees can add up to enormous differences in investment returns over time but that poor disclosure of those fees makes it very difficult for investors to compare funds."
With regard to the fairness of mutual fund advisory fees, Eliot Spitzer, the Attorney General of the State of New York, has stated "The advisory fees that mutual funds charge their shareholders greatly exceed those charged to institutional customers. If mutual fund customers were charged the lower rate for advisory fees paid by institutional investors, they would save more than $10 billion each year." (Emphasis is provided by Eliot Spitzer). Indeed, Professor John P. Freeman of the University of South Carolina Law School has stated with regard to mutual fund fees that "Price gouging over advisory fees is rampant, and the industry is in denial."
Interestingly, Mr. Pozen argues that "pricing trends in the mutual fund business defy common sense." In a sense, I can understand the reasoning and frustration embedded in Mr. Pozen's view of the lack of common sense permeating the setting of mutual fund fees. However, an explanation of the puzzle of the determination of mutual fund fees can be best understood in the context of (1) there is a lack of competition (i.e. there are not multiple bidders or an auction process) in the determination of who is awarded the investment management contract of a mutual fund and (2) a more realistic description of the mutual fund fee process is that it is an economic outcome that is a result of the fund sponsor's right hand negotiating with its left hand. Interestingly, Warren Buffet implies the same point when he proposes as one of his mutual fund reforms that the mutual fund directors be required to look at alternative fee arrangements with other investment management companies and to state that it is their opinion that their adopted investment management fee arrangement is competitive.
That is why Michael Price has made a telling point when he stated that "Directors need to have backbones. You know what the shocking thing to me is? That nobody has had a contract cancelled by a board of directors. Even where a chairman was messing around with the fund, the board didn't cancel the contract. What does it take to get fired in the business?" Adding support to Price's point is Warren Buffett's view that "So what are the directors of these looted funds doing? As I write this, I have seen none that have terminated the contract of the offending management company (although naturally that entity has often fired some of its employees). Can you imagine directors who had been personally defrauded taking such a boys-will-be-boys attitude?" The answer to Price's question as to what it takes to get fired is that when your right hand is negotiating with your left hand you are not going to be fired come hell or high-water. Thus, it is no surprise, as Baer and Gensler state, that "mutual fund boards fire their advisers with about the same frequency that race horses fire their jockeys." Once again, this is the economic result of, to use Warren Buffett's terminology of there being "no-honest-to-God negotiations."
- The SEC Regulatory Efforts: Are They Effective?
The discussion over whether SEC's regulatory behavior has been effective or not effective in promoting competitive market outcomes via public policy has been a long raging debate going back, at least to the 1960's. Instead, the intellectual interchange over the impact of the SEC on the efficiency of securities markets includes the spirited debate between George J. Stigler, a Chicago economic libertarian and the recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1988, and Irwin Friend, a prominent scholar in financial economics and former President of the American Finance Association, is the classic conceptual-analytical and empirical interchange where polar conclusions were derived. However, over the last few years the performance of the SEC, for whatever reasons, has been abysmal. First, the fundamental triggering events of the Enron debacle were uncovered not by the SEC but by the private sector. Indeed, the Senate Government Committee chaired by Senator Joseph Lieberman, a Democrat from Connecticut, concluded in its study dated October, 2002 that there was a "systemic and catastrophic failure" of regulation of Enron by the SEC and that "investors were left defenseless."
The Peter Scannell, the whistleblower at Putnam Investments, fiasco was also a poor reflection on the SEC regulatory behavior. The essence of the Scarnell affair was that market abuses, which are prohibited at Putnam according to their mutual fund prospectus, were in fact, quite common. Alternatively stated, market abuses at Putnam Investment were "seemingly accepted practices for those investors with influences for those investors with influences and money." Scannell's communications with the SEC, unfortunately, lead nowhere. This is in contrast to his meeting with the Massachusetts Deputy Secretary of State and Massachusetts Chief of Securities Enforcement who immediately grasped the economic and financial enormity of the events within a short time period, then serve Putnam Investment with subpoenas requesting relevant information. The Scannell affair aptly emphasize that implementation and execution are crucial for regulation to effective and that key instances in the recent past the SEC's performance has been sadly lacking.
The productivity of the SEC in achieving its public policy goals is very much a function of the leadership, vision, execution, motivational and teamwork talents of the chairman. These talents are rare not only in the public sector but also in the private sector. Thus, it is not surprising that at times in its history, the SEC has floundered, lost it's sense of purpose and the staff, now numbering 3100 people, has become dispirited. Indeed, in the recent past, such as during Harvey Pitt's two years reign, the motives and actions, such as his the proposed appointment of William Webster as Chairman of Accounting oversight board, were questioned and questionable.
This, however, should come as no surprise Nobel Prize in Economic Science recipient, Paul A. Samuelson recognized the essence of the regulatory conundrum back in 1967. Specifically, Professor Samuelson stated then that,
"Self-regulation by an industry tends usually to be self-serving and often inefficient, there is a danger that government commissions, set up .... Originally to regulate an industry, becoming more concerned to protect it from competition than to protect the customer from the absence of competition .... The SEC must itself be under constant Congressional scrutiny lest it lessen rather than increase the protection the consumer receives from vigorous competition."
Summary Conclusions Of The Economics Of The Mutual Fund Industry
The major points regarding the economic characteristics of the mutual funds are:
- There are important and persistent conflicts of interests between fund management (i.e. the advisory company) and the shareholders of the mutual funds
- These economic conflicts of interests involve not only the process of the determination of investment management fees but also include issues involving 12b-1 fees, soft dollars, etc.
- The independent directors do not effectively represent the best financial interests of the mutual fund shareholders
- There are substantial economies of scale and scope in mutual funds
- Mutual fund management fee schedules do not reflect, in a meaningful way, these economies of scale and scope
- There is a lack of meaningful financial disclosure to actual and potential mutual fund investors. Hence, there is a lack of transparency with regard to relevant information parameters that should drive the investor choice of which mutual fund to purchase
- There is a lack of sophistication by inventors as illustrated by the Elston-Gruber-Busse study indicating that investors are willing to buy identical funds (i.e. products) that have higher loads and higher 12 b - 1 fees.
- The investment management fees are "unfair" (i.e. too high). This is a result of the lack of competition in the market for mutual fund investors
Some Suggested Mutual Fund Program Proposals: Some Preliminary Economic Perspectives and An Evaluation of Their Merits and Limitations
Two important dimensions for setting appropriate public policy from the standpoint of libertarian economists are (1) individual choice, (2) competitive markets, and (3) transparency. The role of government, including government regulation, is limited except when, for example, parties have sufficient market economic power preventing the functioning of competitive markets. Further, individual choice and its end results, the efficiency of resource allocation is strengthened if there is firm transparency where relevant investor informational parameters are provided. This will, in turn enhance investor awareness and improve investor choice of mutual funds. Hence, individual rational choice of mutual funds and competitive markets are intertwined. Further, rational investor choice of mutual funds is dependent upon transparency of relevant investor choice parameters provided by mutual funds.
The structure of this discussion will be organized under three overlapping categories. They are (1) Better Mutual Fund Governance, (2) Better Mutual Fund Investor Transparency and (3) Reducing or Eliminating Mutual Fund Agency Conflicts.
- Better Mutual Fund Governance:
- Requiring the Chairman of Mutual Fund Boards To Be Independent
- Require that 75% of Directors Be Independent
Evaluatory Comments: In determination of the structure of the board, the emphasis should be on results and not on the false hope that there is a major ratio of inside directors versus outside directors. Results will be dependant on execution of individual directors that in turn, will depend on the "backbone" and knowledge of corporate value additivity strategies and tactics of individual directors. To conclude, mandating that (1) chairperson of mutual fund boards be independent and (2) at least 75% of mutual fund directors be independent are not high priorities of mine in terms of mutual fund reform.
- Better Mutual Fund Transparency:
- The requirement that the breakdown of the composition of the portfolio into it's constituent securities be provided quarterly or even more frequently big mutual funds is not necessary or desirable change. Indeed, it would result in disincentives to, for example, do the necessary detective work to ferret out the underprice securities. The flip side would be that it would create more incentives for other investment managers to free-rider (i.e. free load) on the investment research of others.
Evaluatory Comments: This data will constitute useful inputs to investors to assess returns, risks, costs and fees each of which will enable investors to make more informed choices in the selection and purchase of individual mutual funds. The information specified should not be required in as much as it results in disinventives for professional Investors to do the necessary security analysis and results in the convergence of intrinsic values and stockmarket prices
- The purpose of a mutual fund prospectus is to
provide relevant informational inputs to prospective investors to make
informed, ideally optimal, investment choice decisions. These
informational inputs that are generally required of two types: They are
(1) prospective investment returns and (2) assessed investment risks.
Both of these parameters are ex ante in nature. By
definition, they are not available. Thus, historical information
parameters will have to be provided with the hope that there is a
linkage from ex post to ex ante. In the pursuit of this task, the following information inputs, among others, should be provided.
- Investment Portfolio Goal
- Historical Portfolio Composition
- Historical Investment Performance Including the Sharpe ratio
- Historical Turnover Ratio
- Investment Management Fees with Decile Comparisons
- Other Expenses with Breakdown
- Benchmark Investment Performance Comparisons to Mutual Funds with Similar Investment Product Lines and the S&P 500, and other more appropriate indices, for 1, 3, 5 and 10 year time periods.
- Mutual Fund Late Trading and Market Timing:
- Because late-trading is an illegal activity, the penalties should be strictly enforced. For market timing, mutual funds should clearly disclosure their policy. Ideally, mutual funds should ban these activities and monitor and enforce their market- timing policy.
Evaluatory Comments: Both late-trading and market timing are mechanisms where wealth is transferred from mutual fund shareholders to parties engaging in these transactions. Obviously, the mutual fund shareholders are better off if there are criminal and civil penalties for late-trading activity and that individual funds take the initiative in eliminating market-timing. Further, redemption fee should be increased significantly to discourage rapid buying and selling of mutual fund shares.
- Reducing or Eliminating Agency Conflicts:
- At minimum complete specifics of soft dollar transaction should be disclosed
- Sales activities wherein dollar incentives are given to third parties to encourage purchase of mutual fund should be, at minimum, disclosure but preferably eliminated. This would certainly include arrangements with broker-dealer to sell shares
Evaluatory Comments: Better understanding of the impact of soft dollars on mutual fund shareholders is necessary. Accordingly, the SEC should undertake a study investigating these impacts. As to the impact of brokerage-dealers being compensated for their sales efforts, it is clear that they have incentives to steer investors into a particular fund or fund family despite whether it is appropriate or not for the investor. Obviously, such behavior is not in the best interests of potential investors. This activity should be constrained or eliminated.
- Summary Comments:
Another positive suggestion would be the creation of a Mutual Fund Governance Board to improve the bottom-line investment results for mutual fund investors by eliminating or reducing activities not in the interest of the fund shareholders.
ENDNOTES
- Senator Frank Lautenberg,'s Democrat from New Jersey, reaction to the mutual fund debacle was that he was "shocked and appalled by the unscrupulous actions of mutual funds principals who are paid to protect all fund investors, without discrimination or favoritism. But instead of working to enhance shareholder value, some directors and fund investment advisors have used their trusted positions to line their own pockets and the pockets of their industry cronies."
- A dark and seamy side of the market timing games that transpired at Putnam is chronicled by the SEC Statement of Peter T. Scannell. This includes war stories that transpired at Putnam including (1) some sample interactions between management (i.e. Managing Directors, Senior Vice Presidents, etc.) and members of Preferred Services Specialist Group, (2) reactions of market timing spreadsheets of Mr. Scannell, (3) blocked computer access to certain years of market timing transactions, etc. Also detailed are some specifics of the "roughing up" incident where Mr. Scannell was taken to Quincy at Medical Center's emergency room. This horrific attack resulted in headaches, dizziness, emotional trauma, etc.
- One company recently in the news, due both to Comcast's $47.7 billion to purchase it and their recent shareholders' annual meeting is Walt Disney. Over the years, Walt Disney has been the poster child of "ineffective" independent directors. Indeed, according to one historical caricature of Walt Disney is that "Eisner sets its agenda, He brooks little discussion at board meetings and certainly not heated disagreement and seldom loses a vote. He discourages directors getting to know one another outside of board meetings, the better to remain the sole source of information for each." More recently, the shareholders at Walt Disney Co. withheld 43% of vote for Michael Eisner. This clear no-confidence signal in Eisner was, as one pundit noted a ringing indication that "few executives have received such an overwhelming vote of no confidence." Interestingly, Disney's board of directors still has proclaimed unanimous support in Eisner. Further, the history of directors is shocking to say the least. Specifically, the Chancery Court of Delaware in their Memorandum Opinion of the Walt Disney concluded that, "It is rare when a court imposes a liability o directors of a corporation for breach of the duty of care, and this Court is hesitant to second-guess the business judgment of a disinterested and independent board of directors. But the facts alleged in the new complaint do no implicate merely negligent or grossly negligent decision making by corporate directors. Quite the contrary, plaintiff's new complaint suggests that the Disney directors failed to exercise any business judgment and failed to make any good faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties to Disney and it's stockholders. "Indeed, the facts that are alleged in Disney" if true, do more than portray directors who, in a negligent or grossly negligent manner, merely failed to inform themselves or to deliberate adequately about an issue of material importance to their corporation. Instead, the fact alleged in the new complaint suggest that the defendant directors consciously and intentionally disregard their responsibilities, adopting a "we don't care about the risks" attitude concerning a material corporate decision, knowing or deliberate indifference by a director to his or her duty to act faithfully and with appropriate care is conduct, in my opinion, that may not have been taken honestly and in good faith to advance the best interests of the company. Put differently, all of the alleged facts, if true, imply that the defendant directors knew that they were making material decisions without adequate information and with out adequate deliberation, and that they simply did not care if the decisions caused the corporation and it's stockholders to suffer injury or loss. Viewed in this light, plaintiff's new complaint sufficiently alleges a breach of the directors obligation to act honestly and in good faith in the corporation's best interests for a Court to conclude, if the facts are true, that the defendant director's conduct fell outside the protection of the business judgment rule." The relevant point and/or question for mutual funds is, for example, do independent directors truly represent the best interests of the mutual fund shareholders or are they shills for an investment management company in approving "excessive" investment management fees?
- Professor John Freeman provides some ad hoc evidence
that illustrates the unfairness of fees charged the retail client of
mutual funds. Namely, that Alliance Capital fee schedule for its
various clients (i.e. retail and institutional) was:
93 basis points (i.e. .93 percent) for retail customers of the $17.5 billion Alliance Premier Growth Fund.
11 basis points (i.e. .11 percent) for managing the investment growth portfolio of Vanguard U.S. Growth
24 basis points (i.e. .24 percent) for managing a $672 million investment portfolio for the Kentucky Retirement System
20 basis points (i.e. .20 percent) for managing a $1.7 billion investment portfolio for the Minnesota State Board of Investment
18.5 basis points (i.e. .185 percent) for managing the $730 million equity investment portfolio for the Missouri Retirement System
10 basis points (i.e. .10 percent) for managing the $975 equity investment portfolio for the Wyoming Retirement System
Given the presence of (1) strong economies of scale and scope factors for managing investment portfolio of various sizes it is difficult to rationale the fee schedule charged by Alliance Capital. More specifically, as only one case in point, how does one rationalize the fee schedule where 10 basis points is charged for the investment management of $975 million equity portfolio for the Wyoming Retirement System and over 9 times the fee rate for a portfolio over 17 times as large for the retail customers of the $17.5 billion Alliance Premier Growth Fund. This is a clear case of discriminatory pricing.
- A neat table labeled "A Tale of Two Funds"
summarizing the similarities and differences between MFS and Putnam
mutual fund woes and problems of MFS and Putnam. Note that, at this
time, MFS has had less fund withdrawals than Putnam even though its
actions seem less reprehensible.
TABLE 1
A TALE OF TWO FUNDS MFS PUTNAM Amount of market timing $2
Billion$25
MillionLate trading Took place No evidence Net investor
activity*Inflows
$800 millionOutflows
$54 billionFines and Restitution $225
MillionTo be determined Executives CEO quits and is suspended CEO resigned Source: Faith Arner, "In a Scandal, Being Nice Helps: Why MFS is Faring Better Than
Bad-Attitude Putnam in the Mutual Fund Mess," Business Week, February 23, 2004
- There are numerous reasons constituting why investors should prefer ETFs (i.e. Exchange Traded Funds) to mutual funds. Add to this list the absence of any trading penalties/costs for the ETF owner as long as he/she continues to own the ETF shares and it's tax superiority over open-end mutual funds. The absence of such costs-penalties is another reason why ETFs should outperform mutual funds of comparable portfolio composition. An excellent discussion of ETF's is detailed in Gastineau.
- The standard academic perspective on optimal portfolio choice under uncertainty is the single period mean-variance portfolio model of Harry M. Markowitz. Markowitz's single period portfolio choice model has been extended to a multi-period scenario via Robert C. Merton's continuous time portfolio rebalancing model. A more recent extension has been the integration of human capital into the investor's opportunity set. As a side-note, Harry M. Markowitz was co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1990 while Robert C. Merton was a co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economic Science for 1998.
- It is interesting that John Bogle argues that the most important factor in assessing the desirability of investing in a specific mutual fund is a low expense ratio. Two other factors that Mr. Bogle feels are also important are the tenure of the investment team and the portfolio turnover ratio (i.e. how much trading for the fund). Two other dimensions that Bogle suggests are relevant in the investor choice of a specific mutual fund are (1) whether the fund caps the size of the money manager and (2) whether the fund is part of a conglomerate.
- The Boudoukh et. al. paper provided empirical evidence indicating that there were abnormal return opportunities available to mutual funds that engage in late trading using stale prices. Curiously, Jeffrey Molitar of the Vanguard Group argued that Boydoukh et. al. was a border line unethical paper which should have been re-titled "Here's How to Steal Money from Your Fellow Shareholders."
- A side-bar story to Eric Zitewitz's research is that in Summer, 2003, he made $500,000 profit from a market timing operation. Perhaps, even more interesting, Professor Zitewitz's annual returns were only 10% on an annualized basis while his assessed returns from such a trading strategy is in 35% to 70% range.
- One classification of mutual fund fees are:
- Disclosed Costs
- Management Fees
- Administrative Fees
- 12-(b)-1 Fees
- Undisclosed Costs-Transaction Costs
- Brokerage Commissions
- Bid-Ask Spreads
- Market Effects
- Disclosed Costs
- Many of the alleged mutual fund cases involving wrong doing via improper trading have been filed by New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. Indeed Eliot Spitzer, despite a relatively small staff 29 investor protection lawyers compared to the 1,000 enforcement officers of the SEC, has aggressively, perhaps brilliantly, led a wave of investigations of mutual fund companies and now other financial services companies. As of March, 2004, there are, at least 15 other state attorney generals investigating mutual fund late trading.
- Robert Pozen, now Chairman and CEO at MFS, a mutual fund, provides an interesting matrix in his book entitled The Mutual Fund Business. The matrix presents a code of ethics for five mutual fund families. The five mutual fund families are (1) Fidelity Investments, (2) Vanguard Group, (3) Capital Research and Management, (4) Merrill Lynch Asset Management and (5) Franklin Templeton Group. The code of ethics focuses on decision areas of (1) participation in initial public offerings, (2) participation in private placement investments, (3) minimum holding period between buying and selling of the same security, (4) restrictions on buying or selling of a security which the fund is trading and (5) short selling restrictions. The code of ethics is applicable to fund portfolio managers, other executives and traders and individuals accessible to trade information.
- Representative Richard H. Baker's comments with some sarcasm regarding "boastful testimony" from the mutual fund industry as how they have avoided major scandal. Representative Baker quotes the Testimony of Paul. G. Haaga, Jr. Executive Vice President, Capital Research Management Company and Chairman, Investment Company Institute before the "Hearing on Mutual Fund Industry Practices and Their Effect on Individual Investors Before the House Committee on Financial Services," 108 Congress, March 21, 2003.
- What has been the ex post investment performance of active equity mutual funds? Here are some broad generalizations.
- Most mutual funds provide useful diversification
- Most funds choose a risk class and stayed within this risk class over time
- Funds, before expenses, did no better than indexes of the same volatility
- Funds, after expenses, performed below average
- Not many, if any, mutual funds performed consistently better on a risk adjusted basis than market averages
- Expenses were too high, especially expenses searching out underpriced securities.
- The history of empirical investigations of the ex post
performance of mutual funds is too extensive to provide an in-depth
comprehensive review. However, a few summary evaluatory comments are:
- Jensen's empirical study which showed that "the evidence on mutual fund performance discussed above, indicates not only that these 115 mutual funds were an average not able to predict security prices well enough to outperform a buy-the-make-and-hold policy, but also that there is very little evidence that any individual fund was able to do significant by better than that which we expected from mere random chance."
- Gruber's empirical study concludes that actively managed mutual funds underperformed on a risk-adjusted basis relevant portfolio investment benchmarks. That is, investment management in actively managed equity mutual funds was non-superior (i.e. resulted in inferior investment results) because their performance yielded negative risk adjusted returns. Why does money flow to or stay in such mutual funds? According to Gruber, it is because the decisions both (1) initially resulting in the flow of funds to the mutual fund and (2) Continuing to retain the shares at the fund is a product of three types of investors. They are (1) unsophisticated investors who fall to fund advertising and broken advice, (2) institutionally disadvantaged investors who opportunity set far investing their pension contributions is restricted to such funds and (3) tax disadvantaged investors who find that, for tax reasons, they are locked in their already purchased but inferior funds.
- A mutual fund investment compensation fee schedule that has incentive dimensions has both (1) a priori economic appeal and (2) empirically demonstrable positive results for fund shareholders. The a priori justification is that if investors do better-worse (i.e. on a relative, such as in comparison to the S + P 500 and not absolute basis), then investment management should be rewarded-penalized. It is the classic win-win or lose-lose scenario wherein the investment management's economic interests are more directly linked to the economic. Empirically, Elton-Gruber-Blake found the incentive-based mutual fund investment managers had an average, risk adjusted returns 1% greater than mutual funds that did not have investment incentive contracts. Part of this performance differential is attributed to the lower fees charged the shareholders. An interesting question is why do only 4% of equity mutual funds have an investment incentive fee.
- An alternative view leading to a different economic conclusion, namely that investor markets which include mutual funds are competitive markets, is detailed in Baumol, Goldfeld, Gordon and Koehn. Their conclusion is derived by regression estimates and economic reasoning. Both, however, are flawed due to measurement error of the boundaries of the market and also due to their non-sequitur reasoning based on arguments that investors can always redeem their shares (i.e. vote with their feet), free entry by firms into the mutual fund indirectly rational investor choice, etc. These conclusions are inconsistent with an array of empirical evidence, some of which is provided here by Gruber and Elton-Gruber-Blake and Freeman.
- It is important to note the different fiduciary responsibilities of the directors of (1) the mutual fund and (2) the investment management/advisory company. The directors of the mutual fund fiduciary responsibilities include negotiating the best deal, such as the least expensive investment management fee and other fees, for the mutual fund shareholders. The directors of the investment management company fiduciary responsibilities are to the equity shareholders (i.e. owners) of the investment management company. These constitute two quite different economic constituencies.
- The Gartenberg 1 and 2 decisions represent an interesting amalgam of law and economies. Whatever the merits are or are not of the legal reasoning in these cases, the economic underpinnings of Gartenberg are woeful lacking in rigor and lead to erroneous and perverse conclusions.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS:
ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND THE LAW
Active Investment Selection - Portfolio Management: A security selection approach that attempts to identify mispriced securities (i.e. alpha securities that have abnormal returns in excess of that assessed firm an equilibrium valuation approach) and purchases the "underpriced" securities.
Active Investment Management: A security selection approach that attempts to identify mispriced securities (i.e. alpha securities that have abnormal returns in excess of that assessed from an equilibrium valuation approach).
Activist Institutional Investors: Institutional investors, such as public (i.e. state and local) pension plans and Taft-Hartley pension plans, who are desirous of changing the corporate governance structure of companies whose behavior puts the economic interests of management before those of the firm's shareholders.
Adverse Selection: Providing false information or signals indicating a willingness to sell or merge. This false information emanates from the firms unhealthy financial conditions and desire to complete the transaction before information is publish.
Agency-Principal Problem: In the context of the modern corporation, it is the principals (.e. shareholders) hiring an agent (i.e. management team) to represent their best interests (i.e. maximize the firms equity share price) in economic resources decisions of the firm.
Antifraud Rules: A vehicle that helps enforce securities laws, both State and Federal. For example, the SEC Act of 1934, Rule 10b - 5 details, in general, act that they regard as fraudulent and manipulate with regard to buying and selling securities and/or affecting information that affects investors decisions with regard to security prices.
Audit Function: The derivation of the firm's balance-sheet and income and testifying as to it's accuracy with GAAP.
Back-End Load Fees: Included redemption fees, contingent deferred sales charges, etc.
Breakpoints: A fee schedule which is reduced as the magnitude of funds invested increases. The points at which the fees are reduced are termed the "breakpoints"
Business Judgment Rule: A rule regarding the appropriate decision behavior of corporate board members. It's bottom-line implication is courts will not second-guess decisions and actions of directors made on a good faith, informed and honest basis.
Capitalism-Free Enterprise System: A structure of how economic resources are allocated. It emphasizes private initiatives private and choice corporations that are publicly traded on an exchange and competitive markets.
Canary Capital Partners: A hedge fund that transferred wealth from several mutual funds of strong capital management via market timing(i.e. a series of rapid trades)
Closed End Mutual Fund: Is a mutual fund whose shares are traded on an exchange and whose price may be higher, lower or at its net asset value.
Conflict of Interests: Where 2 parties do no always coincide. The standard scenario is where manages and shareholders' economic interests diverge. However, on occasion, lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, etc., economic interests may diverge from those of the shareholders.
Contracting Agent Problem: Are the result of the contractor's agent having incentives to take actions that will enhance his/her welfare at the expense of the contractors welfare.
Corporate Governance: Deals with issues relating to whether corporate executive management and its agents (i.e. outside law firms, accountants, etc.) make decisions ex ante that are in the best interests of the shareholders or whether they transfer wealth from the shareholders to their own pockets.
Corporate Scandals: Scenarios where firms deliberately and knowingly create and distribute misleading and false information "pumps" up inappropriately the stock market prices of the firm.
Directors of Corporate Boards: Are the elected representatives of the shareholders. Are elected in a two-step process where (1) the candidates are first nominated and (2) the election occurs and the votes are counted.
Dissident Shareholder: A shareholder or roalition of shareholders who undertake a proxy contest to obtain representation on the board of directors.
Duty of Care: The responsibility of individuals to thoroughly review the relevant materials in a thoughtful detailed manner.
Duty of Loyalty: The responsibility of putting shareholders' financial interests as the number one priority.
Economies of Scale: The reduction in average per unit cost that occurs when production increase in investment assets under management. That is, for mutual funds, there is thought to be significant economies of scale when a mutual fund's assets increase from $100 million to $300 million to $1 billion.
Economies of Scope: The reduction of the average per unit cost for a multi-product firm whose products are similar but not identical. For example, Fidelity Investments may have 50 mutual funds (i.e. equity, fixed income, money market, international sector funds, etc.) Their Fidelity Investors centers provide marketing and service functions to all Fidelity Investors. Thus, in essence, the reduction in average per unit cost can and does result from the total costs of an Investor canter line allocated to many mutual funds and not having a separate Investor Center for each mutual fund.
Efficient Financial Markets: A financial market where there are no arbitrage opportunities (i.e. all securities are "fairly" priced).
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974: A law that details of number of requirements regarding funding, funding requirements, fiduciary responsibilities, etc. Also established Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation to guarantee minimum pension payments.
Exchange Traded Funds (ETF's): A variant of an investment unit trust and have dual trading process. Are more tax efficient than open-end mutual funds.
Fiduciary Duty: The legal requirement of putting the shareholders' economic interests first.
Free Markets: Competitive markets where there is freedom of entry by new firms.
Free Markets Versus Regulatory Solutions: Is a query concerning the relative economic merits of whether competitive markets or government reform is referable in terms of achieving a public policy goal.
Free Rider Problem: The scenario where a small shareholder does nothing (i.e. takes no action) but is the recipient of a wealth increment due to, for example, a hostile tender offer initiated by another party.
Front-End Load Mutual Funds: Mutual funds that have a sales fee which presumably reflects distribution costs. The sales fee is levied at the time of purchase.
Fund of Funds: A portfolio comprised solely of a number of mutual funds.
Hedge Funds: Investment capital pools that utilize numerous alternative investment strategies. They are not mutual funds and are subject to far less regulation than mutual funds.
Independent Director: Details certain characteristics of a person such as not an officer of the corporation, not related to CEO, does not have a specific financial interest in the transaction, etc. Note that the concept of independent director does not to his/her thought and or action process. This means that an "independent" director can still be a shill for incumbent executive management.
Index Portfolio Investing: A passive investment strategy where you purchase an index or surrogate thereof representing a portfolio of stocks. Typically, it is a buy and hold investment strategy where neither market or sector timing nor stock picking is involved.
Index Portfolio Investing: A passive investment strategy where you purchase an index or surrogate thereof representing a portfolio of stocks.
Institutional Investors: Constitute the spectrum of financial institutions such as commercial bank, life insurance company, pension funds (both public or corporate), mutual funds, hedge funds, etc.
Investment Management Fee: The fees charged by the management company to the mutual fund purchasers. The fees reflect a number of component expenses including the fees to manage the investment portfolio.
Investment Company Act of 1940: Placed a number of regulations and restrictions and, in general, set standards of appropriate behavior for mutual funds. For example, it prohibited mutual fund from borrowing to lever the portfolios expected returns and risks. It also placed restriction on a number of other investment parties including investment advisors.
Investment Company Institute: The trade association of mutual funds pushing for changes in legislation that advantages mutual funds.
Late Trading: Is the trading (i.e. buyer or selling) of shares at the 4:00 p.m. EST closing prices for the NYSE and do not reflect the subsequent firm financial information that has been made public. It's like placing a bet at half-time of a football game at the odds of game before kickoff
Managed Funds Association: The trade association for hedge funds, lobbies and promotes the best interest of hedge funds.
Managerial Entrenchment: The placing of mechanisms (i.e. anti takeover tactics) that reduce the probability of a corporate control change. In this scenario, management's actions are thought to be motivated by their self-interest and not the investors' self-interest.
Market Competition: A scenario in which firms are price takers and purchasers benefit vie a vies monopoly and oligopoly market scenarios.
Market Timing: Is the rapid trading (i.e. purchases and redemptions) of mutual funds
Mutual Fund Expense Ratio: Charges to mutual fund for investment management, marketing, custodial charges, etc. but not for trading costs
Mutual Fund Family: A group of mutual funds run by a single investment management company. The mutual funds may run the gamut from money market funds to fixed income funds to international funds to sector funds, etc.,
Mutual Fund Wrap Account: A portfolio made of a combination of mutual funds chosen/ recommended by an investment advisor. The investment advisor fees are above and beyond the fees charged by the various mutual funds.
National Association of Security Dealers (NASD): Is the self-regulatory association for the securities industry. In the context of mutual funds, NASD the SEC rules for fund advertising, marketing brochures, etc. It also sets limits on the magnitude of the loads that the mutual fund charge before such loads are excessive. Likewise, the NASD details the magnitude of the loads that can be charged and have the mutual funds labeled "no-load funds." Is this an oxymoron?
Net Asset Value (NAV): The calculation of the price of open-end mutual funds. NAV is determined in the market price of all of the securities in the fund at the time of closing of the exchange minus any expenses, such as redemption fees, divided by the fund's total outstanding shares.
No Load Mutual Funds: Are mutual funds that do not have a front-end load expense or a small front -end load expense. Figure that out (i.e. how can a no-load mutual fund a front-end load expenses?).
Open End Mutual Funds: A mutual fund whose shares do not trade on an exchange. Instead, the shares are bought or redeemed at net asset value calculated on prices at the closing of the market.
Passive Investment Management: An investment strategy based not on stock picking but choosing a well-diversified portfolio via, for example, purchase of index fund.
Retail Investor: Are individuals/households who purchase securities/portfolios as contrasted to institutional investors.
SEC: A federal agency funded by congress with the purpose of regulation of financial markets. Among its regulatory mechanisms are disclosure requirements and enforcement power.
Self-Dealing: A transaction in which a person, such as a CEO or corporate director has an economic interest in both sides of a transaction. An example would be if the wife of the CEO were to sell at an inflated price a piece of real estateto the firm in which her husband was the CEO.
Soft Dollars: The opportunity to receive products and services in exchange for incurring trading commissions.
Stakeholders: Groups other than shareholders and bondholders that have an economic interest in the firm. Such groups would include workers, suppliers, customers and local cities where the firm has its headquarters or plants.
Stale Pricing: Is the pricing of a mutual fund's shares based on out-dated pricing. This is a result of the fund prices reflecting close at market prices (e.g. prices at 4:00 p.m. EST for the NYSE and not subsequent important financial events that happen past 4:00 p.m. EST.
Transparency: The disclosure in understandability terms of the relevant informational parameters necessary to accurately estimate the corporate value of the firm and it's constituent securities.
12b-1 Fees: A rule instituted by the SEC in 1980 to allow the mutual fund, rather than each mutual fund shareholder, to pay distribution expenses to the underwriting of the fund's share. The SEC found a number of abuses regarding 12b-1 fees due to mutual funds billing expenses unrelated to marketing expenses.
Value Investing: The purchase of "under priced" or "mispriced" securities.
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[Senate Hearing 108-461] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] S. Hrg. 108-461 OVERSIGHT HEARING ON MUTUAL FUNDS: HIDDEN FEES, MISGOVERNANCE AND OTHER PRACTICES THAT HARM INVESTORS ======================================================================= HEARING before the FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, THE BUDGET, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JANUARY 27, 2004 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs 92-686 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2003 ____________________________________________________________________________ For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800 Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama MARK PRYOR, Arkansas Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel Amy B. Newhouse, Chief Clerk ------ FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, THE BUDGET, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois, Chairman TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama MARK PRYOR, Arkansas Michael J. Russell, Staff Director Richard J. Kessler, Minority Staff Director Tara E. Baird, Chief Clerk C O N T E N T S ------ Opening statements: Page Senator Fitzgerald........................................... 1 Senator Akaka................................................ 4 Senator Collins.............................................. 5 Senator Levin................................................ 7 Senator Sununu............................................... 9 Senator Lautenberg........................................... 11 WITNESSES Tuesday, January 27, 2004 Richard J. Hillman, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, General Accounting Office.......................... 13 Hon. Eliot L. Spitzer, Attorney General, Office of the New York State Attorney General......................................... 15 John C. Bogle, founder and former Chief Executive Officer of The Vanguard Group, and President, Bogle Financial Markets Research Center......................................................... 33 Peter T. Scannell, Weymouth Landing, Massachusetts............... 43 James Nesfield, Nesfield Capital................................. 45 Jeffrey C. Keil, Vice President, Global Fiduciary Review, Lipper Inc............................................................ 61 Travis B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America........................................................ 63 Paul Schott Stevens, Partner, Dechert LLP, on behalf of the Investment Company Institute................................... 65 Marc E. Lackritz, President, Securities Industry Association..... 68 John P. Freeman, Professor of Law, University of South Carolina Law School..................................................... 70 Alphabetical List of Witnesses Bogle, John C.: Testimony.................................................... 33 Prepared statement........................................... 106 Freeman, John P.: Testimony.................................................... 70 Prepared statement........................................... 266 Hillman, Richard J.: Testimony.................................................... 13 Prepared statement........................................... 81 Keil, Jeffrey C.: Testimony.................................................... 61 Prepared statement........................................... 179 Lackritz, Marc E.: Testimony.................................................... 68 Prepared statement........................................... 250 Nesfield, James: Testimony.................................................... 45 Prepared statement by James Nesfield and Ian Grigg........... 150 Plunkett, Travis B.: Testimony.................................................... 63 Prepared statement........................................... 205 Scannell, Peter T.: Testimony.................................................... 43 Prepared statement........................................... 131 Spitzer, Hon. Eliot L.: Testimony.................................................... 15 Prepared statement........................................... 102 Stevens, Paul Schott: Testimony.................................................... 65 Prepared statement........................................... 224 Appendix Prepared statements from: Peter J. Kugi, Grafton, Wisconsin............................ 276 Niels C. Holch, Executive Diretor, Coalition of Mutual Fund Investors.................................................. 278 Roy Weitz, Publisher of Fundalarm.Com........................ 295 Questions and responses for the Record from: Paul Schott Stevens, with an attachment...................... 301 Marc E. Lackritz............................................. 333 John P. Freeman.............................................. 334 OVERSIGHT HEARING ON MUTUAL FUNDS: HIDDEN FEES, MISGOVERNANCE AND OTHER PRACTICES THAT HARM INVESTORS ---------- TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2004 U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget and International Security, of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Peter G. Fitzgerald, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Fitzgerald, Akaka, Collins, Levin, Lautenberg, and Sununu. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR FITZGERALD Senator Fitzgerald. This meeting will come to order. Today we are conducting our second oversight hearing on the mutual fund industry. At our first hearing in November we examined the breadth and the depth of the illicit trading practices that have come to light in the past year. We also examined mutual fund management and governance and sought to identify statutory and/or regulatory reforms that should be enacted to better protect mutual fund shareholders. I would like to begin by welcoming all of our witnesses who are present today, and to thank each of them for taking time out of their schedules to share their insights with us. I see that some of them flew in last night, which turned out to be a good move given the weather conditions in Washington today. I also want to acknowledge the dedication and hard work of my colleagues with us today, Governmental Affairs Committee Chairman Susan Collins, whose experience as Maine's Commissioner of Professional and Financial Regulation has contributed an invaluable perspective to our reform dialogue; and the Subcommittee's Ranking Member, Senator Akaka, whose bill, S. 1822, introduced the U.S. Senate to serious legislative treatment of these issues. Also with us is Senator Levin from Michigan, whom I know to having a keen interest in the welfare of America's mutual fund investors. The general consensus of the panelists at the November hearing was that illegal late trading and illicit market timing were indeed very serious threats to investors, but that excessive fees and inadequate disclosure of those fees were an even more serious threat to American investors. We heard extensive testimony from industry experts who forcefully noted that small differences in mutual fund fees can add up to enormous differences in investment returns over time, but that poor disclosure of those fees, and in fact no disclosure of transaction cost, makes it very difficult for investors to compare funds. In general the experts agreed that regulators could readily stop illegal or illicit practices such as market timing and late trading, but that it would be far more difficult and complex to address the problem of excessive fees and the inadequate disclosure, in part because most mutual funds are organized in a manner that makes the interest of fund managers largely adverse to the interest of fund shareholders. The purpose of this hearing is to take the bull by the horns and to pick up where the last hearing left off. We will examine mutual fund fees, the whole menu, the whole panoply of mutual fund fees, their propriety and the adequacy of their disclosure under the current regime. We will attempt to lift the veil off hidden fees such as revenue sharing, directed brokerage and soft money arrangements. We will also attempt to unmask and deconstruct hidden loads such as 12b-1 fees. We will discuss how statutory or regulatory changes might improve disclosure and allow for more informed comparisons between funds. This Subcommittee has specific jurisdiction over Federal retirement benefits. Later this year we will hold a hearing on the unique mutual fund system that is available only to employees of the Federal Government. It is called the Thrift Savings Plan, or the TSP for short. I have a brochure right here from the Federal Thrift Savings Plan. The TSP is essentially a public sector version of the private sector 401(k) plan. All Members of Congress, all of us up here, the Administration and their agency staffs, can invest their retirement savings in any or all of five TSP funds, each of which is either an equity or a debt security index fund. While I may be jumping ahead somewhat to a future hearing, it is worth mentioning here that the expense ratio of the average government TSP fund last year was only 11 basis points, or 11 cents per $100 invested, and that in previous years it has been as low as 7 or 8 basis points. In fact, one of the funds, the Government G Fund, in 1999 and 2000, had a net expense ratio of only 5 basis points. In contrast, according to the most recent data available from the Lipper Services, the average expense ratio for private sector S&P 500 Index Funds is 63 basis points. That is 63 cents per $100 invested. Many private sector S&P Index Funds have total expense ratios substantially lower than that, maybe as low as 17 or 18 basis points, but none even comes close to the Government Thrift Savings Plan. The difference between expenses of 11 cents per $100 invested and 63 cents per $100 invested may not sound like much, but keep in mind what all the experts emphasize, that small differences in fees add up to large differences in returns as the principal invested is compounded over long periods such as 10, 20 or 30 years. I point these facts out now because I think it ironic that Members of the House and Senate have managed to protect themselves from the sort of abusive practices and excessive fees which eat away at the savings of many Americans. If you are lucky enough to be a Senator or a Member of Congress, you simply do not have to worry about excessive fees, directed brokerage, revenue-sharing arrangements or soft dollar payments eating away and siphoning away your retirement savings like most Americans do. Nor do you have to worry about an incestuous board of directors that is beset with conflicts of interest because board members are completely independent and required by law to act solely in the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. The TSP competitively bids out the management contract for the TSP Fund, and not surprisingly, the management fee charged to TSP shareholders is only a negligible percentage of the overall TSP expense ratio. I said that the expense ratio averaged 11 basis points last year for TSP participants. A large portion of that was for a computer system that they had to charge off. They entered a contract to change their computers. Chairman Collins is investigating that. In previous years the expense ratios for the TSP Fund have been much lower than that, and it is projected that next year it will go back down into the single digits, 7 or 8 basis points. The mutual fund industry is indeed the world's largest skimming operation, a $7 trillion trough from which fund managers, brokers and other insiders are steadily siphoning off an excessive slice of the Nation's household, college and retirement savings. Is it not special that Members of Congress and Senators have set up a special separate mutual fund deal for themselves in which no skimming is allowed? Sad to say, retirement investing appears to be yet another instance in which Federal employees get a great deal, but everyone else gets the shaft. A Senator or a Congressman or a member of the SEC staff, for that matter, who participates in the Thrift Savings Plan will have more money at retirement than a member of the general public who invests the same amount for the same number of years in a comparable private sector index fund. That is not right. In fact, it is outrageous. This Committee and this Senate should not rest until Congress has given every American the same retirement savings opportunity that it has given itself. As we commence this oversight hearing, I would like to note that the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, the authorizing committee which will ultimately decide questions of mutual fund industry reform, has scheduled a series of legislative hearings to examine the mutual fund scandal and the merits of various proposals. I commend the leadership of Chairman Shelby and Ranking Member Senator Sarbanes, and look forward to continuing to work with them on this issue in the coming months. Today we will hear a broad spectrum of informed opinion on the problems confronting the mutual fund industry. We will hear the State and Federal Government perspective in our first panel, the illuminating, in-the-trenches whistle-blower perspective in our second panel, and a truly diverse and academic perspective in our third panel. At this point I would like to also acknowledge Senator Lautenberg from New Jersey, who has joined us. Senator, we thank you for your participation. The Senator had a distinguished business career before coming into the Senate, and before retiring and then coming back into the Senate. Welcome back. It is good that you are here for this issue. Senator Lautenberg. Pleased to be here. Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, if you could just yield on that. There was another event in Senator Lautenberg's life on Sunday which we all ought to take note off, which I just found out about. His beloved Bonnie is now his wife. Senator Fitzgerald. Congratulations. You did not go on a honeymoon. Senator Lautenberg. Thank you for the mention, everybody. It is about time. Senator Fitzgerald. There we go. No honeymoon? Maybe later. Senator Levin. That is a sore point already probably. [Laughter.] Senator Lautenberg. In a safe, secure relationship, it is all right to take the precise week that you want for your honeymoon. Senator Fitzgerald. Maybe wait until congressional recess to do that. Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much. Senator Fitzgerald. At this time, before I introduce our witnesses, I would like to recognize our Ranking Member, Senator Akaka, who may have an opening statement, and then I will proceed to the Chairman of the full Committee, Senator Collins, and then to Senator Levin and Senator Lautenberg. Senator Akaka, thank you. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate your conducting this hearing today, and thank you for your leadership on the issue of mutual fund reform. I look forward to continuing to work with you, Mr. Chairman, along with our colleagues on the Senate Banking Committee in enacting meaningful legislation intended to protect investors. Mr. Chairman, I have found the betrayal of trust of mutual fund investors by fund companies and brokers appalling, because mutual funds are investment vehicles that the average investor relies on for retirement, savings for children's college education, or other financial goals and dreams. In one example directly related to worker retirees in the State of Hawaii, Putnam Investments had been responsible for managing $440 million for the State of Hawaii's Employees Retirement System, which administers retirement and survivor benefits for over 96,000 State and county employees in Hawaii before the company was fired due to the late trading abuses that one of our witnesses, Mr. Scannell, helped to bring to the attention of regulators. Today's hearing will provide an opportunity to closely examine the hidden financial relationships between mutual fund companies and brokers. For example, shelf-space payment and revenue-sharing agreements between mutual fund companies and brokers present conflicts of interest that must be addressed. Brokers also compile preferred lists which highlight certain funds which typically generate more investment than those left off the list. It is not clear to investors that the mutual fund company also may pay a percentage of sales and/or an annual fee on the fund assets held by the broker to obtain a place on the preferred list or to have their shares sold by the broker. Brokers have conflicts of interest, some of which are unavoidable, but these need to be disclosed to investors. Without such disclosure investors cannot make informed financial decisions. Investors may believe that brokers are recommending funds based on the expectation of solid returns or low volatility, but the broker's recommendation may be influenced by hidden payments. Mutual fund investors need to know the amount of compensation the broker will receive due to the transaction instead of simply providing a prospectus. The bottom line is that the prospectus fails to include that detailed relevant information that investors need to make informed decisions. Mutual fund investors deserve to know how their broker is being paid. I am also concerned that although consumers often compare the expense ratios of funds when making investment decisions, they are not getting a realistic view of the true expenses of mutual funds. The expense ratios fail to take into account the costs of commissions in the purchase and sale of securities. Brokerage commissions are only disclosed to the investors upon request in the Statement of Additional Information. Brokerage commissions must be disclosed in a document and in a format that investors actually have access to and utilize. Mr. Chairman, I want to take a moment to commend the Securities and Exchange Commission for its proposals intended to improve the corporate governance of mutual funds and to increase the transparency of mutual fund fees that investors pay. The SEC has recently proposed rules to require an independent chairman for mutual fund boards, an increased percentage of independent directors to 75 percent, and a confirmation notice so that investors will be able to know how their broker gets paid in mutual fund transactions. These provisions mirror those in the Mutual Fund Transparency Act of 2003, which I introduced along with Senator Fitzgerald and Senator Lieberman in November in order to restore public trust in the mutual fund industry. I am pleased that the Commission has taken these and other actions to protect the 95 million American investors who have invested a significant portion of their financial security in mutual funds. I am encouraged by the steps taken by the SEC and I look forward to the implementation of many of the proposed reforms. However, legislation is still needed to codify several of these proposals and to bring about additional changes so that comprehensive reform of the mutual fund industry is achieved. For working Americans, mutual funds are an important investment vehicle that offers diversification and professional money management. We must restore the trust of investors in mutual funds, and I look forward to today's discussion and what needs to be done to accomplish that essential goal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator Fitzgerald. Senator Akaka, Thank you very much. Chairman Collins. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS Chairman Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for holding a second hearing to examine the mutual fund industry, and particularly to recognize your leadership in focusing on a very important topic this morning, the fees paid and expenses borne by mutual fund shareholders. For many investors, as the Chairman has pointed out, high fees and excessive expenses are even more of a problem than market timing, late trading and other abuses previously examined by this Subcommittee. Mutual funds have long been promoted as a haven for the small investor who may not have the time nor the expertise to pick stocks. Many investors like to leave the difficult and worrisome decisions regarding which companies to buy and sell to a mutual funds professional manager. To achieve their saving goals, whether it's for a new home, a college education, or a secure retirement, many American families put their hard-earned savings into mutual funds. Savings for the future often mean sacrifices for the present. A secure retirement may mean a shorter vacation. A college education for children can equate to buying a used car rather than a new one. Saving for a first home means fewer dinners out and foregoing other luxuries. These sacrifices, Mr. Chairman, are why I am so concerned that we maximize investors' mutual fund returns, and even more important, that investors understand precisely the fees and the expenses they are charged. Maximum returns for investors cannot occur if fees are excessive or opaque, or if any other questionable practices that reduce investment returns are permitted. By now we are all too familiar with the allegations regarding late trading, market timing, and other practices. What they revealed is that far too often there are two sets of rules, one for favored insiders and another set for the average investor. Perhaps most disturbing, however, was that these practices were carried out not by shady dealers in boiler rooms, but rather by senior executives at some of the most respected names in the mutual fund industry. In the most egregious cases these practices were not only tolerated by senior management but actually exploited by them as well. These executives seem to have forgotten the fundamental principle of money management, that the money given to them to invest is not their money but rather the shareholders' money. That is why Federal law imposes upon investment advisers who run mutual funds a fiduciary duty to the fund and its shareholders. At the very least this should mean, as one former regulator put it, that mutual fund executives are not spending their days trying to invent new ways to skim their shareholders' assets. Although mutual funds have been around for some 80 years, they have only become popular investment choices in the past 25 years. The American public's investment in mutual funds has exploded during that time. In 1980, total assets amounted to about $135 billion, and only 10 percent of Americans owned mutual funds. Today approximately 50 percent of Americans own a mutual fund, and total assets are at least $6.4 trillion. It can be very difficult for consumers to choose among the 8,200 mutual funds. Consumers often focus primarily on the historic rate of return, rather than on fees and expenses. Yet according to the former chief economist of the Securities and Exchange Commission, small differences in investor costs can make a huge difference in the ultimate return over the long run. For example, assume a worker chooses a mutual fund at the beginning of her working career. Should she choose one with high returns in recent years and expenses of 1.5 percent, or should she choose another with steadier, less spectacular recent returns, but only a 0.5 percent expense ratio? Sadly, there is a very good chance that most average investors will choose the former, but choosing the latter would, by the end of this woman's career, probably have returned 35 to 40 percent more money. That is the difference that the amount of fees and expenses charged can make. The government does not place limits on how much mutual funds can charge, nor should it, in my opinion. We know that U.S. mutual funds generally have lower costs than those in many other countries. But research by the General Accounting Office and the SEC suggest that we can do much better in lowering mutual fund investors' costs. It is my hope that today's hearing will shed more light on why the mutual fund market is simply not more cost competitive. It may be that consumers simply do not understand, or have not been given enough information to understand the impact of fees. But one problem clearly is that it is often very difficult for the average investor to discern the level of fees. We do not have a simple system such as we do with our checking accounts, where every month we can clearly see what fees were assessed. I think we need to look at the disclosure of fees and the location of that disclosure to bring increased transparency and disclosure to the process. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for your leadership, and I look forward to hearing the testimony today. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you very much, Chairman Collins. That is an incredible statistic, 8,200 mutual funds in the country. I believe there are only about 6,000 publicly traded corporations, so that statistic would seem to suggest it is a very good business to own or run a mutual fund. Senator Levin. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With 95 million Americans invested in mutual funds, hoping and planning to use their investment dollars for college expenses, mortgages, retirement, and to help their kids, the recently-exposed mutual fund scandals have brought home the need to look at potential reforms to stop late trading and market timing abuses, as previously examined by this Subcommittee. We are going to examine this morning to prevent hidden fees and to end ongoing conflicts of interests and other harmful practices that hurt mutual fund investors. Investors pay $75 billion each year in fees that support the mutual fund industry. The immense size of this dollar amount reflects the importance of the subjects of this hearing: Clear fee disclosure and the elimination of conflicts of interest. Investors deserve complete and accurate information about mutual fund costs so that they can make informed investment decisions and comparison shop to find well-run, low- cost mutual fund products. They also need to have confidence that the fees that they incur are legitimate. They deserve to know that the persons in charge of their investments are exercising independent and careful judgments on their behalf and that their investment advisers are providing them with objective investment advice. As we consider appropriate mutual fund reforms, it is critical to recognize and address conflicts of interests and lax oversight practices. We can start at the top. Like a typical corporation, every mutual fund is governed by a board of directors that has a duty to act in the best interest of the funds' shareholders, but as we can see from recent scandals many of these boards, as currently constituted, have failed to provide needed oversight of their funds. One way to address director conflict of interest concerns is to make sure that the requirement for so-called independent directors is met with directors who are truly independent of the funds they oversee. For instance, right now a current officer or director of a service provider to a fund can be counted as an ``independent director.'' We must change that. Other troubling conflicts of interest arise when mutual funds make undisclosed arrangements with brokerage houses which now sell about half of all mutual fund shares. For instance, recent press reports indicate that some brokers receive undisclosed incentives from mutual funds, without telling their customers about the compensation they get to push that fund's products. These types of secret commissions and arrangements mean that investors are not getting objective investment advice. We need to throw a spotlight on hidden, difficult-to- understand arrangements between mutual funds and brokerage houses involving so-called directed brokerage, revenue sharing and soft dollars arrangements. Directed brokerage occurs when a mutual fund buys stock from a brokerage firm for its holdings if that brokerage firm promotes the mutual fund's shares to their other customers. In so-called revenue sharing, the mutual fund gives the brokerage firm a share of its revenues if the brokers sell the mutual fund shares to their customers. With soft-dollar arrangements, a mutual fund pays a brokerage firm for research and other services, in the expectation that the brokers will promote the mutual fund's products. These hidden practices raise troubling conflicts of interest that need to be ended. As SEC Chairman Donaldson has said, ``Investors have the right to know everything that is inducing a broker to recommend a particular fund.'' Another key reform would be to standardize the method for calculating and disclosing mutual funds' ``expense ratios'' and ensure that they include all material costs. That ratio is designed to show the total annual operating expenses of a fund is a percentage of its total assets. The figure is already compiled by every fund and theoretically should be one of the most helpful numbers to investors comparing fees. If designed well, it should function in a way similar to the per-unit price listed on a grocery shelf price tag, giving a ``price per ounce'' so that comparison shoppers can assess the price savings between different brands and sizes. But right now, many funds leave out key expenses when calculating that ratio. For example, while the ratio now includes the management fee charged by the fund management, distribution fees and other administrative expenses, it excludes what can be one of the fund's largest expenses, portfolio transaction costs such as broker commissions. According to consumer groups, these portfolio transaction costs sometimes exceed all the costs combined that are currently included in the expense ratio. These transaction costs ought to be disclosed in a standard and easily-understood format. Other fee reforms are also needed. Many investors find the various fee options for mutual funds bewildering and rely on their broker's advice about which to choose. However, a broker's interest is often at odds with the investor's. The fee option with the greatest payoff for the broker may result in the highest charge to the investor. That conflict of interest could be addressed by requiring a clear fee disclosure prior to the purchase that presents a clear comparison of the dollar costs of investing in each class of shares over a certain period of time. Mutual funds are the investment of choice for a large percentage of Americans. It is their money that provides much of the fuel for economic growth. All of us have a duty to protect the average investor and in turn the American economy. It is sad but true that the mutual fund industry has shown that it cannot be relied upon to protect its customers. Strong reforms must be put in place in law and in regulation. I salute our Chairman, Senator Fitzgerald, Senator Akaka, Senator Collins, all of those who are involved in the leadership of advocating needed reforms for the mutual fund industry on behalf of the average investor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you, Senator. We have been joined by Senator Sununu from New Hampshire, and if I go in the order that Senators arrived, I would go first to Senator Lautenberg and then we will come back to Senator Sununu. Senator Lautenberg. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Senator Sununu has got all kinds of excitement going on in his State, so he has to get back to the TV screen and we will permit him to do so very shortly. Mr. Chairman and Chairman Collins, we thank you both for having this hearing at this opportune moment. We have been looking at hidden fees and misgovernance and self-dealing and other practices that have harmed investors in the mutual fund industry, and it seems that there is no end to corporate scandals shaking Wall Street and Main Street. I am a former chief executive and a founder of a company called ADP, Automatic Data Processing, and I always felt that my responsibility to the investor was a paramount part of my obligation, that if I could face them regularly, and even if we had an occasional dip in earnings because of the general economy, there was very good acceptance of our stock, and the PE, which I assume most people here are familiar with, was always at a very high level, and that is because they had faith and it is because that was the only way we knew how to run a company. Now what we see is instead of working to enhance shareholder value, it seems that many directors and fund investment advisers have used their trusted positions to line their own pockets and the pockets of their industry cronies. I am on the board of the Columbia University Business School--it is my alma mater--and recently established a chair in corporate governance. And having served on the public corporation for 25 years, I learned a lot from my trusted directors, including Alan Greenspan, who came to the Fed directly from the ADP Board, and recently departed Larry Tisch, who we all knew and who was a terrific example of credibility and care about how you treat public funds. So to see that the mutual fund principles have been so lax that their mission appears to be not to serve the shareholders, not the 95 million Americans who invest in mutual funds because they believe that the funds are diversified, well-regulated and managed by honest professionals, but it turns out that some investment fund managers are more concerned about creating arrangements that are profitable for them, leaving the leftovers for the investors, many of whom are counting on the safety and growth of what might be their only reserve. Today's witnesses--and I am pleased to see the list of witnesses, Mr. Chairman, are credible people, and we are pleased to have them. I am particularly familiar with Attorney General Spitzer's record and zeal in rooting out corruption wherever it can be found, and I salute that effort and urge you to continue it. Today's witnesses will testify--and this may be slightly repetitive but I think worth mentioning--that while the total assets of all mutual funds increased from $56 billion in 1978 to $6.4 trillion in 2002, the expense ratio of the average mutual fund, which actually represents less than one half of all the costs incurred by fund investors, increased from 0.91 percent in 1978 to 1.36 percent during the same period. It sounds like good business to me. That is an increase of 49 percent in the expense ratio. Mutual fund investors have not realized any of the benefits of the economies of scale, and to make matters worse, industry experts have concluded that the return earned by the average mutual fund in the past 20 years, from 1982 to 2002, has lagged behind the return of the S&P 500 by more than 3 percent. That is more than double the lag from the previous 20 years of 1950 to 1970. In other words, mutual funds have gotten more expensive, thus, their performance has realistically gone down. I am searching for a good reason why this has happened. It is hard to think of one. We do know that there has been a rash of corporate malfeasance that has extended into the mutual fund industry. It is clear that the fund managers and investment advisers seem to have become less interested in how their funds perform to the benefit of all shareholders, and more interested in creating schemes that line their own pockets regardless of performance. The New York Times reported last week that corporate executives at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland complained that the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill passed in the wake of the accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, is hampering their ability to do business. They brought it on themselves. I think the simplest axiom for Sarbanes-Oxley is ``tell the truth'' and then you do not have to worry about those kinds of imposing laws. They brought it on themselves. Someone has to look out for shareholder interests for the public interest, and there is too much at stake. Just think, this comes at a time when it is suggested that some part of Social Security ought to be permitted to be invested in the public marketplace. Well, I think that if that does happen, it is going to have serious scrutiny in the Senate and House, and we are going to make sure--if I can do anything about it; my colleagues here I think would agree--that we highlight the performance of the funds including the expenses both hidden and real and make them part of the reporting system. It comes up frequently and regularly. That is where this timing, Mr. Chairman, is so important. I congratulate you. I look forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished witnesses. I think that we have heard much about Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, almost all of it very positive and very exciting. I urge him to continue. It is a difficult and painful review, but it is essential that we get the markets functioning properly again and restore the American people's faith in the fundamental way that this country conducts its business affairs, and I thank you. Senator Fitzgerald. Senator Lautenberg, thank you very much for that excellent opening statement. Senator Sununu, last but not least. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SUNUNU Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for putting together this hearing. I am also a member of the Banking Committee and I look forward to the series of hearings that Chairman Shelby will also be holding on these issues. Let me begin picking up on a point that Senator Lautenberg made, and that is the importance of the board structures and the responsibility of the board structures. It is easy to be a little bit disdainful of wealthy board members that might be meeting overseas for a big economic forum and that they are lamenting some of the regulatory complexities of Sarbanes- Oxley. But at the same time these are board members that are supposed to be representing shareholders' interests and if we pass regulations, whether it is Sarbanes-Oxley or any other piece of regulation, one that limits their ability or creates disincentives for them to make creative decisions and good investment decisions on behalf of shareholders, or two, if we pass legislation against Sarbanes-Oxley or any regulations having to do with the mutual fund industry that makes it difficult to encourage good people, independent minds, creative individuals to sit on boards, we will have done a disservice to shareholders. So while it is important that we have regulations in place that set a clear path, set clear standards for behavior, a bright-line for legal and illegal behavior, conflicts of interest and disclosure, we do not want to create an environment, whether they are volunteer or compensated, where good, qualified people no longer want to participate in the process or serve the interests of shareholders on boards because our financial systems and our markets will have been hurt significantly by it. We all have concerns about some of the issues that have been uncovered and revealed in part by the work of Eliot Spitzer and others. Late trading, market timing, these are practices in some cases that were discouraged if not outright illegal, that need to be clarified and dealt with either by the SEC or by legislation passed by Congress. Investors need to be protected by the impact of any illegal or inappropriate trading schemes. They can place undue burdens on the funds themselves, and they can also undermine the confidence that investors have in our financial system, and that is what we saw with some of the concerns that were addressed by Sarbanes-Oxley. First and foremost we are concerned about confidence in the marketplace because without confidence we cannot have efficient trading and investing activities. Disclosure is also extremely important and highlighted here in a number of cases. We want to have consistent standards for the fees reported by these mutual funds or any other investment vehicle. What are the costs, what are the fees as a percentage? But at the same time, the absolute level of the fee is not the most critical piece of information that consumers can have, and if we suggest otherwise as policy-makers or witnesses or anyone else, then we are doing the public a disservice. The most important number is the returns of the fund net of all the fees. That is how you compare one fund to another, and if I say this fund has expenses of 20 basis points and this one has expenses of 50 basis points, but one has a return that outstrips another, then we are not going to be giving the consumers all the information that they have, so it is important that we are able to discern that different funds are going to have different risk profiles, or different returns. We want to look at those returns net of all the fees. Given good information, I think consumers will make good decisions, and I think it is a mistake to suggest that the entire mutual fund industry is a giant skimming operation. There are some bad funds out there, of course, 8,000 funds, Senator Collins pointed out. There are funds that have individuals, managers, brokers that might have broken the law and they should pay. They should certainly be prosecuted under current or future securities laws. There are funds that have done a very poor job in delivering returns to their investors, and they should certainly pay in the court of public opinion that we call the marketplace. Eight thousand mutual funds suggest to me at least an extremely competitive marketplace that is good for investors, that is good for the country. By doing a good job here with our oversight to deal with disclosure issues, we can make that marketplace even stronger and healthier, but the oversight needs to be geared toward not just good disclosure but fairness in disclosure. Some of the proposals that I have seen seem to be weighted against independent research firms. The very firms that as a result of the settlement by the Attorney General of New York and the SEC has been encouraged and I think strengthened. Independent research is a good thing. We should not do anything now in our oversight or new regulations that put independent researchers at a disadvantage. I do not believe that we should undertake regulations that try to micro manage the selection of boards on behalf of shareholders. If anything, we should be looking at ways to give the shareholders themselves, whether it is a mutual fund or a public company, the power that they need to exercise a choice in selection over board members and even hold board members accountable, and it is not the topic for this hearing, but questions of proxy and how shares are voted and the disclosure of those votes are all very important, I think, to giving power to shareholders and the decisions that they make. I appreciate the opportunity to make an opening statement and appreciate the work of the Chairman that he has done on this issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Fitzgerald. Senator Sununu, thank you very much. We are glad to have you here. I would like to now introduce our first panel of witnesses. Our first witness is Richard J. Hillman, who is the Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment at the General Accounting Office (GAO). Mr. Hillman has served at the GAO for the past 27 years and has worked on a series of reports regarding the mutual fund industry including an assessment of the industry's transparency, the quality of listing standards within securities exchanges and other corporate governance and oversight matters. The GAO conducted a review of the mutual fund industry and published an extensive report in June 2003 stating the need for greater transparency. Of course, that was before the market timing and late trading scandals broke, and now that report is getting needed attention, as are many other reports you wrote in previous years, going at least as far back as 2000 that I have seen. Our second witness is the Hon. Eliot L. Spitzer, Attorney General for the State of New York. Attorney General Spitzer's inquiry into the trading activities of Canary Capital Partners was the first of many subsequent announcements and actions against players in the mutual fund industry. Additionally, his investigations of conflicts of interest on Wall Street have been a major catalyst for reform in the Nation's financial services industry. Prior to being elected Attorney General, Mr. Spitzer served as an Assistant District Attorney in Manhattan from 1986 to 1992. I would like to thank both of you for appearing before us. In the interest of time your full statements will be included in the record, so we would ask that you limit your summary statement to 5 minutes. Thank you very much. Mr. Hillman, you may proceed. TESTIMONY OF RICHARD J. HILLMAN,\1\ DIRECTOR, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND COMMUNITY INVESTMENT, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE Mr. Hillman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman Collins and Members of the Subcommittee. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Hillman appears in the Appendix on page 81. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's work on the disclosure of mutual fund fees and the need for other disclosures of mutual fund practices. Concerns have been raised over whether the disclosures of mutual fund fees and other fund practices are sufficiently fair and transparent to investors. Our June 2003 report, entitled ``Greater Transparency Needed in Disclosures to Investors'' reviewed (1) how mutual funds disclose their fees and related trading costs and options for improving disclosure of those costs; (2) changes in how mutual funds pay for the sale of fund shares and how the changes in those practices are affecting investors; and (3) the benefits of and the concerns over mutual funds' use of soft dollars. This testimony summarizes the results of our report and discusses certain events that have occurred since the report was issued. In summary, we recommend that SEC consider the benefits of requiring additional disclosure relating to mutual fund fees and evaluate ways to provide more information that directors and investors could use to evaluate the conflicts of interest arising from payments funds make to broker-dealers and fund advisers' use of soft dollars. Specifically regarding mutual fund disclosures, we learned that although mutual funds disclosed considerable information about their cost to investors, the amount of fees and expenses that each investor specifically pays on their mutual fund shares are currently disclosed as a percentage of fund assets, whereas most other financial services disclose the actual cost to the purchaser in dollar terms. The SEC has proposed that the mutual funds make additional disclosures to investors that would provide more information that investors could use to compare fees across funds. However, SEC is not proposing that the funds disclose the specific dollars amount of fees paid by each investor, nor is it proposing to require that any fee disclosure be made in the account statements that inform investors of the number and value of mutual fund shares they own. Our reports recommend that SEC consider requiring mutual funds to make additional disclosures to investors including considering requiring funds to specifically disclose fees in dollars to each investor in quarterly account statements. Our report also discusses less costly alternatives that could also prove beneficial to investors and spur increased competition amongst mutual funds on the basis of fees. The work that we conducted for our report also found that 12b-1 fees, which allow fund companies to deduct certain distribution expenses such as sales commissions from fund assets can raise cost to investors, but also provide additional ways for investors to pay for investment advice. Our work also found that mutual fund advisers have been increasingly engaging in a practice known as revenue sharing under which they make additional payments to the broker-dealers that sell their fund shares. Although we found that the impact of these payments on the expenses of the fund investors was uncertain, these payments can create conflicts between the interests of broker- dealers and their customers that could limit the choices of funds that these broker-dealers offer investors. However, under current disclosure requirements, investors may not always be explicitly informed that their broker-dealer, who is obligated to recommend only suitable investments based upon the investor's financial conditions, is also receiving payments to sell particular funds. Our report recommends that more disclosure be made to investors about any revenue-sharing payments that their broker-dealers are receiving, and on January 14, SEC proposed new rules in this area. We are also reviewing a practice known as soft dollars in which a mutual fund adviser uses fund assets to pay commissions to broker-dealers for executing trades and securities for the mutual fund portfolio, but at the same time also receives research or other brokerage services as part of that transaction. These soft-dollar arrangements can result in mutual fund advisers obtaining research or other services, including research from third-party independent research firms that can benefit the investors in their funds. However, these arrangements also create a conflict of interest that could result in increased expenses to fund shareholders if a fund adviser trades excessively to obtain additional soft-dollar research or chooses broker-dealers more on their ability to provide soft-dollar offerings, rather than their ability to execute trades efficiently. SEC has addressed soft-dollar practices in the past, and recommended a number of actions, but has yet to act upon them. Our report recommends that more disclosure be made to the mutual fund directors and investors to allow them to better evaluate the benefits and the potential disadvantages of the fund adviser's use of soft dollars. In conclusion, GAO believes that various changes to the current disclosure and other practices would benefit fund directors and investors. Additional disclosures and mutual fund fees could help increase the awareness of investors of the fees they pay and encourage greater competition amongst funds on the basis of those fees. Likewise, better disclosure of the costs funds incur to distribute their shares and the costs and benefits of funds' use of soft-dollar research activities could provide investors with more complete information to consider when making their investment decision. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to questions at the appropriate time. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you, Mr. Hillman. Mr. Spitzer. TESTIMONY OF HON. ELIOT L. SPITZER,\1\ ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL Mr. Spitzer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Spitzer appears in the Appendix on page 102. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This Subcommittee's hearing last November played an important role in focusing attention on the conflicts inherent in an industry where directors were beholden to management. That hearing also started the process of crafting solutions to protect the $7 trillion Americans have invested in mutual funds. Several of the proposals that seemed radical when we discussed them in November have already become conventional wisdom. Requiring mutual funds to have truly independent directors and an independent board chairman are now the centerpiece of every reform proposal. There is now also widespread recognition that mutual fund directors must be given the staff and resources needed to allow them to effectively oversee the management companies that run the funds' day-to-day operations. Many reformers also recognize that mutual fund compliance officers should report to the funds' independent directors and not to the managers, whose activities are being monitored and reviewed. Perhaps most significantly, there is universal agreement that the disclosures provided to mutual fund customers are inadequate, and several competing proposals address this problem. I continue to believe that the proper approach would be to provide each investor with an itemized statement of the actual costs charged to his or her account. This would provide mutual fund customers with the information necessary to engage in true comparison shopping. That is the good news. The bad news is that the industry and many of its apologists are still opposing true reform in the area that most directly impacts investors, advisory fees. As I indicated when I was here last November, in 2002 mutual fund investors paid advisory fees of more than $50 billion and other management fees of nearly $20 billion. That is in addition to the tens of billions of dollars in marketing fees and trading costs imposed by the fund industry. The advisory fees that mutual funds charge their shareholders greatly exceed those charged to institutional customers. If mutual fund customers were charged the lower rate for advisory fees paid by institutional investors they would save more than $10 billion every year. The industry has asked whether there is a link between the advisory fees charged to investors and the late trading and market timing practices that were the initial focus of investigation. The answer is yes. Improper trading and exorbitant advisory fees are both a consequence of a desire by managers to enrich themselves at the expense of investors and an inability or unwillingness on the part of directors to protect investors. This can be demonstrated by the fact that the managers who permitted late trading and market timing in many instances did so in return for increased investments in other funds that they managed. As one mutual fund manager frankly admitted in an E-mail uncovered during the investigation, ``I have no interest in building a business around market timers, but at the same time I do not want to turn away 10 to 20 million dollars.'' Mutual fund directors and managers breached their duties to investors in many ways, and we must pursue every manifestation of that breach. This includes breaches of duty that allowed managers to overcharge investors. When I was last before this Subcommittee I spoke in generalized terms about the advisory fee overcharges imposed on investors. Now that our investigation has progressed, I'd like to talk more specifically about the advisory fees charged by two fund complexes, Putnam and Alliance. In 2002 Putnam managed approximately $279 billion from mutual fund and institutional investors. Our investigation revealed that Putnam charged mutual fund investors significantly higher advisory fees than those charged to institutional investors. Here are the numbers. Putnam's mutual fund investors were charged 40 percent more for advisory services than Putnam's institutional investors. In dollar terms what this fee disparity means is that in 2002 Putnam mutual fund investors paid $290 million more in advisory fees than they would have paid had they been charged the rate given to Putnam's institutional clients, and these are for identical services. There was a similar disparity in the advisory fees charged by Alliance. Once again mutual fund investors were charged significantly higher advisory fees than institutional investors. Specifically, Alliance's mutual fund investors paid advisory fees that were twice those paid by institutional investors. In dollars terms this means that Alliance investors paid more than $200 million in advisory fees than they would have paid had they been charged the rate given to Alliance's institutional clients. Because of these findings I refused to join in a settlement with Putnam that did not provide investors with some form of compensation for the advisory fee overcharges they incurred. Similarly, my office's settlement with Alliance requires them to return $350 million to investors by way of a 5-year 20 percent reduction in their advisory fees. These actions have led some to accuse me of engaging in rate setting. That is simply wrong. Requiring mutual funds to return to investors money that should never have been taken from them is not rate setting. It is what regulators across the country do every day when they uncover evidence that consumers have been ripped off, and it is what I will continue to do as I uncover more evidence that mutual fund investors have been overcharged. When the charge of rate setting fell flat, the industry turned to a more audacious argument in defense of their advisory fees. Earlier this month the Investment Company Institute issued a report that attempted to rebut the evidence showing that mutual fund investors pay more than institutional investors for advisory services. The ICI report tries to rebut the important conclusions of an academic article published in the Journal of Corporation Law by Professors Freeman and Brown. Professor Freeman is testifying in a later panel and does not need my assistance to articulate the foundation of his analysis, but he is due our thanks for shedding light on an abusive practice that takes billions of dollars each year from the pockets of average family savings of families who are saving for a new home of their children's education. The ICI's conclusion that mutual fund investors do not pay more than institutional investors for advisory fees was unfortunately misleading and wrong. It was not based on data showing what mutual funds charge for advisory services. Instead, the ICI relied exclusively on data concerning the fees that sub-advisors, the outside advisors occasionally hired by mutual fund managers to give investment advice, charge management companies. There are three reasons it is inappropriate to rely on data concerning sub-advisors. First, fewer than 20 percent of all mutual funds employ sub-advisors. Indeed, after the ICI released its report, Business Week noted that as few as 7 percent of mutual funds employ sub-advisors. Second, unlike most mutual fund fees where directors rubber stamp their affiliated management companies request, the fees charged by sub-advisors are the product of an arm's length negotiation between disinterested parties. Third, even the small percentage of mutual funds that employ sub-advisors often impose their own costs on top of those of the sub-advisor. For example, if the sub-advisor charges the fund 30 basis points, the fund will tack on its own premium of 20 or 30 basis points and charge investors the combined amount. The ICI report used the amount charged by the sub-advisors without accounting for the premiums tacked on by the mutual funds and passed on to shareholders. The result is that even in mutual funds that are sub-advised, shareholders pay more for advisory services than the actual cost for that service incurred by the management company. Thus, the ICI report takes a number that reflects a narrow slice of the industry and is the only part of the industry where fees are a product of arm's length negotiation, ignores the markup imposed by mutual fund and then attempts to pass that number off as representative of the entire industry. The real data that reflected the overcharge throughout the overwhelming majority of the industry are those such as what I gave you from Putnam and Alliance, data, by the way, that the companies themselves provided to us. I know that the ICI has a representative testifying in a later panel. I hope the Subcommittee will explore the issue of sub-advised fees, especially the premiums that the funds impose on top of sub-advisory fees. My sense is that these premiums are often as much or more than the fees charged by the sub- advisor itself. This raises the question of what service is being provided to justify these premiums. In the coming weeks my office will take a closer look at that question. When discussing advisory fees the challenge is not in determining the scope of the problem but in crafting an appropriate solution. I would like to ask this Subcommittee to consider a proposal endorsed a few weeks ago by the treasurers of California and North Carolina and by the New York State Controller. This proposal would require all mutual fund fee contracts to control break points providing economies of scale savings to shareholders, and would require mutual fund boards to justify fees in an analysis published in the fund's annual report. The analysis must include a comparison of the fees charged to institutional investors, a review of the management company's pretax profit and a detailed itemization of the costs of the various services including investment advice, marketing and advertising, operations and administration. I believe that this proposal, if enacted, would lead to savings of billions of dollars or more every year. I hope the Subcommittee will give it serious consideration. Thank you very much. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you, Attorney General Spitzer. I wondered if you had any kind of response to Senator Sununu's opening statement where he argued that the investment returns of the funds are equally if not more important than the fees charged by the funds. I know that last time he was here, John Bogle, who will be on our final panel today, noted that 88 percent of mutual funds underperformed the market, and that while some funds do outperform the market sometimes for a number of years, ultimately they all tend to revert to the mean, and they are at or a little bit less than the market return. So that in Mr. Bogle's view the fees are indeed very important over time, and I think that was reflected in Chairman Collins' opening statement. Do you have a response to Senator Sununu's argument? Mr. Spitzer. Yes, sir, I do. I think that certainly I am not going to dispute that the net return is a critical number that one should look at, but I think that as you just pointed out, Senator Collins and Senator Lautenberg and my great friend John Bogle, have pointed out that the fee component of the overall return is so critically important that the failure to explain adequately what fees are being built into that overall return really is what has been leading to substantial misinformation out in the marketplace. If we do not understand what fees are, why they keep increasing over time and how the compound impact of that fee will affect overall return, then investors are making a decision that is not based upon a full litany of the facts they should have. Clearly, return is a critical determinant to where we invest. Clearly as well, the fee structure, which is a constant number, is important, and I think it was Senator Collins who so well articulated if you have a momentary above-market return but high fees, that above-market return may be volatile and it may be that 2 years from now that return has returned back to the market mean, in which case the high fees that you are paying for will overwhelm that 1 year of high returns. And consequently, all these numbers are critical, must be disclosed, and the sort of disclosures that I laid out for you, that so many others have laid out for you I think is the way we should go. Senator Fitzgerald. The ICI and its allies, and even some perhaps at the SEC, seem to have been critical of you for negotiating settlements with mutual fund companies where you have required them to reduce their fees. What is your justification for bringing fees into the mix in your settlements? Is it your thought that telling them to end market timing and late trading and pay some kind of a fine really is just a slap on the wrist, that where they are getting rich really quickly is with these exorbitant fees. In my judgment we do not have a total free market here because disclosures are inadequate. Some funds are captive; they are in accounts that are tax sheltered that cannot just be moved into any other funds. To some extent these mutual funds have a lot of money, lazy money that cannot be moved. They have a guaranteed clientele. What is your public policy justification for tying fees in to your settlements? Mr. Spitzer. Let me articulate it this way, Senator. I agree with everything you just said with respect to the market reason that fees are as high as they are. The assets in the mutual fund industry are sticky, by which we mean they do not move as rapidly as they should if investors were making a market determination every day or every quarter based upon returns and costs, and consequently there is a complacency in the board room. There is an improper relationship between boards and management companies. There has been inadequate disclosure. Having said all that, none of that would give me an appropriate rationale for seeking a fee reduction in a settlement absent a belief on my part, a provable belief on my part that the boards had breached their fiduciary obligation in a way that led directly to the increased fees. I believe that we need disclosure. I have laid out in my testimony--and others who have studied this much longer and in greater depth than I will speak more wisely than I to the types of disclosures that will lead to better market behavior. But I do believe that where a regulator finds a board that has permitted behavior to continue, behavior that is a breach of its fiduciary obligation, then you seek a remedy that addresses that breach. In this case the breach was permitting and acquiescing, and indeed sometimes soliciting overcharges that injured those to whom they owed a fiduciary duty, the investor. Senator Fitzgerald. In saying they breached a fiduciary duty are you describing that fiduciary duty in the traditional sense of corporate law, that the directors owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders? My legal staff tells me they have canvassed all the reported cases out there and have never found an instance in which a mutual fund board was held to violate or breach a fiduciary duty, and my staff tells me that is because the fiduciary duty in the Federal laws, in the Investment Company Act, is a weaker fiduciary duty than the one we are accustomed to in State corporate laws, and the State courts have found a weaker fiduciary duty apply in State laws. Most mutual funds are organized either as a Delaware trust, I believe, or a lot of them are organized under the laws of the State of Massachusetts. Have you had an opportunity to examine the nature of the fiduciary duty that is imposed by law on mutual fund directors? Mr. Spitzer. We have looked at it and I would say this, that it is an area where these unique facts have really not been presented to the courts, and it is my belief that if we were ever to be forced to litigate a case where we could show that a board had knowledge and was aware that there were two different fee structures that had been imposed, one that permitted institutional investors to be getting a fee structure that was significantly lower than that was being charged to the other mutual fund investors, we would be able to demonstrate that was a breach of the duty and we would succeed in that litigation. Senator Fitzgerald. One final question before I turn it over to my colleagues. It has come to my attention that some of the funds charge fees to their mutual fund shareholders in order to remit their dues to the ICI which has been fighting you so aggressively. I find it kind of incredible that fund boards debit everybody's account to get dues to pay for the ICI to go lobby in Washington against the interests of the shareholders that are paying for their lobbying. Do you have any thoughts on that issue, and what do we do about that, because does not the ICI really represent the insiders? They encourage the perception that they represent mutual fund shareholders, ma's and pa's here in Washington, but is it not really the case that they represent the insiders? Mr. Spitzer. I agree with your conclusion because I agree with your premise which is that the ICI does, in fact--and with all deference to my friends who are here from the ICI--the ICI has not been a voice for reform or protection of the shareholder, but really has been a voice for the status quo and a voice for the very internecine set of relationships that have led to the enormous breaches of fiduciary duty---- Senator Fitzgerald. Do you think they have acted in the interest of mutual fund shareholders? Mr. Spitzer. No, I do not, and needless to say, I have disagreed, as my testimony makes clear, fundamentally with not only the conclusions but the very way that the ICI has addressed this issue. I will say that the way that the ICI addressed and thought about the issue of timing and other clear problems that existed, structural problems that existed within the industry has been deeply disconcerting to me because I think it was a voice for the status quo, a voice in opposition to meaningful and reasoned reform. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you very much, Mr. Spitzer. It is wonderful testimony and we appreciate you coming to Washington in this adverse weather. Senator Akaka. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Spitzer, I would like to ask you two things. First, a study conducted by John Freeman and Stewart Brown showed that the average actively managed mutual fund company investing in large cap stock paid 0.52 percent of fund assets for investment advice, as opposed to the 0.21 percent paid by pension funds for large cap portfolio management. My request is that you please explain to the Subcommittee why this difference exists, and would like the benefit of your experience and your insights. What should be done so that mutual fund companies act more like pension funds and reduce their expenses? Mr. Spitzer. Those numbers are perhaps the most important numbers that we should focus on because it is that net, that enormous margin between the 52 basis points and the 21 basis points that compounds every year to those enormous return differentials that investors are suffering from as a result of the disparity between what institutional investors pay and mutual funds by and large pay. What should be done falls into several categories, but first disclosure, and disclosure we all believe transparency. Disclosure ultimately will leave the marketplace and investors to make the appropriate determinations. But we also, given how broken the fund board structure is right now, we need to go beyond that to actually mandate--and this is what I wove into the final passages of my testimony--we need to mandate a particular methodology by which mutual fund boards would then begin to undertake this analysis. They can reach whatever conclusions they want of course. They are the board. But they must consider the factors that are enumerated, which are what fees are being paid by institutional investors, what are the margins that are being derived by those who are rendering this advice, what are the costs that are being incurred. Given the failure of the boards to properly weigh these factors--and we know that that is the case because of the 52 versus 21 basis point differential we just highlighted--we I think can fairly say to them: Do this analysis, reveal your conclusion. You are free to reach any decision you wish, but you must go through this analysis and give us the tools to evaluate the wisdom of your conclusion by giving us the data that you relied upon. Senator Akaka. Mr. Hillman, I am concerned that it is not clear to investors that the mutual fund company also may pay a percentage of sales or an annual fee on the fund assets held by the broker or both to obtain a place on the preferred list, or to have their shares sold by the broker. Investors may think that their broker is recommending funds based on the expectation of solid returns, low volatility or the needs of the investor, but the broker's recommendation may be influenced by hidden payments. Mr. Hillman, please describe for the Subcommittee what you have learned about the typical revenue- sharing arrangements found at the large fund supermarkets, and also what the typical investor knows about these financial relationships. Mr. Hillman. Thank you very much. What you are referring to, revenue sharing, is payment that is made by the fund's investment advisor from its own resources to finance the distribution of fund shares. SEC, in 1977, through Rule 10b-10 of the Securities and Exchange Act, required that the nature of revenue-sharing arrangements be described in general terms which they are in mutual funds prospectus. However, a fairly simple statement amounting to the acknowledgement that payments are made to broker-dealers has historically met SEC's requirements. Therefore, no publicly available information that would allow one to quantify the nature or extent of revenue sharing at the fund or industry level exists. There is simply no transparency of these expenses. It is also a legal issue. As to whether payments are an indirect use of fund assets to finance the distribution, you would think therefore that they ought to be included within a 12b-1 plan that funds' boards of directors are supposed to be evaluating. Because, though they are taking out of the investment advisor's profits, there is limited disclosure to the board of directors of these payments, and therefore limited information being provided to them for their review. SEC has recently, January 14, proposed new rules to enhance the information that broker-dealers provide to customers at both the point of sale, which is critically important, as you mentioned in your opening statement, and during the confirmation process once a trade is executed, and we applaud the SEC for their initiative in this area. Senator Akaka. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you, Senator Akaka. Chairman Collins. Chairman Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hillman, I want to explore with you the issue that the Attorney General brought up in his statement about the huge disparity in the fees charged institutional investors versus the every-day retain investor, at least in the two cases that he cited. For example, in the Putnam case I believe the Attorney General said there was a 40-percent difference, which is certainly substantial. In addition, one of our witnesses who will appear later this morning has also looked very closely at this issue and authored an article in the Journal on Corporate Law that also concluded that institutional investors were charged considerably less than the small investor. The mutual fund industry, as the Attorney General cited, has done a study that says that such differences can be accounted for by a different level of service or more work being done to serve institutional investors. I also wonder if perhaps the industry looks at the institutional investor as deserving of volume discount, if you will. What are your views on this issue? Is there a justification for having a very different fee structure, a much more favorable fee structure for institutional investors than for the average American who is investing in a mutual fund? Mr. Hillman. That is a very good question, something that we have not looked at as part of our study in June 2003, but let me offer these viewpoints. It is clear that institutional investors bring to the table greater assets, and therefore a reduced fee will allow mutual fund companies to retain large amounts of funds from those individual institutional investors that is drastically different from what might be coming available from an individual investor who may have a smaller portfolio, a smaller amount invested. Additional costs on the part of that fund to maintain information could cause for a difference to be there between institutional cost expenses and those of individuals. But the numbers that the Attorney General surfaced are quite astounding. The difference between those fees are enormous over the long term, and something that is deserving of additional attention. Chairman Collins. Mr. Spitzer. Mr. Spitzer. Senator Collins, could I just add one thought to that? Obviously, it is not only framed properly, but really cuts to the core of the issue. I would point out that the differentials we talked about are for essentially equivalent pools of capital even though the individual institutional investor may be larger, obviously, than the individual mutual fund investor. We are aggregating those pools and we are saying: What did you charge to provide advisory services for equivalent pools of capital? $100 million, $200 million; not $100 million to the $10,000 mutual fund investor. The incremental costs that clearly are borne, in terms of redemption fees, in terms of communication, in terms of statement issuance that attached to the small investor are not part of the advisory fee costs. Those are shown elsewhere. Those are other fees. This is an apples to apples comparison. When we generated these numbers, we went to Putnam and we said: Give us your best apples to apples comparison for identical services. The numbers were from them for that identical set of services. Chairman Collins. That is a very important clarification, and I appreciate you adding that to your testimony. I want to explore with both of you the best way that we can ensure that consumers have the information they need on the fees that they are paying. As, Mr. Hillman, you pointed out the amount of fees and expenses that each investor specifically pays now are currently disclosed only as a percentage of the fund's assets. Most other financial services disclose the actual cost to the purchaser in dollar terms, and again I go back to my checking account analogy, where you can see very clearly what fees you are being assessed every month. It is my understanding that the SEC has proposed additional disclosures, but still is not proposing that funds disclose the specific dollar amount of fees paid by each investor, nor is the SEC requiring that the fee disclosures be listed on the account statements. And yet the account statement is what most of us rely on. We do not go back and read the prospectus to determine our investment expenses are. So really that means we are not getting any timely, regular disclosure at all of the fees if you are the average investor. Starting with you, Mr. Attorney General, and I see my time is up, could you tell me if you think the SEC's proposal is adequate or whether you would like to see on the quarterly account statement a clear disclosure in dollar terms as well as percentages of the fees? And then, Mr. Hillman, I would like you to answer the same question. Mr. Spitzer. Thank you for that question, Senator. I vowed I was going to come to Washington and leave without being critical of the SEC, and so I am going to answer your question a little differently. Rather than saying whether the SEC is good or bad, I would merely say that I think the format of disclosure that you described would be enormously helpful for investors and perhaps would be the most important way for them to understand what fees they have actually been charged. I think that there is certainly a desire--there should be a desire to give each consumer an actual dollar cost that he or she is paying. There also should be a desire to provide an easy comparative basis, which means a per-unit comparison akin to what we all see at the supermarket, where as either Senator Levin or Senator Lautenberg referred to it, as either a per ounce, what am I paying per ounce? So there should be both a per dollar disclosure and what your portfolio is being charged per quarter. Chairman Collins. Thank you. Mr. Hillman. Mr. Hillman. This is an area that we have done considerable work on, and the concern here really is over investor awareness of fees. Despite existing disclosures and educational efforts, the degree to which investors understand mutual fund fees and expenses remains a significant source of concern. There were studies conducted by the SEC and the OCC back in 1996 which found that one in five fund investors could not give an estimate of the expenses for their largest mutual funds, and fewer than one in six understand that higher expenses lead to lower returns. A Vanguard money investor literacy test back in September 2002 found that 75 percent of respondents could not accurately define a fund expense ratio, and 64 percent did not understand the impact of expenses on funds' returns. Clearly, more needs to be done to make sure investors are aware of the impact of fees on the returns for their mutual fund investors. Special dollar disclosure could be the incentive that some investors need to take action to compare their fund's expenses to those of other funds and to make more informed investment decisions. Chairman Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you. Senator Levin. Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to get into the area of revenue sharing and directed brokerage. This is a way that the mutual funds get money to brokers for selling their shares. I want to ask you just a very simple question about a public company that wants to have a broker sell its shares on the stock exchange and pays the broker a hidden fee of a dollar for every share of stock that it sells to that broker's customers. Is that legal? Mr. Spitzer. I think not. Mr. Hillman. It is not. Not a practice you would want to do, no. Senator Levin. How is it any different when a mutual fund pays a broker a hidden fee, and one of the two ways that are involved in either revenue sharing or directed brokerage, to sell its shares to the broker's customers; how is that any different from a publicly traded company saying: For every share you will sell of my company on the stock exchange, I am going to pay you a buck? Mr. Spitzer. I do not believe it is different. I think it is a hidden subversive interest that without full and complete disclosure runs contrary to the fiduciary duty that is owed to that customer to whom you are marketing the product. Senator Levin. You would agree with that, Mr. Hillman? Mr. Hillman. Yes. Hidden cost. Senator Levin. The fiduciary duty that we are talking about here actually, I believe, or from what I know is the broker's fiduciary duty. Mr. Spitzer. That is correct. Senator Levin. It seems to me that is what we have to really clarify. We have to focus on what conflicts of interest we are talking about here. With directed brokerage what we are talking about is that a mutual fund is going to agree that it will buy stock from a broker if that broker sells that mutual fund's shares. So it will give business in effect to that broker if that broker sells its shares. It is a hidden deal. Mr. Spitzer. For the mutual fund it is a disclosure violation, that it is not disclosed that it is providing this incentive to the broker, and that is a material fact that obviously should be disclosed in their hidden fee issues. For the broker, who has not disclosed to his or her client that there is a hidden benefit that he or she derives from that sale, it is a breach of the fiduciary duty. Senator Levin. Is it an illegal act for a broker to receive that hidden fee from somebody to sell a share to that broker's customer? Mr. Spitzer. Let me state it this way because I do not want to suggest that necessarily it would be a criminal act. We would have to look at all sorts of surrounding factors, but it is something that we would consider to be a violation of the Martin Act. Senator Levin. Of the what? Mr. Spitzer. Of the Martin Act, the New York State securities law. Senator Levin. If it is a violation of law for a broker to sell me a share of stock when unbeknownst to me he was paid by that company to sell me that share of stock, it seems to me that is obviously, it is more than a conflict of interest. It seems to me it is a violation of law. If it is not, it should be. Mr. Spitzer. It is. Senator Levin. Now looking at the mutual fund that is paying the broker to do that, are they not aiding and abetting an illegal act? Mr. Spitzer. You could certainly try to bring them in as aiders and abettors, absolutely. Senator Levin. Should we try to bring them in as aiders and abettors either by regulation or by law? Are they not contributing to an illegal act by making a payment to somebody to sell me something that is not known to me? Is there not an inherent conflict there which either is or should be illegal on the part of the broker and should it not be illegal to do that because you are aiding and abetting that just the way--if I give you a bribe and you accept the bribe, you have violated the law by accepting a bribe. But have I not violated the law by offering the bribe? How is this different except that it is in a market setting? Mr. Spitzer. It is not different. I would come at it from a slightly different perspective. I would reach the same conclusion, but I think it is the behavior that we want to eliminate, and whether we eliminate the behavior by saying the mutual fund is aiding and abetting or whether we simply ban the behavior without full and fair disclosure to all participants and make everybody equally culpable, I suppose I could say I am indifferent to how you address it. The behavior we wish to eliminate is the hidden fee shifting. Senator Levin. I agree with that, but when we come to eliminating behavior we do it in two ways. One is disclosure, but the other one is a prohibition with a fine at least, an administrative fine and maybe sometimes a criminal fine, but nonetheless there are a number of ways to address the conduct. I agree with you, we want to stop the conduct, but disclosure is one way. It may or may not succeed by the way, just like these fee disclosure may or may not succeed depending on how complicated they are. You get a fee disclosure on your telephone bill, most people do not have the vaguest idea, looking at a complicated telephone bill, what the heck is in that bill. That is disclosure, but it does not do the job. I guess this is my final question because my time is up. It seems to me that is a critical question which we face. We have got to act against the conduct. It is clearly a violation of a fiduciary duty on the part of a broker, it seems to me, to be selling something to me without disclosing to me that he is getting paid by the guy whose share he is selling to me or whose stock he is selling to me, to sell it to me. If that is not a violation of law, it surely ought to be. But, what we need to do is decide do we want to get at the conduct from the mutual fund side by either forcing disclosure, but if it is improper, it should not just be disclosed. We do not just want to disclose impropriety. We want to stop impropriety it seems to me. And if it is a conflict or aiding and abetting in a conflict, why should we not just ban that action rather than simply say disclosure is good enough? That is my final question. It sounded like a speech but it is really a question. [Laughter.] Mr. Spitzer. With all due respect, if I were in the courtroom I might have objected to the question as being compound, but that is all right. Senator Levin. I think it was a leading question. Mr. Spitzer. I am going to hedge right now on whether there should be a ban because I can imagine situations where smaller mutual fund companies would want to announce to the world: We have many representatives out there, who when they sell your products, we give them some degree of compensation. There are salesmen who have relationships with us and many other mutual funds as well. As long as the investor is fully aware--and I do not mean the sorts of disclosures that are on the third page of an 18-page contract. I mean they are really being informed why the salesman, the broker as it were, has an interest in pushing particular funds over others. Then I can imagine that that is a conflict. Senator Levin. A financial interest? Mr. Spitzer. Correct. Senator Levin. Has a financial interest. Mr. Spitzer. That is correct, because that is a way to disseminate and market the product. Senator Levin. I would end with a request then, that you would give us advice for the record on that issue because I think that is one of the really fundamental questions we face as to whether disclosure is going to be adequate or whether there ought to be some kind of a prohibition that we ought to urge on the regulators. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Fitzgerald. Senator Levin, those were excellent questions, and I hope to have the opportunity to share with you a bill I am working on, because I tend to agree with you that a lot of these practices, these shadowy practices which people are only vaguely aware of, should simply be banned as opposed to disclosed in a better fashion. I think your analogy with what if a publicly traded corporation, not a mutual fund, went to brokerage houses and said: We will give you a dollar for every share of our stock that you sell. That would be an outrageous fraud on the public. Right now you have brokerage firms steering their clients into certain mutual funds, not because it is necessarily in the best interest of their client, but because they are going to get revenue sharing or some other fee from the mutual fund. In Chicago they call that a kickback, as I said at the last hearing. I do not think it is right. Senator Sununu. Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did not understand all of the details of the previous question, but I assume in the public equities market to a certain extent, provided it is disclosed the right way and you comply with the laws, it is also called a commission. The brokers make commission all the time for selling stocks. You want it to be disclosed, and depending on who else they are doing business with there could be some conflicts of interest, and that is obviously what the line of questioning gets to, but simply being a broker is making money by selling mutual funds or stocks does not necessarily mean they are doing anything wrong. I want to pick up on a point that you made, Mr. Spitzer, and I think it is a very important one, which is in this discussion about the financial arrangement, you emphasize that there could be a situation where a small mutual fund in particular, your example, was disadvantaged. In other words, you focused on the disclosure but you could imagine, I think you said, a situation where a small mutual fund was trying to get out information about the new fund. Without getting into the particulars of the example, I think that is an important point because there are other areas of regulation here where we might see practices we would enjoy better disclosure of. We want to make sure we are not disadvantaging new mutual funds, smaller funds, at the expense of the larger funds or to the benefit of the larger funds. I was not very clear there, but we want to make sure we have a level playing field, which gets to my first question. Would you be concerned about regulations that treat independent research in a discriminatory manner with respect to the large full service brokerage houses? Mr. Spitzer. Let me restate your question. I have seen the articles that I gather you have seen as well that suggest that if there were a straight ban on soft money as a means of compensating certain entities, that could have a disparate impact and a very negative impact on some of these smaller independent research boutiques that are there. Senator Sununu. That qualify either a straight ban or a discriminatory reporting report, that one set of fees has to be reported in a particular way, and another set of fees for the full service does not have to be reported. Mr. Spitzer. The answer to your question is yes, I am worried that we not act in a way--and as you pointed out in your opening statement, one of the efforts 2 years ago now really was to resuscitate the role of independent research and to make sure that there was somehow a business model that would work. I think we need to think carefully as we address the issue of soft money and the issues relating to these regulatory schemes, what collateral impact there may be in the context of research. Now, I do not say any of that to justify what I think is at best a very murky area, which is the enormous sum of money that flows through these soft dollar commissions which is untracked and hard to understand, and I think is an area that significantly cries out for some very careful thought. Senator Sununu. Are you for banning all soft dollar transactions, or are you for uniform disclosure of those transactions? Mr. Spitzer. I have said in prior testimony, and my position has not changed since then, I simply have not looked at the issue to have an informed judgment on the matter. I have seen obviously enough to know that there is, as I said, significant area for inquiry, but there are also significant subtleties in how we deal with it. Senator Sununu. A hypothetical. Two funds, they are mid-cap funds. They are the size---- Mr. Spitzer. Mid-cap, I am sorry, you said? Senator Sununu. Mid-cap funds. They advertise themselves in the same way, have generally the same requirements for investment, about the same size in total assets. One has a 5- year return of 11 percent and an expense ratio of 40 basis points. Mr. Spitzer. Five years, 11 percent, OK. I want to make sure I get my numbers. I do not have an HP 12. Senator Sununu. One has a 5-year annualized return of 8 percent and expenses of 20 basis points. Which one was the better investment? Mr. Spitzer. I will have to ask Mr. Bogle. He is the master of these numbers. Senator Sununu. I think both the esteemed Mr. Bogle and you could come to the same conclusion. The 11 percent with the 20 more basis points in the expense is going to be the better return over the 5 years. I mean 300 basis points and at least the gross returns really does make a difference in the long run. A simple example, I know, but it just comes back to this point that we want to make sure we are emphasizing the important statistics for investors, and I will consistently come back to the issue of returns net of all expenses I think is the best barometer because it takes into consideration different levels of investment, different levels of assets. I could have expenses of $387 for my mutual fund investment, but it obviously makes a difference whether my total assets are $350 million invested in that or $1,000 in the expense ratio. So the dollar value could be important. I could imagine circumstances where I would want to be able to compare that, but I think the return net of all expenses is the one that consumers will use most often to compare mutual fund performance across their own portfolio or to other funds that are out there. With regard to the board structure, you support the idea of an independent board chair, correct? Mr. Spitzer. That is correct. Senator Sununu. Did any of the firms against whom you brought charges have independent board chairs? Mr. Spitzer. Yes. In fact, let me just clarify. I support the notion of an independent chair and the 75 percent threshold, but have always made it clear these are not panaceas. To go back to a slightly different context, if you were to look at the Enron board and look at the constituency of that board on paper you would say: What a spectacular board. So clearly when you define board membership, and we try to promote good board behavior by defining constituency, that does not guarantee any result. It is sort of like a prospectus. But it perhaps permits us to be in a situation where we can raise expectations and get divergent views. Senator Sununu. Unless there is an academic study out there that I am unaware of, and I would be very interested in seeing it, why support a ``reform'' if there is no empirical evidence that it has ever resulted in better behavior or better results for shareholders or investors? Mr. Spitzer. I think you are drawing the wrong logical conclusion. To say that it does not inevitably guarantee an appropriate result does not mean that it is not logically superior as a matter of principle to have an independent board chair who would then be in a position to negotiate at arm's length with a management company to which he or she does not owe a parallel duty. Senator Sununu. Do the independent board members not participate in those negotiations with fund managers now? Mr. Spitzer. They might participate but I think the record suggests that the participation has not been adequately vigorous, and that is why as a theoretical matter, what we are trying to do--as I think we all, even you, I dare say, would agree with the notion that we want to resuscitate the vigor with which the mutual fund board enters these negotiations. As a matter of principle it seems quite clear that having a board which does not have a significant overlap with the management company is more likely to give you an arm's length negotiation. Senator Sununu. But I come back to my belief, which could be wrong, that there is no empirical evidence that shows that those boards led by independent chairmen have had their boards engage in these negotiations ``more vigorously'' than boards that do not have independent chairmen. You can feel free to respond, but I think it would be wrong to suggest that we know there would be a better result if there were an independent chairman, even though we cannot show that in all the cases where there were independent chairmen there was a better result. That seems to me to be a non sequitur. Mr. Spitzer. I am happy---- Senator Sununu. No, you do not have to respond. Mr. Spitzer. I think we have stated our positions with some clarify, but I think the premise of independence is one that most people feel would move us in the right direction. Senator Sununu. Do you support--one final question, it is a yes or no; can I just ask one more? I am sorry. Senator Lautenberg. Time is flying, and we are trying to parcel it out. Senator Sununu. Do you support the same proposal for every public in America, that they have to have an independent disinterested chairman? Mr. Spitzer. I do not, but I will tell you some of the most staid and conservative corporate lawyers in America have come to that conclusion. I would point to Ira Millstein at Weil Gotshal, who has for years been calling for independent chairs as one of the critical ways to resuscitate board behavior. Senator Sununu. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg. I apologize for running over. Senator Lautenberg. That is all right. Senator Fitzgerald. Senator Lautenberg. Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say to Senator Sununu I think that he is on a good track, and the hearing thus far has been excellent, and I thank both of the witnesses here for their testimony. I look at this a little bit differently. First of all, I think that in the case of an underwriting, which I think was Senator Levin's kind of focus, compare it to the difference between--may I call it--wholesale and retail, because everyone knows that if you want to buy a car, Mr. Levin's example perhaps ought to be--that what you pay does not give you all of the details about what the dealer you bought it from paid. You make your decisions based on a net, but it is a lot easier to compare Chevrolet to Ford, etc., than it is for the arcane business of details about mutual fund purchases, etc. For most of the public it is foggy. For most of the people in our business it is foggy because it is very complicated, hard to understand. One of the things I think we might have to do is--I think Senator Sununu was on the right track with one exception, and that is that simply measuring the net performance of a mutual fund to its shareholders is not quite sufficient because you do not know what these hidden costs are, and maybe the shareholder ought to get more. Just because they got 11 percent compared to an 8 percent, maybe they should have gotten 15 percent, and had they been aware of where it was going, that they would have required that. Someplace along the way we have to make this knowledge comprehensible about what people ought to look for. I do not know whether it is an index, a mutual fund index that says here are the costs, here is the net result, the difference between the two is thus, and give people an easy way of forming opinions about whether or not they go ahead and purchase these shares. The thing that is scandalous is the amount of--some call it baksheesh; it is a common term in the Middle East, and we paid plenty for that in Iraq--but it is distributed around. I think that if they are giving away your money, even if you got a pretty good return for it, that is not appropriate. Mr. Spitzer, I would like to know if anything has happened since you broke the mutual fund scandal in September? Have you seen anything that says: Uh-huh, they are making changes that would correct some of the conditions that brought on these problems? Mr. Spitzer. Yes, sir. I think the answer is that it is--I do not know if it was Justice Holmes, I may be wrong--light is the best disinfectant, which is not only the premise to disclosure but the enormous spotlight that has been beamed and been focused upon the industry over the last number of months that has revealed not only the warts and improprieties but also those who are good, has led every board to reconsider and rethink its behavior, and therefore we are seeing embers, that hopefully will burst into flames, of changed behavior. So, yes, there is change that results from first the sheer embarrassment of having the names of companies in the headlines, the fact that people have been taken away in handcuffs and sentenced to jail, and so, yes, there are changes. Senator Lautenberg. There are still people being taken away in handcuffs. Mr. Spitzer. And there will be more. Senator Lautenberg. This is kind of a pet subject of mine, and that is directorships and how they function, and I think one day that in America we will see a class of executive called director. I know this, that when I was running ADP and we started with nothing, we had nothing to invest except our hard work, and the company that we started many years ago, today has over 40,000 employees and had the longest growth record of any company in America, over 10 percent gain each and every year for 41 years straight in a row. It was a good investment. I should not have sold my stock. [Laughter.] But I do believe that to obtain the interest of a director away from a company, I never took another company's board seat. I did for a while and decided that was not for me. If I was going to run my company, I wanted to focus exclusively on my company. If I wanted to do something that was a not-for-profit or something like that, I enjoyed it, but I did not believe that I had the right to take time away from my company, no matter how comfortable they offered to get me there or whether it was an overnight conference in Las Vegas, that that was enough to divert me from my appointed rounds, as I say. I think we are going to see a class some day of directors exclusively, people who will have attained a degree of experience and reputation and so forth that can qualify as directors, and they will sit on several boards. This is where I think we are going, and I think it is essential. Otherwise, it is too tough. People become friends. There are relationships, serious relationships that develop. But to respond to Senator Sununu's question about have you see any different result as a consequence of an independent board, I think it is fair to say that what you have seen is just the reverse of that, which is a corollary, and it says, hey, when you look at Enron and you look at the people and you look at some of the people who were directors, they closed their eyes. They did not have the time, they did not have the interest. You made a very important statement, directors should be furnished with a staff person, resources, and information expanded that the public can understand. No matter what happens, I do not think the CEO of a company--this is a personal thing--ought to be able to walk away with the profits of the store unless he owns the store. I think that he has a job like everybody else, and when a chief executive walks away from a job that paid millions and millions and millions of dollars, and then there is still a reach out, there are grasps out there to see that the favorite wines or the favorite airplanes or the favorite massages are still included. I think it is a travesty. One thing we have to make sure of is that we have people taking their assignments seriously. Maybe they begin to understand that when they too are punished for either lack of interest of lack of action on their part when they see these abuses. I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. We are going to go much further before these subjects are fully aired. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you. As I wrap up, I just would like to make my own comments on Senator Sununu's suggestion. I think, again bringing up the analogy of the Government Thrift Savings Plan that we are all members of, our directors have to be independent by law, and they competitively bid out the management contract. The management contract was won on a competitive bidding basis by Barclays Global Investors in London. They charge an exceedingly low fee to manage the TSP fund for Federal employees. I wonder how we would feel if all of a sudden we changed the law and the directors of our TSP board did not have to be independent and they could instead be insiders at the outside manager. What if the chairman of the TSP board were an officer of Barclays Global Investors and owed a fiduciary duty to shareholders of Barclays? We might not sleep as well at night knowing that. Yes, there are independent directors who do not have conflict who are not very bright or are not very diligent or do not work very hard or whatever. So having an independent director is no guarantee that you are going to have a good director, but certainly it helps to eliminate conflicts that could otherwise arise. We do not have to worry about that for our retirement funds because Congress has created a separate investing regime for Members of Congress. We get one special deal, and the whole rest of the world is stuck in this rotten world where conflicts are all over the place, where fees are exorbitant, where there is revenue sharing, directed brokerage. We do not have to worry about that, but my goal is that hopefully we can give the rest of America as good a mutual fund deal as Congress has given itself. With that, I want to thank these two witnesses. They have been excellent. We have gone on for 2 hours. You have been very patient. We are going to give you leave to go back to New York or go back to your offices. Thank you very much for being here. Mr. Spitzer. Thank you, sir. Mr. Hillman. Thank you. Senator Fitzgerald. Our next panel is the whistleblower panel, and before I introduce them I am going to take a 2- minute break so that we can all stretch. We have been here for 2 hours. So why don't we take a 2-minute break and then we will return. [Recess.] Senator Fitzgerald. During the break there was a request made to take one of our panelists out of order because he has a plane to catch, and we are happy to honor his request. John Bogle probably needs no introduction. In the mutual fund world I think he is probably the best known investor in the country. He is the founder of Vanguard. It is something he had wanted to do since he was in college and wrote his thesis at Princeton I believe on the Massachusetts Investment Fund at the time. He had this dream of creating a truly mutual mutual fund, and he had the opportunity to fulfill that dream in founding Vanguard and watching it grow in a short period of time to be one of the two largest mutual funds in America. He is the author of several books on mutual funds. He is an industry expert without equal, as far as I am aware, and we are honored and delighted to have him back for the second time before this panel. So without further ado, Mr. Bogle, thank you very much for being here. TESTIMONY OF JOHN C. BOGLE,\1\ FOUNDER AND FORMER CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE VANGUARD GROUP, AND PRESIDENT, BOGLE FINANCIAL MARKETS RESEARCH CENTER Mr. Bogle. Thank you, Chairman Fitzgerald, and thank you particularly for the courtesy in accommodating my schedule. Sometimes we get a little bit over scheduled and that is the position in which I find myself today. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Bogle appears in the Appendix on page 106. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I am very happy to be here because when you think about it, if you do for a moment, out of all the persons you have heard from, I am the only one who has actually been in the mutual fund business. I have been the Chairman of the Investment Company Institute back in 1970-71, I think, and I have actually been in this business for more than half a century. So I hope the perspective that I can bring to you is helpful. My entire career has been in this business, and I have observed in that period that this industry has changed greatly in that half century and it has not changed for the better. It has been a business that originally focused on prudent stewardship. It focused on long-term investing. It focused on putting the shareholder first. It had very low costs and attracted people who were attracted to the wisdom of long-term investing. Since then the industry has changed in almost every measurable way. Portfolio turnover is higher. Costs have doubled for equity funds. Funds hold their shares for a much shorter period of time, meaning we are selling the public speculative funds that basically are capitalizing on the folly of speculation rather than the wisdom of long-term investing. Instead of running this industry in the interest of fund shareholders, we are running this industry, I am sorry to say, to too great an extent in the interest of fund managers. We have become too much of a business and not enough of a profession. So this industry has to rethink, has to stand back and look at itself. I think the steps that are necessary to bring this change around--I will not deal with the technical steps too much-- requires us to figure out how to give the mutual fund investors the fair shake they deserve. Part of that is to give the weight of the mutual fund structure more heft, if you will, on the mutual fund shareholder side and less left on the mutual fund manager side. To that end I believe deeply that we need a more independent board, a completely independent board chairman, and I believe we badly need an express Federal standard of fiduciary duty which requires directors to act with loyalty and care in the best interest of fund shareholders. I think we need to help fund investors better understand their costs, and what would do that is the full disclosure of the total costs you bear as a shareholder in your fund, including transaction costs and others, the actual dollar cost each investor pays. I think it would be unarguably a great advantage for investors. We also need something that has not been brought up today. We need mutual funds to report not just their per share results, which are the time-weighted, returns you read in the paper--we got a return of, say, 11 percent per share--but the returns their shareholders actually earn, what are called dollar-weighted returns. So many mutual fund purchases are done at the wrong prices at the wrong time and the wrong funds that those dollar-weighted returns are often as many as 6 or 7 percentage points behind the returns that the funds actually report. That should be reported. It is a known number. It should be reported in fund reports. I think those will help. I also think that we should direct the Securities and Exchange Commission to undertake a comprehensive economic study of the mutual fund industry. With $7 trillion in assets, in mutual funds, the national public interest and the interest of investors would be well served by shining the simple spotlight of disclosure on the revenues and expenditures of mutual funds and their managers, taking into account the fees, the sales charges, the transaction cost, where they are spent, where they come from, where are they spent, and how much is left for manager profits. Mutual fund investors incur not only the $70 billion of costs that were referred to earlier. That $70 billion is the direct cost that the mutual funds pay, but they pay another $40 or $50 billion in transaction costs, sales charges and other expenses like that. We need to follow that money because those costs of $120 billion are the amount by which mutual fund returns are apt to fall short of the financed markets' returns year after year. I also think, strongly agreeing with Attorney General Spitzer, that we need a requirement for fund advisors to provide, and fund directors to consider, the amount and structure of fees paid by institutional clients. One brief example to show how shocking this disparity can be. One advisor charged its mutual fund 97 basis points on a $4.5 billion fund, $41 million. But it charged a fee of 98 basis points, less than one-tenth as much, for a $900 million fund for California retirement system, or one-sixtieth as many dollars, just $700,000. California also pays investment incentive fees for investment success, but such fees, so-called performance fees, are conspicuous by their absence in the mutual fund industry. Finally, as I say in my formal statement, there are two firms in this business--actually three now that you mention the Federal Thrift Savings Plan--that have in fact been truly mutual in their struture. One is Massachusetts Investors Trust, which started the first mutual fund 80 years ago, had an excellent record, was the largest fund in this industry for 45 years with the lowest cost. It abandoned that structure in 1969. Five years later Vanguard adopted a similar mutual structure, albeit very different in concept and development. And we are unique in many other ways. So over 75 of this industry's 80-year history, we can observe how mutuality worked. Our costs are the lowest in the industry, 100 basis points below the industry norm. We operate at a quarter of 1 percent compared to 1.4 percent for the industry. Our market share has gone up 20 years in a row from 1 percent of assets to 9 percent of industry assets. So mutually has been a successful business strategy. It has provided above- peer returns to our shareholders and the lowest cost in the industry. I think we have to have some language in the new legislation that requires mutual funds to consider, once they reach a certain size, the option of mutualization. It works for investors. Directors also need an independent staff, I believe, when they get to a certain size or when directors oversee a certain number of funds, a staff that will be independent of the manager, giving them the objective information they need. Who would pay for that? Let me tell you how we did that at the inception of Vanguard. We said to the manager, ``We are going to have our own independent staff to evaluate you, and we will not only reduce your fees by the cost of that staff, we will reduce them by a 50 percent fee markup because that is the profit you are making in those services.'' I think it would be a wonderful example for other firms to follow. Thank you, and sorry to be a couple of minutes long, Mr. Chairman. Senator Fitzgerald. Mr. Bogle, we are so honored to have you here. I appreciate your coming down a second time, and as always, your comments were directly on point. You and I talked the last time you were here about the fact that Vanguard was the only private sector mutual fund. We have now identified the Government Thrift Savings Plan as being in essence a truly mutual mutual fund in that it is not directed by somebody else who is profiting off it. I was troubled by the fact that mutual funds in America are allowed to call themselves mutual funds because that implies they are mutuals, like Mutual of Omaha, or a mutually-owned insurance company like State Farm in my State, in which the owners are actually the policy holders. We have a system in this country for chartering mutual savings banks. There are lots of mutual savings banks in which there are no stockholders. The depositors in the banks are the actual owners of the savings bank. Do you think it is appropriate that we allow mutual funds, when they are in fact not mutual and they are not owned by their fund shareholders? They are in effect used by an outside private company that is stock held to make money. I mean, do you think it is appropriate that mutual funds be allowed to call themselves mutual funds, or does the name ``mutual'' not mean much to younger people today so it is no longer a misleading term? Do you have any thoughts on that? Mr. Bogle. We have somehow tried to get around that by calling ourselves mutual mutual funds, which is a little bit repetitious but gets the point across. I think we would have a hard time changing the name that everybody has come to give this industry, and of course, I would be enough of a rebel to say that maybe what we ought to do is do the opposite, require mutual funds to be mutual, and I think we can do that without going to a full mutualization, by the way, simply by giving that board the heft, the weight that I talked about in my testimony. Senator Fitzgerald. I know you want to comment on Senator Sununu's suggestion in his opening remarks that one of the most important things for investors to focus on is investment returns, and that if investment returns in a given fund are very high, then a higher fee will not really matter over time. What is your response to that? That line of reasoning suggests that the Senate, this panel, should not be so concerned about mutual fund fees. What do you think about that? Mr. Bogle. With all due respect to Senator Sununu, I hope he does not invest the way that little syllogism of his would suggest. That would be very unwise indeed. Because what we have here is a--of course, he is mathematically correct. If a fund earns twice as much as another, let us say 20 percent compared to 10, and they charge you 9 percentage points a year, you would have been better off in that 20 percent minus 9, rather than the 10 percent fund minus 1. I mean that is just mathematics. However, the reality of the matter is that we know that over time the lowest cost funds win. A simple statistic, and that is if you take the lowest-cost quartile of funds--and this is not in any selected 10-year period; this is every 10-year period we have looked at--the lowest-cost quartile of funds outperforms the highest-cost quartile of funds by 2\1/2\ to 3 percent per year in all of the Morningstar boxes. So you know from looking back, cost matters. It has been said that the mutual fund industry is the only industry in the world where you get what you do not pay for. Think about that. You get what you do not pay for, and that is a truism. What happens in our business, however, is the broker or the salesman that wants to sell a high-cost fund, he picks a high- cost fund because there are plenty of them, and he picks one with a high return in the past, and he makes the exact argument that Senator Sununu was putting forth. But the reality is that the past has nothing to do with the future. We did a study about a year ago, and we looked at the 10 highest-performing--I am sorry--the 20 highest-performing mutual funds of the 3 year period, 1997, 1998 and 1999, and compared those returns of those funds with the 3-year period 2000, 2001, and 2002. It was literally biblically true that the first shall be last. The first mutual fund, number 1, in the first performance derby was last in return, 841st, I think the number was, among those groups of funds that had been in business all that time over a certain minimum size level, 841st. And the other 20 funds--I believe this was the number--there was one that was not ranked below 700 out of those 800 funds. So much for past performance. It tells you nothing except probably the manager is speculating, exactly the opposite of what that Federal Thrift manager is doing. Senator Fitzgerald. Senator Collins. Chairman Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bogle, thank you so much for testifying before us today. I am a great admirer of yours and I think we have a lot to learn from your experience, because as you pointed out, you have actually done this for much of your life. One of the challenges that we face is making sure as we attempt to bring about reforms that we do so in a way that does not cause unintended problems down the road, and therefore it is difficult to decide what should be legislative, what should be left up to SEC, and what should we look to the industry to do for itself to self reform. My inclination is to believe that we need a combination of all three. We are dealing with a law that I think in the mutual fund area has not been significantly revised in approximately 65 years. I suspect that it does need to be brought up to date. But can you give us any guidance of the areas that you think should be codified versus the reforms that you think the SEC ought to pursue via regulation, versus the areas that we should just stay out of and expect industry to pursue? Mr. Bogle. Yes, thank you. I would say on the regulatory side things like a redemption fee on short-term transactions, things like disclosure about soft-dollar brokerage, things like perhaps banning the shelf space sort of payments that are made that are such a cost for investors and so misshape the distribution process. Those kind of things I believe should be left to the regulators. I believe that the Congress, speaking for the people of the United States, should do its best to have a governance structure that improves on the governance structure that was given to us in the 1940 Act. That Act, as you know, says that mutual funds must be organized, operated and managed in the interest of shareholders, rather then the interest of investment advisers, and that is clearly not what is happening. That is why I feel we need to chairman of the board to be independent. That is why I feel we need a heavy majority--indeed, sometimes I wonder why any management representative should be on the board--and that is why we deeply need this Federal standard of fiduciary duty for fund directors. These are things that will require legislation. As to the industry, I do not know how many of you have had a chance to read my paper on the development of mutualization that was my formal statement before the Committee, but it talks about how mutualization work, how it came, the struggle it was to get it done. An SEC report that was delivered in 1966 called Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, that suggested many of the problems that we came to face later on. In that report, the SEC recommended very good solutions, but they were never implemented in law because the lobbying power of the Investment Company Institute was just too great. They wanted a requirement that the fees be reasonable. Well, nobody in the industry wanted that. So we got to where we are today I think through that route. But at the end of my formal testimony is a very important point, and that is you can legislate a structure, let us say more power for the board of directors of the funds or the requirement that a mutual structure be made available or be considered at certain levels at fund size, but a structure will only take you so far. I also mentioned next you have to have the right strategy in that structure. The Federal Thrift Savings Plan has that structure, and they have followed with the right strategy. The structure gives the power to get cost out of the equation and give the participants, Federal Government employees, basically the total return the stock market delivers, a magnificent return over the long run. But the third thing you need--and this is the hardest part, we can't legislate it--is the spirit. How do you get that spirit into the mutual fund industry once you have the structure and once you have the strategy? I think we have to rely on the individual investor, the man on the street, and I have talked to thousands and thousands of mutual fund shareholders individually, and I do not know how many hundreds of thousands in groups, and the people that come out to the meetings or the people that I meet with sense that spirit. How do you get it out to the public? That has a lot to do with the kind of cost disclosure. Investers will learn. They will learn in the long run, but they will be hurt as they. I would like to make the experience of mutual fund investors a very positive one for them, but it takes all of those fronts, as you say, Chairman Collins. Chairman Collins. Thank you. My second question that I want to ask you has to do with soft dollars. We have heard comments about that today. I think of soft dollars in terms of campaign finance reform, but here we are learning of another kind of soft dollars, but one that once again creates possible conflicts of interest. Is the answer a ban on soft dollars? Mr. Bogle. I think ultimately the answer is yes, there should be a ban on soft dollars, and it seems to me it comes down to a very simple principle, and that is, it is amazing how cheap everything you buy is if you buy it with other people's money, and that is true of distribution services and it is true of research, which of course as we all know, has as soon as it is out in the public eye, a value of zero. Because everybody has it, it cannot be capitalized on any longer. It would be very disruptive to the brokerage system and the market system, but I think that should be the direction. In the meanwhile, I am somewhat concerned about banning soft dollars for the smaller research firms when the large firms, the big brokerage firms, will just collect more and more hard dollars in the guise of payments for research. As enlightened as that solution may appear at first glance, it is not the right solution. So I think we need a more global solution for soft dollars than that. Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Fitzgerald. I have a follow-up on that. Soft dollars are expenses that, if a mutual fund paid for its research, would show up in its expense ratio. So what they do is in order to get research or other services, such as when some mutual funds want to get a new set of computers, they cut a deal with the brokerage firm. The brokerage firm will buy them new computers for their office. One mutual fund had a brokerage firm buy new carpeting for their office, and the way the brokerage firm was able to do that is the mutual fund permitted the brokerage firm to charge an excessive brokerage commission, which was passed along to their mutual fund shareholders. There seems to be an impulse on the part of mutual funds to convert operating costs into brokerage expenses or transaction costs because then they do not show up in the expense ratio. Am I not right about that? And that is a problem with our disclosure law, we do not require transaction costs to be disclosed so mutual funds keep trying to convert their ordinary overhead, like buying computers and carpeting, into a transaction cost which does not have to be disclosed. Mr. Bogle. You are quite right, Chairman Fitzgerald and I have even heard an anecdotal story that goes beyond the computers for these traders who are working so hard. This may be apocryphal, but I was told with a straight face that the person offering the soft dollars said: Well, these traders are working so hard we not only get them good computer systems, but we ought to get them golf club memberships so they can relax on the weekend. Both arguments are equally valid. Once you start going down that long trail, you are going to be wasting the shareholders' money. But the reality is that it is in the manager's economic interest. And one thing we should always be confronted with is that these directors who are directors of both the manager and the mutual fund, have a fiduciary duty to the manager's shareholders as well, and that is something that we cannot get away from. They have two sets of loyalties and are trying to be, as the biblical quote says, ``men who can serve two masters.'' I do not think it can be done. When they are buying research with soft dollars they ae maximizing the profitability of the manager. If they took that, say, $25 million of soft dollars and expensed it through the manager's books, the manager would earn $25 million of lower profits. So of course they want to get their own expenses as low as they can. So it is a very tough system to beat, but it is going on, and that is certainly where very strong action, both disclosure and I think ultimately regulatory will have to be required. Senator Fitzgerald. Senator Lautenberg. Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. It is interesting to see how you can play it straight and make so much money, Mr. Bogle. It can be done in this great country of ours. Obey the rules and do it the way you should do it. These situations, a lot of these funds are regarded as if they are a gold mine, and if you mine it hurriedly, you know that you have yours all taken care of before it goes to the marketplace, and frankly, I think that the problem is an informational problem. How do we get a message to the mutual fund investor that makes them clear, informs of the risk, informs them of the cost, other than perhaps hiring Howard Dean to go out and put out the message. [Laughter.] The fact of the matter is, that does not get him elected President, but it does show that your message can be delivered. How do we tell the public that they are getting gypped in part, that this idea of, well, simply say 11 versus 8 or what- have-you, but as I said earlier, that 11 maybe ought to be 20. I ask you this with a degree of innocence because I am not as familiar with the mutual fund industry as you might be. I know that you do a pretty good job. Is yours the lowest cost? Mr. Bogle. By far. Our second lowest-cost competitor, lowest cost next to us, has costs that are approximately 200 percent higher than ours. We run for about 26 basis points, and the second lowest cost is up there around 75 basis points. Senator Lautenberg. You have managed to grow with that modest cost, have you not? Mr. Bogle. Our market share has grown from 1 percent of industry assets to 9 percent, and has not declined in any one of the last 20 years. Senator Lautenberg. How much is invested now, and are you-- how much are the funds that you are managing these days? Mr. Bogle. We started in 1974 with one billion dollars under management. We used to celebrate each billion additional, and our most recent number was $700 billion, so we gave up the one billion celebrations quite a while ago. Senator Lautenberg. That is a nice celebration to give up, on to the larger increments. Is there a way, when we see a prospectus or proxy or a mutual fund that parallels that for industry generally---- Mr. Bogle. Mutual fund prospectuses are singularly unhelpful. There are pages after pages of type. There is no highlighting of things like costs, or even for that matter returns or returns compared to the market, or the total dollar amount of costs. I think we need a uniform disclosure document in which certain things are highlighted in large type, the dollar amount of the fee, the fund's record compared to the stock market over long periods of time, the impact of cost on returns, things of that nature, in a very simplified way, and then throw in the rest of the prospectus afterward. Senator Lautenberg. Does a typical mutual fund annual statement include salaries or profits made by the senior executive team? Mr. Bogle. No, sir, it does not, and it does not because we have never been able to pierce the corporate veil. The mutual fund itself reveals its directors' compensation, but all we know about the manager's compensation is the total fee paid. I believe we absolutely need disclosure of the officers and the management company's salaries, disclosure of portfolio manager's salaries, disclosure of the transactions and ownership they have in the funds, none of which is out there now, and disclose of each individual's share of the profits the management company has earned. I would also add that we need disclosure of how the manager spends that money--and that is why I want this economic study of the industry done. If the manager is getting paid $100 million, is it spending $10 million on investment management and $50 million on marketing, and has a profit of $40 million or whatever the case may be? We have been unable to get to that because the management company is a separate and often privately-held company. I should add to that there is another extremely unhealthy trend that has taken place in the years over the last half century, and that is, 36 of the largest 50 mutual fund management companies are subsidiaries of giant financial conglomerates. Believe me, sir, you know enough about corporate America to know that those conglomerates are in this business to earn a return on their capital, not a return on the capital of the mutual fund investors. When those two conflicting goals butt up against each other, as we have now seen in some of these scandals, it is the return on capital to the manager that has taken precedence. While I do not think we can ban that conglomerate ownership, we ought to think long and hard about whether the American public is served by conglomerating this once professional business. Senator Lautenberg. Is there any kind of an index out there that identifies the efficiency of the operation of a fund and shares its cost basis in a way that the public can understand it, or would it be a good idea? I think in terms of indices because we used to, at ADP, we delivered the Alan Greenspan econometric space. They sold it, but we would deliver it through our network. It seems to me that there is a heck of a value out there if we can put this information in a simple enough form that it tells the investor, hey, these people have this kind of a cost ratio, they have that kind of a result, and really understand what it is. There is a comfort derived from thinking that you are going into a mutual fund that everybody-- you said it, Mr. Chairman--is like an insurance company, that here we are all in this together so everybody is going to take care of everybody and we need not worry about it. Meanwhile, we have seen some of the most outrageous scandals that have come across the financial marketplace in this hidden array of things that are there. Mr. Bogle. The array of costs and revenues and ways money gets spent, and profitability of managers, is so vast that I have to confess to you that I am not sure, other than dealing with the most basic information I think would be understandable and palatable to the public. When you get to the real information to see how this industry works, I think it is more complex than that, and therefore, I think what we need very urgently is to have a staff responsible to the board of directors that can provide that information to directors on an independent basis. The present consultants to boards are always paid by the mutual fund managers, so they shape that information--for example, they often leave Vanguard out of the comparisons I am told--but I think it is up to the fund directors to be responsible in this industry, where unlike corporate America there are no large owners; in corporate America, we have 100 large financial institutions that own 50 percent of all stock, and if they just asked for information, they would receive it. There is no such dominant body in the fund industry, so I think we need the fund directors to assume their responsibility. I agree with you, by the way, on the potential emergence of a kind what we will call a director class. I think it is an excellent idea, because the responsibility in this business largely owned by small investors is to have a board that puts those small investors first. The board will be able to digest any information that we can think of, particularly if it is provided by independent sources. Senator Lautenberg. Just this closing question. Is there a point in time when size becomes a determinant as to whether or not another fund under the same management company must be created so that there is not such a mass in one place, it can destroy a company's value if there is a decision to sell? Mr. Bogle. Yes. You bring up a very good point, Senator Lautenberg. In this business, when you are in the business of asset gathering and fee maximizing, which is what a management company does--you can argue it is fine, for that is their business--you tend to let funds grow to awesome size. One of the funds in the industry grew actually to $100 billion. They had a 1 percent management fee. They were paid $1 billion for investment management. And of course, by the time they were that large, they turned into an index fund. They did not want to be an index fund, but they had no other choice. They could not buy small-cap stocks or mid-cap stocks in any appreciable way. So you can observe them now kind of going along the index route, which is fine for me--I mean I love it--except at a cost that means they are destined to fall short of the index return. So, yes, we let funds get to too large a size, and no, we do not cut funds off at a reasonable level, and it is very difficult to replace one large fund with another fund doing the same thing. In other words, they say, we are going to close Fund A and start Fund B. But if you use the same advisor, clearly the problems do not go away, unless, as we did at Vanguard in the case of Windsor Fund and Windsor II, you use a totally different advisor. So it is another area that I believe the SEC should be looking at very carefully. I do not think that is a legislative issue on fund size because I do not think any of us can articulate it very well. But, yes, there is a size beyond which you cannot differentiate yourself because the cost of portfolio transactions simply overpowers your ability to move the money. Senator Lautenberg. I appreciate your candor. Thank you very much. Mr. Bogle. Thank you, sir. Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Bogle, we want to thank you once again for making the journey down to Washington in the inclement weather, and as promised, we will have you out of here in time to make your plane. But thank you very much for coming here. We really appreciate it. Mr. Bogle. Thank you all for your courtesy. It has been a privilege to be here. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you. Now I would like to go to the whistleblower panel. Mr. Bogle. I am not one. [Laughter.] Senator Fitzgerald. You are not one of the whistleblowers. Well, I guess you are, yes. I would like to ask Peter Scannell and James Nesfield to please come up to the witness table. Thank you very much for being with us today, and we appreciate your patience waiting through the first panel and giving a special dispensation to John Bogle so we could accommodate his schedule. Mr. Scannell began working for Putnam Investments in March 2000. As a preferred services specialist in Putnam's call center, Mr. Scannell noticed a pattern of high-volume trades by a group of investors. In March 2003--that is nearly a year ago--Mr. Scannell disclosed this repeated trading to the Boston office of the Securities and Exchange Commission, then subsequently presented his information to the Massachusetts Securities Division within the Office of the Secretary of State. Shortly thereafter, William Galvin, the Massachusetts Secretary of State, issued subpoenas seeking further information that later led to disclosures about Putnam's mutual funds. Our second witness on this panel is James Nesfield, a former contractor with Canary Capital Partners. Mr. Nesfield cooperated with authorities in their investigation of market trading abuses. When Mr. Nesfield was hired by Canary as a consultant, he was asked to help find companies willing to allow Canary to actively trade their funds and find points of access to enter orders for market timing purposes. Mr. Nesfield has extensive knowledge of trade processing systems on Wall Street that enabled him to communicate directly with many mutual funds. I would like to note for the record at this time that Peter J. Kugi \1\ of Grafton, Wisconsin, has submitted a statement for the record. Mr. Kugi was recently profiled in Newsweek Magazine as an aggrieved investor who saw the savings he invested in mutual funds for his son's college education dwindle by more than half. Mr. Kugi considers himself to be an above-average investor. As reflected in his statement, however, even he found that he could not understand the fee structure of the mutual fund in which he invested, leading him to believe that the vast majority of average investors are likely to share his frustration. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Kugi appears in the Appendix on page 276. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thank you both for appearing today. Mr. Scannell, you may proceed. As with the earlier witnesses, we will ask you to submit your written statement for the record. It will become part of the permanent record of this hearing, and if you are able, we would appreciate it if you could summarize your testimony in 5 minutes. Thank you. Mr. Scannell. TESTIMONY OF PETER T. SCANNELL,\2\ WEYMOUTH LANDING, MASSACHUSETTS Mr. Scannell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Subcommittee Members and Senators. I have submitted my written testimony. It is fairly lengthy, so I will do an overview. Again, I would like to thank you for this extraordinary opportunity to come forward before you to share my experiences and profound concerns. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ The prepared statement of Mr. Scannell appears in the Appendix on page 131. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If I was told a year ago that I would be present at a Senate Subcommittee hearing addressing the very issues I was trying to expose, I would not have believed it possible. Every step of this fight was met with obstacles designed to keep someone like myself, without a corporate title, from being heard. I became aware of the market timing abuses taking place at Putnam Investments in April 2000, and tried to expose those abuses to the Boston office of the Securities and Exchange Commission in March 2003. I was working at the fifth largest mutual fund company in the world, and although most prospectuses state that market timing is either prohibited or discouraged, known to be a detriment to the unwitting long-term investor, it was my experience it was occurring daily. My fear was that market timing abuse and exploitation of the mutual funds were not only an accepted practice at Putnam, but that my understanding of the darker side of human nature and the research I had done told me it may be an accepted practice for those with influence and money throughout the mutual fund industry. For years no news was good news for both the mutual fund industry and the regulators who had oversight responsibilities. A tangled web has been woven, and from my perspective in the mutual fund scandal, it is an imperative that we fully understand the scope and the depth of those abuses. of fiduciary malfeasance and the lack of proactive regulating. These abuses should have been brought to light years ago. Senators, the important part of my testimony is not about my family and I, but it is more importantly about what happened to me on this road not traveled by others. Every step in this fight has been met with an imposing force. That is, until I met with Massachusetts Deputy Secretary of State Matthew Nestor. Mr. Nestor immediately understood the magnitude of what I was presenting to him, and also understood the immensity of the burden that I carried. I put my welfare and the welfare of my family aside because of the importance of bringing to light this behavior. I must emphasize that there were thousands of decent, honest, hard-working Putnam employees who live in the area I call my home, and most if not all, had no knowledge of the abuses I speak of, yet their lives could be greatly impacted as well. In my neighborhood there is outrage. We have read that the American public does not seem to have great concern because of the inflows of monies to the funds. The American family, who is being responsible for their future retirement needs and their children's higher education have no other choice. For them, mutual funds are the only game in town, and they realize that however lopsided that game may be, they have to participate. They know it is time in the market, not timing the market that will help them reach their goals. Families are working two jobs, taking care of their children, and deeply concerned for the world they live in. They have no time and energy left to protest in the streets over the mutual fund scandal. Senators, let me commend you for your deep concern and understanding of the issues that face the American worker, who is the taxpayer and who ultimately is the long-term investor. Every single day they are getting nickeled and dimed to death, and through no fault of their own they are being scammed on such a daily basis their heads are spinning. Here we are, the very lifeblood of our economy, and to think that there are some of the many who manage the mutual fund industry think the contributions entrusted to them are theirs to divvy up amongst themselves is outrageous. The longer it takes mutual fund companies that are under scrutiny to address their past, the longer it is going to take them to move ahead, if they can move ahead at all. For a CEO to leave Putnam Investments in such a horrendous state, risking the livelihoods of all the innocent rank and file has to be a crime. Individuals in these corporations need to be held accountable. Consequences need to be imposed and licenses need to be yanked. If you do not care about your neighbor, you need to get out of the mutual fund business. And for those who do not think market timing is not a real problem, I believe we should think again. After I read Stanford University Professor Eric Zitzewitz' study on market timing, I was not surprised. I was validated. But there was one question that was not addressed that I thought was critically important, so I gave Eric a call and asked him quite simply, ``Did market timing in the last 5 years contribute to the historic volatility we have experienced affecting all markets?'' His answer was, ``Sure it did, but it would be unquantifiable.'' So that means we permitted a select group, not just market timers but those who allow market timing, to affect our markets in a way we will never fully understand, and that is a very troubling thought. Mutual fund trading abuses and hidden fees can be curtailed with the appropriate regulation, but there is one form of uncovering abuse that has yet to be suggested. As the Federal Government has in place a very effective Whistleblower Statute for the monies we entrust the government to spend, so too should there be a replicated statute for the securities industry. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 will not inspire those who may want to come forward but are not willing to risk their careers and maybe more. Every regulator that I have spoken to has said: Peter, it is going to take an insider like you to make a difference. It is the proverbial needle in a haystack, and with the technologies available today, as well as future technologies, which will magnify thousands of times, we can make the difference. Maybe the next person to step up to the plate may have even more to offer than a former waiter from Boston's North End, Senator, as I have read to you and submitted my previous testimony, I have been dismissed by a CPA, a CEO and the SEC, and all of them more than likely regret it. I was bashed in the head for the American investor. It is our once in an investor's lifetime opportunity now to level the playing field. I remember Matt Nestor saying that he worked on the side of the angels, and to do effectively you must think like the devil. Let us not close the back door to have offenders slip in the side window. There will always be those who will try to take what is not rightfully theirs. I would like to thank you once again for allowing me to present these issues for your consideration, and it is truly a privilege and an honor for me to do so. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you for being here, Mr. Scannell. Mr. Nesfield. TESTIMONY OF JAMES NESFIELD,\1\ NESFIELD CAPITAL Mr. Nesfield. My name is James Nesfield. I have worked in the securities industry at various levels since 1978. In 1999, I was approached by Hartz Trading, later to be named Canary Capital, to find brokerage firms, trust companies and mutual fund managers that would be willing to accept large orders at frequencies generally not available to the average shareholder. This activity is known as market timing. A critical feature is permission by funds managers or a way to hide the volume of frequency of the transactions from the fund managers, thereby avoiding being blocked. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Nesfield and Mr. Grigg appears in the Appendix on page 150. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 5 minutes of testimony I will not be able to relay the intricacies and techniques developed by timers, mutual fund managers, administrators, and other agencies to thwart detection. It has taken hours and days of multiple communications to convey my knowledge to the AG's Office. My job was to find those that would bend the rules for Canary because they were richer and could provide a quid pro quo of investing in other funds or private equities or separate accounts operated by the fund managers. I found these people simply by reading the news, public directories and searching for their E-mails. Most people within the fund industry hated timers, as that was the official doctrine. I found as I got closer to the upper levels of management, the morality was gray and easily shaded by immediate need or greed. The same is true of brokerage firms and trust companies. It is the golden rule that he who has the gold rules, and if you want a friend get a dog. No support staff member sets out to originally break a law or help the boss break a law. There is a slow process of inclusion, indoctrination, that pulls the helpers into the complex web. It was that naive perspective that would convince me that the founders and former managers of Hartz Mountain Pet Food were pursuing legitimate investments. Lawyers had vetted them with opinions on the strategy, and it was shocking to learn these pillars of society were violating laws. Because I worked from my home in North Carolina I learned from the newspapers that Mr. Stern, the Chief Executive at Canary Capital, had computers in his office connecting directly to the mutual funds, and he was purloining portfolio inside information from them and making investments with every edge imaginable. While it was a secret shared by many mutual funds that the Sterns were late timing and receiving portfolio inside information, the pawns were not enlightened. Each knew their part. None could fathom the entire picture. Although any one could see if they examined the NSCC FundServ system, that late trading was possible and easily transacted. I was never once at a meeting with Mr. Stern or a mutual fund manager or had any other significant business contact through Mr. Stern. I was never given information about the trades except after they were complete and mismarked in execution to hide the true time of execution so that no one would know. A good conspiracy rotates on its ability to keep the critical elements apart. Canary Capital kept staff separated from both trading parties and from senior management. Even Noreen Harrington, who is another mutual fund whistleblower, only reported suspicions by overhearing some mutual fund lingo on the trading form. I filled in technical detail and produced the errant confirms, but the AG still had to find the extent of the trading through subpoena. Even today it is unclear if the $40 million penalty was commensurate with the profits on and offshore. I may not have originally understood all the parts of Hartz Mountain's operations, as we had come to know them, because I was not the accountant or the trader with direct responsibility for transactions. But once I understood the severity of these allegations without legal representation, as I still am here today, I came forward to inform completely. I like to think that if I knew earlier, I would have come forward voluntarily. Indeed, in December 2002, I filed a form CA-1, a Form 1 with the SEC outlining potential industry abuses, a way to stop them through automation. The lesson here is that if there is a legislative solution, it is that mutual funds needs to be regulated on par with broker-dealers as they occupy a strange place of issues, investment advisor, and in many cases points of distribution. A coordinated regulatory regime and checks and balances must be established for mutual funds that can be verified in a robust manner. The lack of expenditures by mutual funds for compliance and critical self assessment warrants concern and suggests an almost intentional neglect of public trust. I also hope that the Securities and Exchange Commission will review its duty to the public in the strictest terms as well. If legislation is passed in this Congress, the SEC should take care to consider the best interest of the investor first and foremost in implementing any legislation. Too many times I have seen legislative mandates watered down by interpretations of agencies implementing them. The mutual fund industry should have a higher level of disclosure and inspection since the shareholders are not protected by the Security Investor Protection Act. Mutual funds are exempted. Thank you. Senator Fitzgerald. Mr. Nesfield, you have come forward and given your story to the New York Attorney General's Office, as I understand it. You cooperated with Attorney General Spitzer's office, and ultimately your cooperation, as well as that of a couple of others led to the charges that were announced in early September of this past year against Canary and others. Did the Attorney General grant you immunity? Mr. Nesfield. No. Senator Fitzgerald. Apparently because of your cooperation, they have not pursued any criminal charges against you for your participation? Mr. Nesfield. No, there has been none. Senator Fitzgerald. What were you doing before 1999? You were a consultant of some sort? Mr. Nesfield. Before I went to work for Canary I worked at SIPC liquidation in Longview, Texas. Senator Fitzgerald. What did they do? Mr. Nesfield. SIPC is the Security Investors Protection Corp. A brokerage firm had gone under, and I was working for the trustee. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. You were hired as a consultant by the trustee? Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. When you were hired by Canary, were you hired as an outside contractor or as an employee? Mr. Nesfield. Outside contractor. Senator Fitzgerald. Outside contractor. Who at Canary hired you? Mr. Nesfield. I was contacted by Andrew Goodwin. Senator Fitzgerald. Andrew Goodwin. Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. What is his position or was his position? Mr. Nesfield. He was one of the traders there. Senator Fitzgerald. He was one of the traders. Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. What did he say to you? Did he call you up on the phone? How did he find your name? Mr. Nesfield. He basically saw my resume on the Web and it lists a number of skill sets I have in regards to some of the technical aspects of the business. Senator Fitzgerald. He called you up. What did he say? Mr. Nesfield. ``I would like to meet with you. I will pay you,'' basically, if you want to---- Senator Fitzgerald. Did he tell you what he was interested in over the phone? Mr. Nesfield. No. Senator Fitzgerald. So he met with you in his office at Canary? Mr. Nesfield. I went up to Secaucus, New Jersey and met with him, Eddie Stern and Noah Lerner. Senator Fitzgerald. And Mr. Stern---- Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald [continuing]. Was in the room. And Mr. Stern and Mr. Goodwin? Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. And a lawyer? Mr. Nesfield. No. Noah Lerner. He is another gentleman that worked with Mr. Stern. Senator Fitzgerald. Noel Lerner? Mr. Nesfield. Noah, as in the boat. Senator Fitzgerald. Noah, OK. Noah Lerner, Mr. Stern and Mr. Goodwin, they met with you? Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. What did they say to you in that meeting? Mr. Nesfield. They basically said, ``We do market timing.'' I knew what it was. I had talked to somebody else. This might have been 5 years before that I knew about market timing. And somebody had approached me to--mutual fund companies had started implementing automated means of detecting market timing activity so they would be able to block those orders or stop timers. If you look at the design of the system that is used to put orders in for mutual funds, there is a way to subvert that, and essentially that is what they hired me to do. Senator Fitzgerald. Did you advertise your ability to help them engage in market timing? Mr. Nesfield. No. Senator Fitzgerald. They called you in. You did not know exactly what they wanted to hire you for, and then they explained to you, ``We do market timing. Can you help us?'' Mr. Nesfield. You have to understand market timing is not illegal, correct? Senator Fitzgerald. Maybe illicit. Could be illegal in certain circumstances. Mr. Nesfield. It is what you call gray, is that correct? Senator Fitzgerald. Well, it could be illegal in certain circumstances. If Mr. Stern, as you said in your opening remarks, was receiving insider portfolio information---- Mr. Nesfield. I did not know that directly. I learned that in the paper. Senator Fitzgerald. You did not know that by working there? Mr. Nesfield. No. I never put an order in for Mr. Stern. I was never--as I said, I never had direct knowledge. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. Mr. Nesfield. I knew all the technical aspects of it, but that is why Mr. Spitzer's office had to go and get Mr. Goodwin because Mr. Goodwin had the direct knowledge. Senator Fitzgerald. So when they were hiring you, you did not view this as them asking you to help them with any illegal activity? Mr. Nesfield. Basically, just find people, find the people that had access to this. Senator Fitzgerald. What did you tell them? Did you tell them you thought you could help them with that? Mr. Nesfield. I knew I could. Senator Fitzgerald. You knew you could. Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. That you knew the processes at mutual funds and you would be able to sift out the ones that would---- Mr. Nesfield. Well, it is not just mutual funds, OK? Senator Fitzgerald. OK. Mr. Nesfield. Anybody that is an NSCC FundServ participant---- Senator Fitzgerald. NSCC? Mr. Nesfield. Right. National Security Clearing Corp. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. Mr. Nesfield. Anybody that is an NSCC FundServ participant can time mutual funds with or without the permission. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. Mr. Nesfield. So Mr. Bogle's fund was timed. Senator Fitzgerald. Did they tell you at that meeting how much they would pay you? Did you settle on an arrangement? Mr. Nesfield. Yes. $50 an hour to start. Senator Fitzgerald. So you were paid by the hour? Mr. Nesfield. Initially, yes. Senator Fitzgerald. Initially. Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. Did that fee later go up? Mr. Nesfield. About 2 weeks later. Senator Fitzgerald. What did it go up to? Mr. Nesfield. It went on a percentage of assets they put into timing capacity channels I had found. Senator Fitzgerald. What was that percentage? Mr. Nesfield. A tenth of 1 percent or 10 basis points. Senator Fitzgerald. You got 10 basis points. That is the total expense ratio for the Government Thrift Savings Plan. Mr. Nesfield. Well, I worked harder. No. Senator Fitzgerald. How much money did you make doing this? Mr. Nesfield. Over 4 years, maybe between $250,000 and $300,000. Senator Fitzgerald. Over 4 years? Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. How much in total assets did you find market timing capabilities for them? Mr. Nesfield. I do not know. A great deal. I was not paid on some of it. Senator Fitzgerald. You were not? Mr. Nesfield. No. Senator Fitzgerald. Did they owe you money at the end? Mr. Nesfield. Well, Mr. Stern has a funny way of accounting for things. He owes me money and he owes Mr. Goodwin money as well. Senator Fitzgerald. How much money do you think you are owed? Mr. Nesfield. I do not know. I do not have full disclosure, but I mean if I take a guesstimate, not concerned about how it appears, he might owe me $3 million. Senator Fitzgerald. Do you have other clients that you have helped market time? Mr. Nesfield. No. Mr. Stern nailed me to an exclusivity contract. Senator Fitzgerald. Had you ever helped any other entities engage in market timing? Mr. Nesfield. Someone proposed the question to me years ago before Mr. Stern. I gave them my best answer and they would not take my advice. Senator Fitzgerald. So you have not done this, provided this service to anyone else? Mr. Nesfield. No. Senator Fitzgerald. Just for Canary Capital. Mr. Nesfield. Right. Senator Fitzgerald. It is quite a story. It is really an interesting story. You said that you wondered whether the fine, the $40 million penalty that the Attorney General's Office assessed on Canary, you wondered whether that was enough. How much do you think they made? Mr. Nesfield. I think the Attorney General's Office probably--this is my assumption, but they probably did not go and turn over every rock inside the Stern organization. I mean they probably trusted what was given to them for---- Senator Fitzgerald. How big is the Stern Hedge Fund? Mr. Nesfield. It was $4 billion. Senator Fitzgerald. It was $4 billion. How big was it when you started in 1999? Mr. Nesfield. It was $300 million. Senator Fitzgerald. So it grew really fast? Mr. Nesfield. Yes, but it's not just---- Senator Fitzgerald. With this market timing it was having abnormally high returns? Mr. Nesfield. They made 110 percent the first year. Senator Fitzgerald. One hundred seven percent? Mr. Nesfield. One hundred ten percent. Senator Fitzgerald. One hundred ten percent? Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. How about the second and third years? Mr. Nesfield. Diminished returns, 25 or 26 percent. Senator Fitzgerald. Is that because the fund was getting bigger and bigger? Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. Were they making most of their money from market timing or did they have some real good investments? And a lot of this--the market crashed in 2000, right? Mr. Nesfield. You have to understand, if you--the mutual funds need market timing. I mean nobody really understands. There is this organization called Reflow.com that has been funded by--what is his name--Getty, the oil guy, Gordon Getty? He started this investment advisory firm. What it does is it helps mutual funds deal with negative redemptions, and in some sense it was the prudent--I mean it sounds obtuse to say this at this point, but it was the prudent manager of the mutual fund who actually required cash, additional cash coming in from market timers to handle the impact of negative redemptions. So it is really a money management technique, even though when Stern does late timing, or anybody does late timing, it is illegal. The fund manager, when--some fund managers like MFS ran a trading program or a timing program. When they were doing it, it was basically a means for them to borrow money short term in order to handle a falling market or negative redemptions. So while they might not ordinarily accept that, during a falling market, which we have experienced, which we are still in more or less, they are going to have to take some rather weird type of money management things. They have to get their money where they can get it. The other thing that happened is since 1999 the investment advisory companies collateralized their fees. There is actually bonds that are issued on the fee income derived from mutual fund managers. One of the reasons they are so adverse to having the assets under management go down is because it will affect their debt service on those bonds that they have written. You know, you can put your finger in the water, but it is a pretty mixed pond. There are a lot of things going on there. That is why when I hear people talk about legislative solutions, it is not so clear cut. It is not as easy to perceive--I mean it is not as easy as everybody would like to make it. It is very complex and it has got to be done carefully. Senator Fitzgerald. Let me ask you this. You started trying to search out mutual funds that would give market timing capacity to the Stern Hedge Fund. Mr. Nesfield. Right. Senator Fitzgerald. How many mutual funds did you find over the course of your 4 years there? Mr. Nesfield. Hundreds. Senator Fitzgerald. Hundreds? Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. What were the five biggest funds? Mr. Nesfield. Janus. Senator Fitzgerald. Janus. Mr. Nesfield. Invesco. Senator Fitzgerald. Invesco. Mr. Nesfield. AIM, A-I-M. That's part of Invesco. Senator Fitzgerald. A-I-M. Mr. Nesfield. Putnam. Senator Fitzgerald. Putnam? Mr. Nesfield. Yes. And that's all I can recall off the top of my head. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. But it was hundreds of them, so many that---- Mr. Nesfield. Yes, everybody had a deal. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. But typically---- Mr. Nesfield. Kinetic is another one, yes. Senator Fitzgerald. Who? Mr. Nesfield. Kinetic Funds. They're a small group of funds. Kinetic had one. Senator Fitzgerald. Kinetic. Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. So on your first go-round with these people, how would you--a lot of times you are turned down. Were there some that accepted you right away? Mr. Nesfield. Well, my motto--and it held true--is if you heard no, you didn't ask the right person, or you didn't ask at the right time. Senator Fitzgerald. Were there any that turned you down? Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. Who turned you down? Mr. Nesfield. Scudder. But I have recently found out in the newspaper that they had a timing program, so obviously it was the wrong time and the wrong person. Senator Fitzgerald. Scudder turned you down. Who else turned you down? Mr. Nesfield. Well, I was turned down by most of them. It is just I had to reapproach it--see who do you ask. Senator Fitzgerald. Who kept turning you down and never changed their mind? Mr. Nesfield. Nobody. Senator Fitzgerald. Oh, once you told them that you are huge, you are big, you are a multi-billion-dollar---- Mr. Nesfield. Kind of like the same pick-up lines you use at a bar, yes. I am kidding around; it is a joke. I'm sorry. Senator Fitzgerald. So they all were agreeing ultimately. Were they putting any limits on you at Janus? Mr. Nesfield. They would have limits, but I didn't discuss them. They would--once the contact became like affirmed, if you will, then I turned it over to Mr. Stern, and he would negotiate with them. Senator Fitzgerald. And then Stern would negotiate with them personally? Mr. Nesfield. Yes. I didn't have the latitude to actually negotiate the deal. Senator Fitzgerald. Now, you probably made them, if they had 102-percent return the first year you came on board, you probably just made millions and millions of dollars for them, and all you got paid was $250,000 over 4 years. Mr. Nesfield. Just my luck, right? Senator Fitzgerald. Just your luck. Mr. Nesfield. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. Mr. Scannell, turning to your experience with Putnam, you noticed large, repeated timing trades happening at Putnam, apparently in accounts of some union members? Mr. Scannell. Yes. Those are the ones that would stand out, Senator, only because of---- Senator Fitzgerald. What union was it? Mr. Scannell. The initial union was the Joint Industry Board of Electricians. This was a 27,000-member union. That was in 2000, and probably almost 3 weeks into my employment after training, again, for a complete career change, this was very unique. I believe one of the things that made it stand out to me is because I didn't have a background in the financial services industry. They were marketing timing two tech funds, and they were being hurt significantly. They were losing literally thousands and thousands of dollars in individual accounts. These gentlemen had two, three, four hundred thousand dollars in their accounts. I've given examples in my testimony to you. And they just went away in 2000, September 2000, a little later. The NASDAQ just wouldn't provide enough recovery for the systems or the techniques that they're using to market time. It was my belief that it was almost like scuttlebutt or what have you. They'd call up--I mean, these are hardworking guys. They'd call up between three and four, Hey, people, what's the NASDAQ doing? And, put me in, put me out. Senator Fitzgerald. They would call into your call center where you worked? Mr. Scannell. Exactly. Senator Fitzgerald. And initially you were probably helping some of them, not knowing what they were doing. Mr. Scannell. I was executing transfers at the request of participants and/or members, of which they were. This was something that many representatives brought up to our supervisors, and this was a---- Senator Fitzgerald. Had you been trained to look out for this? Mr. Scannell. Absolutely not. There was no training. Senator Fitzgerald. You had no training. Mr. Scannell. No. As a matter of fact, one of our concerns was, as the market was plunging in 2000, the mantra in the industry was diversity, suitability, really trying to get people to do it. And I'd address supervisors with that and would talk with preferred services specialists like myself who were becoming licensed and more educated in regards to the mutual fund industry and what detriment this was doing. Senator Fitzgerald. So did you understand the detriment to the other funds? Mr. Scannell. Absolutely. Before I even received my first license. Senator Fitzgerald. At what point did you go--you went to supervisors at Putnam? Mr. Scannell. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. Who was your supervisor? Mr. Scannell. I had many supervisors. Senator Fitzgerald. You had many supervisors. Mr. Scannell. Yes. It's a very high-turnover call center, and what happened was we actually became very adept at what we were doing. Putnam increased our ability to form multi-task and do the---- Senator Fitzgerald. What did the supervisors tell you? Mr. Scannell. Just discouraging the discussion. Yes, stating we cannot give advice. We were always constantly being--it was trying to be told to us that there was a bill before the legislature that would allow us to give advice over the phone. I mean, it was fairly---- Senator Fitzgerald. Just they would give you the roundabout. Mr. Scannell. Exactly. Senator Fitzgerald. Did you take it beyond your supervisors in the call center? Mr. Scannell. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. Where did you go to? Mr. Scannell. Well, later on, discussing, again, after I received my Series 63, and Series 7 license, we became this preferred services unit where we encountered a different market timing strategy, and that was an international fund market timing. Now, this was a fund that the--it happened to be just another union. We had a lot of market timers at Putnam Investments throughout the 2,000 plans. But, again, because they had a technique and as a group they had the fund within their plan, they had the ability to market time. Senator Fitzgerald. And what union was this? Mr. Scannell. This was the Boilermakers Local 5. Senator Fitzgerald. In Boston? Mr. Scannell. No, it was not in Boston. I believe it was New York or New Jersey. Senator Fitzgerald. In New York or New Jersey? Mr. Scannell. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. And you start getting boilermakers calling you. Mr. Scannell. Right. And, unfortunately for myself, the connotation unions, market timing, and what it's conjuring isn't the case. I mean, they had a technique that we allowed them to do. It was the International Voyager Fund, and any fund family that has their participants or members, as we describe union members, had a particular group of funds that they could invest in. Now, they had the ability to transfer those funds daily from an International Voyager Fund into a guaranteed investment contract fund. That was the technique. It was done 100 percent, as Mr. Nesfield was discussing. That was very common. The market going down was insignificant for transfers of Internal Voyager Fund and their ability to turn a profit. Senator Fitzgerald. So you began to wonder why your firm permitted this because you knew it was harming the other fund shareholders. Mr. Scannell. It was not only harming the other fund shareholders, but, again, I'm going back to the initial, Joint Industry Board for the Electrical Industry (JIB), that it was actually--we were allowing--I compared it to a pharmacist--and, again, not the boilermakers--refilling a prescription over and over again knowing that it's doing great harm to somebody. Senator Fitzgerald. Was anybody else in your call center as concerned as you? Mr. Scannell. Absolutely. Senator Fitzgerald. And did anybody else do anything? Mr. Scannell. Absolutely. We brought it up to the attention--of senior management. It was discussed in front of one senior manager that said it wasn't criminal in a preferred services specialist meeting where one of my peers brought it to their attention. We had a great buffer between senior management for obvious reasons. Senator Fitzgerald. But you did get in to see the senior-- -- Mr. Scannell. Well, we were at a meeting, and it was brought up. Senator Fitzgerald. With the senior manager there. Mr. Scannell. Exactly, and his reply was it's not criminal. Senator Fitzgerald. Who was that senior manager? Mr. Scannell. His name was Robert Capone. Senator Fitzgerald. Like Al Capone. Mr. Scannell. Exactly. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. And you brought it up to Mr. Capone, and what did Mr. Capone say? Mr. Scannell. It was brought up to Mr. Capone by another representative in front of another senior vice president, and a human resources representative---- Senator Fitzgerald. Is Mr. Capone still there? Mr. Scannell. I believe so. Senator Fitzgerald. He is? Mr. Scannell. I believe so. I'm not sure. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. It was brought up at one of those meetings. You weren't the one who brought it up. Someone else brought it up. Mr. Scannell. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. And his response was? Mr. Capone's---- Mr. Scannell. It's not criminal. Senator Fitzgerald. It's not criminal so don't worry about it. Mr. Scannell. It was very shocking to hear him say that. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. Mr. Scannell. But that he would say that in front of us-- for myself, understand as well that---- Senator Fitzgerald. Was this after-hours trading or market timing? Mr. Scannell. This is market timing. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. Mr. Scannell. And it could be just as successful as after- hours trading with an international fund. Again, it's well known now, we all seemingly have a good idea of market timing. It does not take a positive movement in the market. It just takes taking advantage. It's the arbitrage that's available. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. So after it was brought up to Mr. Capone and he just said it's not illegal and dismissed it, then what? Did you or your---- Mr. Scannell. One of the representatives, again, who--and because he's still working there actively, I'd rather not mention his name. He confronted a supervisor with a spread sheet. I already had a spread sheet active in my--an Excel spread sheet. I was tracking them. I knew that they knew I was tracking them. Everything that I did was monitored, whether it was on my computer or on my phone--everything. So I was putting myself in a position that, well that's---- Senator Fitzgerald. Did anybody tell you, warn you off, to quit pursuing this line? Mr. Scannell. Well, what happened--no, they wouldn't. But, again, it wasn't applauded. And the efforts--one of the interesting things was that we were constantly told that there is not a system to do this. And that was for a number of years. And back to your point about another supervisor, I put this spreadsheet together, and I actually gave them the account numbers of market timers, and nothing was ever done. That's when I decided that I need to take my time and make sure I provided all the documents I could not only to protect myself but to expose Putnam. And I found internal documents that suggested Putnam was aware of this in 2000. Senator Fitzgerald. You then went to the SEC? Mr. Scannell. Exactly. Senator Fitzgerald. Was that the first place you went? Mr. Scannell. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. And when did you go to the SEC? Mr. Scannell. I went to the SEC at the end of March. First I went to--I have a brother who is an attorney, and he said, ``You need a securities attorney.'' And I was fortunate enough to find a firm in town, and she happened to be an employment specialist. It was through a family friend. So it was decided in March that I would go to the SEC and provide them the documents. Senator Fitzgerald. Did the lawyer go with you? Mr. Scannell. Well, there was some discussion first. Evidently this wasn't incredibly welcome news, and it was described what I did have, a very compelling and succinct anthology of what I believed was something disturbing at Putnam Investments. It took a number of communications, as I provided in my testimony, before they would even meet with my attorney. I wanted to remain--my identity to remain confidential. Unfortunately---- Senator Fitzgerald. OK. So they didn't meet--you didn't go initially to the SEC? Mr. Scannell. We had a number of communications through my attorney. Senator Fitzgerald. Through your attorney. Mr. Scannell. There was about seven. Senator Fitzgerald. Seven, before they met with her? Mr. Scannell. Before they met with her, three attorneys on 76 Tremont Street. Senator Fitzgerald. And how long did that take? Mr. Scannell. That was in April. Senator Fitzgerald. So you started this process at the end of March, and by April---- Mr. Scannell. April 24, I believe it was. Senator Fitzgerald. April 24, your attorney---- Mr. Scannell. I finally was able to meet with them. This was happening---- Senator Fitzgerald. Did they meet with your attorney first? Mr. Scannell. They met with my attorney first. I believe it was on April 14. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. And they were interested? Mr. Scannell. Again, they came back to me--I mean, my attorney came back to me, and there was some more discussion. They did not agree to meet with me yet. Once I met with them, I needed to provide them with the prospectuses of the funds that I was concerned about, and in doing so, obviously identify myself. There was a number of websites out there and there was a number of people at Putnam Investments that knew that it was me that was---- Senator Fitzgerald. Now, it wasn't necessarily illegal activity you were bringing to their attention, but perhaps activity that---- Mr. Scannell. It wasn't mine to judge that it was illegal. I was just seeing--I was seeing something that I didn't believe was in the best interest of initially the actual members doing it and losing hundreds of thousands of dollars. Senator Fitzgerald. Did it contradict the promises in the prospectus? Mr. Scannell. That was interesting. When I met with three attorneys from the SEC, they handed me back the prospectus that I gave them and asked me what my opinion was of it. I found that, as not an attorney, I read very clearly that it stated that short-term trading--this was not a vehicle for short-term trading. It would be prohibited. Putnam would do anything within its management ability to curtail or to stop or to refuse transactions, whether it was from one fund to another. Senator Fitzgerald. So there is the violation, they advertise in their prospectus that they discourage this market timing, but then you see them allowing it every day. Mr. Scannell. And there was also a disclaimer in it that said--there was a 1-percent redemption fee, which we now know that that would not stop market timing, a 1-percent redemption fee. Senator Fitzgerald. Were they imposing that redemption fee or they were---- Mr. Scannell. That 1-percent redemption fee would not be imposed to anybody in a 401(k) Putnam-managed fund, omnibus plan, or variable annuity. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. Mr. Scannell. So that was kind of where it started to point me. Well, let's get into a Putnam plan, and if you don't have to worry about tax consequences, if you don't have to worry about redemption fees, you are all set. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. So you meet April 24 with the SEC? Mr. Scannell. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. You personally meet. Then what happens? Mr. Scannell. With my attorney. We had a meeting for an hour and a half. They thanked me for my courage. And I went on my way. Senator Fitzgerald. Did you hear from them again? Mr. Scannell. My attorney contacted them in about 2 weeks. There was nothing to report. Then it went on for about 3 weeks, another 3 weeks. I asked her to contact them, and previously they asked me if I was going to be going anywhere else, to let them know first. And then for whatever reason, it was communicated through my attorney that they're not interested in updating me or keeping me abreast. All the while I knew that market timing was continuing at Putnam Investments. Senator Fitzgerald. And at what point did you then go to somebody else, the Secretary of State's office? Mr. Scannell. September 11, 2003. I met with Matt Nestor in the Federal Reserve Building where my attorney's offices are. Senator Fitzgerald. And that was after the charges had been brought in New York against Canary, which Mr. Nesfield has worked for? Mr. Scannell. Yes, right about that time. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. And then you got the idea, you saw a State attorney general was pursing this in New York. Mr. Scannell. Yes, and I had a lot of admiration for what Attorney General Spitzer was doing. At the same token, our Secretary of State William Galvin was investigating Prudential Securities before that for brokers--I believe it was trading after hours. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. Mr. Scannell. So obviously I went to my---- Senator Fitzgerald. And the Secretary of State, Mr. Galvin's office, got on it right away in September. Mr. Scannell. Well, in about 4 hours after having met with Matthew Nestor, who I informed, that the SEC never got back to me and seemingly was not interested. From what I believed and from the market timing I knew was continuing, he assured me that William Galvin's office wouldn't behave like that, they would be acting on this. He was very impressed with the information. Senator Fitzgerald. Are you still working at Putnam? Mr. Scannell. No, I'm not. Excuse me. I am on disability from Putnam Investments. I was assaulted over what I believe this---- Senator Fitzgerald. When did you go on disability? Mr. Scannell. February 2. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. So you were bringing these concerns to the SEC after you had gone on disability? Mr. Scannell. What happened to me right before February 2, I compiled my information and left, knowing--and telling a supervisor, an assistant vice president there, that I'd no longer be accepting transactions for known market timers. I was told to be careful and I had to do what I had to. It was the following Sunday at a meeting that I regularly attended that I was assaulted by somebody that I believed was trying to make me--the person who assaulted me looked like they were a Boilermaker Local 5 member. Senator Fitzgerald. When were you assaulted? Mr. Scannell. The following Sunday, February 2. Senator Fitzgerald. On February 2. Mr. Scannell. My disability is from my assault. Senator Fitzgerald. Your disability is from your assault? Mr. Scannell. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. And you had been raising concerns within Putnam? Mr. Scannell. And downloaded documents and, again, that they're well aware that I did, once I left. People were aware that I was--I wasn't going to---- Senator Fitzgerald. Where did the assault occur? Mr. Scannell. In Quincy, Massachusetts. Senator Fitzgerald. OK, and you believe it related to your whistle-blowing activities within Putnam? Mr. Scannell. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. Who do you think were---- Mr. Scannell. Actually, I feel kind of uncomfortable talking about this in detail, Senator. I've included that in my testimony to you very---- Senator Fitzgerald. OK. Mr. Scannell. In descriptive form. It's another incredible coincidence, and that's something that a lot of people have wanted me to believe that all these coincidences are just that--coincidences. And I'm concerned that there's more to it than that. Senator Fitzgerald. Did you tell the SEC when you met with them that you had been assaulted? Mr. Scannell. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald. And that you thought it related to your---- Mr. Scannell. Yes. Senator Fitzgerald [continuing]. Complaints. OK. Well, I compliment you on your courage. I compliment both of you for coming forward. I think you have done a great public service by helping shed a spotlight on the experiences that you two had within the industry. A lot of this is difficult for people outside the mutual fund industry to understand technically how some of these activities, the market timing and late trading, actually occur. And both of you show a lot of courage by coming forward, testifying before Congress, and we certainly appreciate it. Mr. Scannell, we do have your full statement for the record, and we can read the details there. And if you have more ideas, please feel free to be in touch with my office as all of this progresses. Is there anything else either of you would like to add before we close up? Well, if not, we will allow you to get on your way, and thank you very much. Mr. Nesfield. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Scannell. Thank you for the opportunity, Senator. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. We are set to begin the third panel, and I want to begin by thanking all of you for your patience. You have probably been waiting here since the first panel, and I know it has been a long day. And I am sure many of you traveled a long way as well in the inclement weather, so we appreciate all that you have done to be here. Our first witness on the third panel is Jeffrey C. Keil, who is vice president of Global Fiduciary Revier at Lipper, Incorporated, headquartered in Denver, Colorado. Mr. Keil has been analyzing the mutual fund industry for the past 12 years and has specialized in mutual fund fees and expenses as well as regulatory and disclosure issues. Last week, Lipper released a study on the feasibility of eliminating the 12b-1 fees that mutual fund companies charge to cover costs such as marketing and advertising and reimbursements to brokers for distributing their funds. We look forward to hearing from Mr. Keil on Lipper's findings in their report. Our second witness is Travis B. Plunkett, who is the legislative director at the Consumer Federation of America. The Consumer Federation of America is an association of 300 organizations that work to promote and protect the consumer interests by engaging in advocacy, education, and network building. Mr. Plunkett's focus at the CFA is on financial services, including credit reporting, credit counseling, and consumer privacy and insurance. Our third witness is Paul S. Stevens, who is a partner at Dechert LLP, in the firm's financial services group. Mr. Stevens is with us today on behalf of the Investment Company Institute, known as ICI, where he served as senior vice president and general counsel from 1993 to 1997. While serving in this capacity, Mr. Stevens is credited for leading the ICI in its efforts to support passage of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, as well as in the adoption of mutual fund disclosure reforms by the SEC and the formation of new industry standards on personal investing. In his position at Dechert, Mr. Stevens leads the firm's practice in the areas of mutual fund governance and bank/broker-dealer activities. Our fourth witness on this panel is Marc E. Lackritz, who is the President of the Securities Industry Association. The Securities Industry Association represents the shared interests of over 600 securities firms, including mutual fund companies, investment banks, and broker-dealers. Mr. Lackritz has a great deal of experience in the securities industry, having served not only as SIA president since 1992, but also as executive vice president to the organization and as executive vice president at the Public Securities Association, which is now known as the Bond Market Association. And, finally, with us today is Professor John Freeman of the University of South Carolina School of Law. Professor Freeman was referred to in remarks by Attorney General Spitzer. Professor Freeman holds the John Campbell Chair in Business and Professional Ethics and has taught courses in legal ethics and securities laws for the past 30 years. Professor Freeman has an extensive background analyzing mutual fund and other investment issues, and he recently co-authored an extensive study entitled ``Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest.'' That was the report Attorney General Spitzer was referring to. Again, I would like to thank each of the witnesses for being here, and in the interest of time, if you could all be kind enough to submit your written remarks for the record and we will include those remarks as part of the permanent record of this Subcommittee hearing, and if you could summarize those remarks in no more than a 5-minute opening statement, we would greatly appreciate it. So, Mr. Keil, we will begin with you. Thank you for being here. TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY C. KEIL,\1\ VICE PRESIDENT, GLOBAL FIDUCIARY REVIEW, LIPPER, INC Mr. Keil. My pleasure. Thank you, Chairman Fitzgerald. Lipper appreciates the opportunity to be here and address the Subcommittee today. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Keil appears in the Appendix on page 179. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I wish to address four issues vital to the business today in the next few minutes: Lipper's recent study on 12b-1 fees; generally on fees and expenses of mutual funds; costs opaque to investors; and fund governance. My aim is to clear up some misperceptions about these particular topics and outline some recommendations for reform. First, with regard to 12b-1 fees, several misperceptions will require a bright light at this time. Rule 12b-1 fees frequently are referred to as an advertising and marketing fee borne by investors. Frankly, 95 percent of the fees pay for sales charges, investor service fees, and administration, while only 5 percent actually pay for advertising and promotion. Second, given this particular reality, saying the 12b-1 sheets should create commensurate economies of scale through asset growth is effectively outdated since advertising and promotion is only 5 percent. Finally, funds closed to new investors must continue to provide certain service to investors covered by the 12b-1 plan. Hence, some plans should be--are justified for closed funds. Briefly, the highlights of our study on Rule 12b-1 recommendations update the factors that boards should consider when reviewing and continuing 12b-1 plans, issue more definitive guidelines as to acceptable 12b-1 expenditures, provide more investor transparency on the specific uses of 12b- 1 fees, and commission a study that considers whether sales charges, meaning commissions to brokers actually under the rules, should be removed from underneath Rule 12b-1, and generally recraft Rule 12b-1 to account for today's market realities, as it is woefully outdated at this point. It hasn't been updated for about 23 years, if I'm correct. I believe I'm correct. Copies of our 12b-1 study have been provided in its entirety to the Subcommittee for your review. With regard to funds' management fees and expense ratios, based on Lipper expense data, most shareholders are not paying more in both management fees and total expenses than they were 10 years ago. Using funds' size-weighted ratios, fees for most investors have not risen. When simple average ratios are cited to the investing public and through the press, they are highly skewed by a larger proportion of very small funds not held by the vast majority of investors. To the point about pension funds and mutual funds, we would maintain that funds do not necessarily pay substantially more in advisory fees than pension funds do. We have maintained that a more definitive study still needs to be authored that uncovers all reasonable benchmarks to the extent that the data actually is available, which is one of the limitations that the data are not available to a large extent; hence, the ICI study using sub-advisory comparisons. A full 1.5-percent difference between the industry-wide median total expense ratio and a much lower ratio weighted for fund size indicates that size economies are being passed to investors. That obviously doesn't address the actual amount of the fee, but there are economies of scale that do exist in this business. I see it on a daily basis. Finally, to extend the economies-of-scale argument to an entire fund business based on aggregate assets of the business is illogical. Scale is realized on the fund and the complex level only, not the entire business. This business has quite a few hundred variable very small fund complexes which have not reached any serious asset threshold, and there are very few economies to be had. Simple as that. As far as Lipper's recommendations, we support initiatives to report hypothetical expense levels in dollars in shareholder reports. We suggest an aggressive investor education initiative on cost impacts on returns be launched. That comes from comments earlier. Last, we feel enhanced disclosure should be provided in the prospectus on expense benchmarks. This comes from earlier discussion as well so that investors know, in relation to some type of average or index, what are they paying. With regard to costs opaque to investors, I would certainly echo the sentiment today that most of the lack of transparency centers around brokerage fees. There are very few misperceptions about brokerage fees because, frankly, there isn't a lot of disclosure about brokerage fees. We recommend transparency of all brokerage arrangements. That includes soft dollars, directed brokerage, etc. Boards should review all brokerage arrangements and ensure shareholder interests are protected. Regulation considering requiring the quantification of brokerage costs based on consistent algorithms across all complexes. And to the benchmarking comment, require brokerage costs be reported as a ratio in the prospectus alongside the total expense ratio, again, for comparative purposes. And, finally, with regard to fund governance, we recommend the following: We support the appointment of chief compliance officers reporting directly to independent trustees or directors. We also support calls for board administrative support and a 75-percent independent majority. We urge formal independent certification of board members' financial and fiduciary knowledge. Election of board chairpersons by independent board members would allow outside directors to determine whether they function more effectively with inside assistance or are hindered. We feel, in line with several comments today, we think that the general level of fiduciary duty of boards needs to be elevated. We do not feel, however, that advisory contracts should be put out for bid. We feel market forces and investor demand should set prices. We feel we can strengthen the current board structure through clear oversight guidelines. And probably the punch line, perhaps, of my oral testimony, we do not endorse or support punitive damages levied through indiscriminate advisory fee reductions unrelated to trading charges. Damages do not replace board activism. Rather, we feel if fees are reviewed by regulators as unreasonable, we feel a structured and equitable solution be designed to provide boards with a road map for ensuring reasonable costs are borne by investors and market forces are left to their own devices. In closing, we wish to caution legislators and regulators to proceed with care. Quickly assembled reforms may have unintended consequences and costs unforeseen during this period of improprieties and investor outcry. We fully support reform of the mutual fund business to the extent it bolsters competition, protects investors, and strengthens the business long term. Thank you. Senator Fitzgerald. Mr. Plunkett. TESTIMONY OF TRAVIS B. PLUNKETT,\1\ LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA Mr. Plunkett. Good afternoon. I am Travis Plunkett, legislative director of the Consumer Federation of America. I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Senator Akaka, for holding hearings on a mutual fund scandal that does far more harm to its victims than the recently revealed trading abuses, as shocking as those are. That is the scandal of how mutual funds are sold to unsuspecting investors and the high costs that result. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Plunkett appears in the Appendix on page 205. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- My concern today is primarily with the nearly 50 percent of mutual fund transactions that are conducted between broker- dealers and retail investors. What sets these transactions apart is the veneer of impartial advice that attaches to them. Despite their fancy titles and polished advertising campaigns, however, broker-dealers are not advisors. They are salespeople. And the overwhelming evidence now suggests that all too many brokers select mutual funds and other products they recommend not based on which offer the highest quality at the lowest price, but on which funds offer lucrative financial incentives to the brokerage firm and the individual sales representative. This is a phenomenon sometimes called ``reverse competition.'' This is allowed to occur because only a relative small portion of the mutual fund marketplace could be said to be truly cost competitive right now, and that is the 13 percent of mutual fund transactions that occur directly between the fund company and the retail investor outside of any employer- sponsored retirement plan. In the growing number of fund transactions that occur through retirement plans, however, investors generally have very limited options and, therefore, cannot effectively make cost-conscious purchase decisions. And in the rest of the market, funds that rely on broker-dealers and other salespeople outside of company-sponsored retirement plans, as I mentioned, this portion of the market competes in ways that drive costs to investors up, not down, through a number of mechanisms we have heard about today: Sales loads, 12b-1 fees, payments for shelf space, and directed brokerage. This allows mediocre, high-cost funds to survive and even thrive that could not do so in a truly competitive market. Another major factor undermining effective competition is the lack of good disclosure, either of mutual fund costs or of the conflicts of interest that can bias sales recommendations. For disclosures to be effective, they must provide the information investors need, in a form they can understand, at a time when it is useful to them in making their purchasing decisions. Mutual fund costs and conflict disclosures fail all three tests. In particular, they leave out key information, such as expense portfolio transaction costs. Now, let's talk a little bit about the SEC's regulatory response. Initially, the SEC was slow to acknowledge the need for fundamental cost disclosure and governance reforms. Although the Commission now appears to be making important progress on these and other issues, there are still serious gaps in their regulatory agenda. For example, the SEC does not have the authority to strengthen the definition of independent director, as legislation introduced by Senator Akaka and Chairman Fitzgerald would. Even if the Commission's promising disclosure proposals on broker conflicts of interest are offered--and we are waiting for the actual details there--they appear to have serious holes. We will not know for sure until the rule is proposed, but it does not appear that the Commission intends to include information about the non-distribution-related expenses of the fund, the annual expense ratio, in either the point-of-sale document or the confirmation statement. If the Commission is going to take the unprecedented step of requiring point-of-sale disclosure, it should do more to ensure that it covers all the information investors should have prior to sale, including information on investment risks, for example, and comparative information on fund costs, not just sales incentives. Congress should build on what the Commission has begun and ensure that all the key information investors need pre-sale is included in these reports. Chairman Donaldson has indicated the agency will study use of soft dollars, but the SEC does not have the authority to repeal the safe harbor for this unacceptable conflict of interest. Congress should. A major shortcoming of the SEC approach is that it relies exclusively on better disclosure of broker-dealer conflicts of interest rather than on bans of conflict-inducing practices. Such an approach ignores the fundamental reality of how investors relate to brokers and the degree to which they rely on them for advice. We doubt that even the best disclosures will be able to overcome multi-million-dollar advertising campaigns that encourage investors to view financial professionals as objective advisors. It is long past time to require brokers to either live up to the advisory image they project and accept the attendant responsibility to make recommendations that are in their client's best interest or to cease misrepresenting themselves to clients as advisors. One timely idea is to get mutual funds out of the business of determining distribution prices entirely, not just by eliminating 12b-1 fees, directed brokerage, and payments for shelf space, but also by getting funds out of the position of determining commission levels altogether. If funds got out of the business of competing to be sold and brokers' compensation came directly from the investor and did not depend on which fund they sold, then brokers might begin to compete on the basis of the quality of their recommendations, and funds might have to compete accordingly by offering a quality product and good service at a reasonable price. I want to thank the Subcommittee again for exploring these important issues, and we look forward to working with you as you move forward. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you, Mr. Plunkett. Mr. Stevens. TESTIMONY OF PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS,\1\ PARTNER, DECHERT LLP, ON BEHALF OF THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE Mr. Stevens. Chairman Fitzgerald and Ranking Member Senator Akaka, thank you very much. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Stevens appears in the Appendix on page 224. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I think it is appropriate to begin by underscoring on behalf of the Institute its strong support for the ongoing efforts of Federal and State Government authorities to root out abusive trading practices affecting mutual funds. The Institute is committed to taking whatever steps are necessary to prevent such abuses in the future and to fulfill the industry's fiduciary obligations to its tens of millions of fund shareholders. The SEC has moved swiftly across a broad front to bolster regulatory protections, and the Institute pledges its cooperation as Congress, the SEC, and other interested parties work to restore and maintain the confidence of fund investors. I welcome the opportunity to present the Institute's views on mutual fund fees and expenses. My written testimony goes through a whole variety of issues. There are three in particular that I would like to emphasize here. First, although you might not know it from this morning's discussion, we all should recognize that this is at least a glass that is half-full. Indeed, fully informing investors about mutual fund fees and expenses has been a long-time objective of SEC regulations. Current regulations, including the very prominent standardized fee table that appears in every mutual fund prospectus, assure a high degree of transparency about the costs of mutual fund investing. Is there more that might be done? This is the question that, Mr. Chairman, your hearing poses. Yes. And the SEC is developing a variety of new additional disclosure requirements. Maybe there are things that the SEC has not yet considered or proposed that should be added to that. Fair enough. But building on existing regulations, these and other reforms, it seems to me, will provide a level of information to fund investors that is unrivaled by any other financial product. I am more than prepared to discuss the details, but I want you to know that the Institute strongly supports precisely that objective. Second, with respect to recent research on trends in mutual fund costs, I believe the consensus of all serious recent research is that the costs of mutual fund investing have trended downward significantly over the past 20 years. The Institute's own extensive published research supports this view. So, too, does the independent analysis that has been conducted by the SEC and the GAO. And it is fair for us to ask, why is that? Well, I believe there are a variety of market forces at work in producing this result, including, among others, the healthy level of competition that exists among fund providers, and the very widespread availability to investors of information about mutual fund costs, performance, and services. In fact, if you look at trends over that 20-year period, the fact that mutual fund shareholders are now heavily invested in the lowest-cost funds suggests that they and their financial advisors understand and recognize the importance of fund fees. Finally, Mr. Chairman, in light of the interest in this topic that has emerged during this hearing, I want to address how mutual fund fees compare with those of pension managers, other institutional investment managers, as well as--and this is a subject to which you have returned a couple of times-- those that are associated with the Federal Thrift Savings Plan. My colleague, Professor Freeman, on this panel and others have contended that differences between the ``investment advisory fees'' paid by a pension plan and the ``management fees'' paid by a mutual fund indicate that mutual funds are overpriced. The analysis is provocative. It is one that Attorney General Spitzer has cited numerous times. But, unfortunately, the analysis is seriously flawed. The two types of fees that Professor Freeman and his colleagues compare are fundamentally different. A pension plan's ``advisory fee'' primarily covers portfolio management services. I have been a mutual fund lawyer for 25 years, and I know that, by contrast, a mutual fund's ``management fee''-- that is, the number that is reported in a fee table, the number available through Morningstar--covers a host of additional costs that are spelled out in the fund's contract with its manager. These can include a whole variety of things: Pricing the fund, providing it office space and equipment, providing a clerical staff and bookkeeping support, defraying the salaries of fund officers and directors, and paying for legal and regulatory compliance, which in the case of a fund is no small undertaking. And these are to name just a few. The comparison drawn in Professor Freeman's study is for this reason incorrect and misleading. The ICI study that Attorney General Spitzer referred to earlier--and invited you, Mr. Chairman, to ask me about--is a study that makes precisely the point I just made: That this is an apples-to-oranges comparison, and the data is not normalized, if you will, in order to draw any inferences. Now, the ICI study also suggests that if you compare the pure investment advisory fees of a pension plan with some equivalent in the mutual fund arena, the two would appear to pay comparable amounts for similar portfolio management services. Attorney General Spitzer and, I suspect, probably Professor Freeman, don't accept that comparison, but even if they don't, it doesn't make the comparison drawn in Professor Freeman's article accurate. The fact of the matter is the comparison he was drawing is just simply misleading. Now, what about institutional versus retail money management? This is important and it is a subject that Attorney General Spitzer addressed this morning. Institutional investment managers and retail investment managers occupy a very different space, and I think it is a truism in the business that it is much more difficult and expensive to deal at a retail than it is an institutional level. And if you think about it for a moment, it is intuitively obvious why that is the case. First of all, retail assets are much harder to attract. They are out there in a much more disparate universe, belonging to households and individuals. Institutional assets come from institutions, of which there are fewer, and they are more readily identifiable and approachable. Retail assets are also harder to manage. In a mutual fund form, for example, a high percentage of the assets has to be maintained in a liquid form. That is under SEC rules. But it is also to provide the daily transaction capabilities and redemption capabilities that a mutual fund promises to its investors, which institutional managers don't have to deal with. They are also more difficult to administer, again, because of legal and regulatory issues, and they are harder to retain. Individual mutual fund investors make decisions every day about redeeming, exchanging from one fund to another, or moving to another manager, and the open-end form of their funds assures them the ability to do that. Institutional money, however sticky it may seem retail mutual fund money is, is far stickier. Now, if it were, in fact, the case that institutional money managers' fee schedules are so much more reasonable by comparison to retail managers, you would think institutional money managers would be making a lot--retail money managers, rather, would be making a lot more money. That is simply not the case. We can provide for the Subcommittee's consideration after these hearings information concerning this point. Capital Resource Advisors conducts an annual survey called ``Competitive Challenges,'' where it addresses these issues, among others. In 2001, on average, as a percentage, retail investment managers' total operating profit margin was 22.3 percent. Institutional managers' profit margin you would think would be less if their fees were so much more reasonable. Well, it was not. It is 29.5 percent. In 2002, the comparison was 16.5 to 28.5. The truism is, I think, demonstrated in the profitability of the businesses. The retail part of investment management is simply a much more expensive and difficult exercise. And then, finally, Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, but let me say just a few things about the Federal Thrift Savings Plan. When I was at the Reagan White House for 3 years, I participated in the Federal Thrift Savings Plan, so I know it from the point of view of an investor as well. Senator Fitzgerald. Do you still have it, or did you get rid of it? Mr. Stevens. Well, as you know, President Reagan has been out of office a long time, and since I hadn't been back in Federal Government any longer, I did cash out my interest in the plan. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. Mr. Stevens. Maybe that was a mistake, but it is a decision I made. Senator Fitzgerald. It almost assuredly was a mistake. Mr. Stevens. Well, perhaps. But I think one of the things that it reinforces to me, at least, my familiarity with both the Thrift Savings Plan and the retail mutual fund business, is that they are very different animals. For example, all of the Thrift Savings Plan's portfolios are indexed, and all of them are very large. That is not true with retail mutual funds. Many of the costs that we think of in a mutual fund arena as administrative and distribution costs are actually subsidized by the Federal Government. They are borne by the agencies whose employees participate in the Thrift Savings Plan and are never taxed back to the expense ratios of the portfolios themselves. So there is a governmental subsidy. I am not saying it is inappropriate. It just does not appear in the performance figures. And then, finally--and this is significant as well--there are no regulatory or related costs in running the Thrift Savings Plan. And I want to tell you, 25 years of being a mutual fund lawyer underscore to me those costs are not insignificant. So at least some observations, Mr. Chairman, that may be of use. Thank you. Senator Fitzgerald. I will hold my rebuttal until all the witnesses have finished, but thank you very much for that very good presentation. Mr. Lackritz, thank you very much for being here. TESTIMONY OF MARC E. LACKRITZ,\1\ PRESIDENT, SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION Mr. Lackritz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Securities Industry Association. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Lackritz appears in the Appendix on page 250. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- First of all, let me begin by commending you and your Subcommittee for your long tradition of protecting the public, and I would add we look forward to working with you and your colleagues and the other committees in the Senate and the Commission to restore the public's trust and confidence in the Nation's securities markets and in mutual funds. Our members, Mr. Chairman, underwrite securities--stocks and bonds--to raise funds--capital--for private companies and public bodies. These entities use the funds we raise to expand and grow--hiring new workers, investing in new equipment, and building public works. Our industry has raised more than $21 trillion over the last 10 years to finance innovation and growth in the form of new enterprises, new processes, new products, and new bridges, roads, hospitals, and schools. We also help individual investors achieve their financial goals, such as planning for a child's education or for a comfortable retirement. Thus, as intermediaries between those who have capital on the one hand and those who need it on the other, we serve the very essential function of channeling capital to its most productive uses. The securities industry is based on two bedrock principles: Disclosure and competition. The format of securities regulation was articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis back in the early part of the 20th Century, and the architecture of the securities laws reflect, that you need both full disclosure and vigorous competition. Justice Brandeis was also credited with the notion that sunshine is the best disinfectant, electric light is the best revealer. I think in this discussion that we are having about what to do in this area, Justice Brandeis' teachings are actually very relevant here, that, in fact, what we need is more transparency and what we need is better disclosure, because public trust and confidence are really the bedrock principles on which our market participants succeed, and as long as the same rules are vigorously and fairly applied. Mutual funds are the vehicle by which an overwhelming majority of investors participate in our markets. Nine out of ten investors have at least some money in stock mutual funds, and just over half invest exclusively in funds. As a result, the health of our securities markets depends to a great extent on the public's continued robust participation in mutual funds. Yet, as we know from these hearings and other disclosures, not all is well with mutual funds. Revelations of wrongdoing, including late trading and market timing, contrary to fund prospectuses, as well as other practices, have shaken investors' confidence in many fund organizations and in the intermediaries distributing the funds. To restore public trust and confidence in funds and their distributors, the interest of investors must come first. Investors must be assured, Mr. Chairman, that fraud, self- dealing, and dishonesty will not be tolerated and will be vigorously enforced and punished. Investors should be treated fairly and should be given complete, clear, and useful information about the funds that they buy. All aspects of the mutual fund business, including fund fee structures, financial incentives offered to intermediaries, fund investment and redemption policies, and fund governance must be as transparent as possible. And all investors should be assured of prompt execution in fair pricing of their fund transactions. We think a two-pronged approach is necessary to restore the public's trust in mutual funds. First, swift, sure, and tough enforcement actions are the proper remedy to address clear violations of the law. I might add that, in addition to tough enforcement and swift enforcement, the time has come to implement some necessary reforms as well. We support efforts to improve disclosure and sales and trading practices to ensure that investors' interests come first. Specifically, investors should have clear, direct, timely information in a useful format that allows them to comparison shop and that promotes consumer choice and competition. Disclosure must be easily accessible and investor friendly rather than a ``Where's Waldo?'' search through fragments of disclosures and long prospectuses and long legalese for relevant information. In that vein, we strongly support efforts to enhance the transparency of revenue sharing agreements, including the nature of services received and differential compensation arrangements. Such disclosures should be uniform across regulatory agencies and should focus on arrangements that are likely to influence recommendations made to investors. Disclosures should provide investors with material information that they need. Finally, investors should have full, clear, and useful information on mutual fund fees, since they will have a significant effect on the investor's return. With respect to both soft dollars and directed brokerage, the key investor protection here is to maintain best execution for the customers. We believe that soft dollars are both pro- investor and pro-competitive, particularly for third-party research, as we heard earlier. But advisors, fund trustees, and broker-dealers must always put investors first. Thus, we support improved disclosure of soft-dollar arrangements to both investors and to fund trustees. We have been appalled by reports of late trading of mutual fund shares. As Attorney General Spitzer noted earlier, such activity is the equivalent of betting on a horse race after it is over. Reforms should make late trading virtually impossible to achieve. At the same time, we believe strongly that any reforms here should not penalize innocent investors, particularly those in 401(k) plans or 529 plans or those who buy their mutual funds from broker-dealers rather than directly from funds. We look forward to working with the SEC and your Committee to eliminate late trading in a way that protects all investors and does not create competitive disadvantages for some. Late trading has had a terribly corrosive effect on investor confidence, and we must find and implement an effective remedy now. Mr. Chairman, we are very proud of the capital our industry has raised, the jobs we have helped create, the innovation and growth we have helped foster, the new products and services we have made available, and the dreams we have helped our consumers achieve. Yet, we abhor the abusive activities involving mutual funds that you have shone a spotlight on. We urge the SEC, the NASD, and State authorities to continue to bring wrongdoers to justice swiftly and surely. And we are eager to do our part to improve mutual funds so that they can continue to be an effective investment vehicle for all Americans. Thank you very much. Senator Fitzgerald. Thank you, Mr. Lackritz. Professor Freeman, thank you for being here. TESTIMONY OF JOHN P. FREEMAN,\1\ PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW SCHOOL Mr. Freeman. Thank you for inviting me, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Senator Akaka. I am delighted to be here with you. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Freeman appears in the Appendix on page 266. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The issue isn't whether or not we should thoroughly regulate mutual funds. As my formal statement points out, there isn't an issuer of securities in the United States that is subject to more detailed regulation than mutual funds. They are the most heavily regulated financial product in our economy, and all this regulation and all this attention has gotten us a train wreck and a scandal that is beyond belief for somebody like me who has been watching and writing about the fund industry for about 35 years. Where to start? Basically, it is conflict of interest. Conflict of interest, conflict of interest, conflict of interest. Fiduciary duty, fiduciary duty, fiduciary duty breaches. The bigger the fund, the more money under management, the more the advisor makes. Raising that money, bringing that money in, means getting dollars in the hands of people who sell the funds. When I was working at the SEC on mutual fund distribution in the summer of 1977, this quote came in, which I have never forgotten and have often repeated: ``To close one's eyes to the reality''--this is from the industry--``that salesmen in the mutual fund industry have traditionally sold products which pay the most money is to regulate without a sense of what the industry is about.'' Now, there has been talk about overcharging and fees, and let's talk about that. I have been criticized and called irresponsible by the ICI. And speaking of conflict of interest--you alluded to this earlier, Mr. Chairman--here is an entity that takes money from fund shareholders and uses that money unceasingly to protect the interests of sponsors who are exploiting those fund shareholders. I say the ICI epitomizes problems of conflict of interest in the mutual fund industry, and anything they say should be taken in light of that. But let's talk about their criticisms. They say: ``Oh, Freeman's got it wrong, he's too stupid, maybe, he's irresponsible. He's been dealing with this topic for 35 years. He's been teaching securities regulation in law school for 30 years. He's been writing about this for a long, long time. He's working with a guy who's a Ph.D. and a chartered financial analyst. But they just can't get to the bottom of it. They just can't figure it out.'' Well, let's assume that is true. If we can't figure it out, who on Earth can? Your average investor? No. Your average State regulator? No. The SEC itself, where I used to work, have they figured it out? I question that. Now, let's talk about the irresponsible statements in our report. We had a statement in our report that was to the effect that mutual fund shareholders--and this is the direct quote-- ``pay nearly twice as much as institutional investors for money management. And that calculation doesn't even include any front- or back-end sales charges you may also pony up.'' And that was about our finding, and it is about double. And you say, well, Freeman and Brown, they don't know any better. That quote came from Ruth Simon. It was published in Money Magazine and is in Footnote 10 of our article. That was published in Money Magazine in 1995. It is so well known that the funds have been gouging their shareholders that when the Wall Street Journal wrote a story about our article--which is unusual for national press to write about a law review article--they did it in 2001, and the headline was, ``This is news? Study finds mutual fund shareholders being overcharged on fees.'' In other words, I mean, come on, guys, come up with something original. What we cited in our article, besides Ruth Simon and a lot of data talking about profitability, in the article is some evidence that when fund management companies are sold out, they command double the multiple for other institutional management companies. The marketplace values the lucrativeness of mutual fund management when the marketplace buys out these people. But we also quoted and referred to the Wharton Report, going back 30 years--and you have heard references today--the Public Policy Implications Study. And what did those things find? What they found was the same thing we found: Fund shareholders being gouged, paying prices far in excess of other institutions. Now, the question is--it has been raised. Mutual funds are all these little people and you get these big institutions, they should be paying less. Well, let's take a look very quickly at that one. In the case of Alliance Fund, Alliance was charging the Alliance Fund shareholders 93 basis points, and Alliance was managing something like $16 billion. What was the fee? It was around $160 million a year for the Alliance Fund. The same management company using the same processes and the same theories and everything was managing a portfolio of about $900 million for the Wyoming Retirement Plan for 10 basis points. So the fund shareholders at Alliance are paying $160 million or so a year, and the people at the Wyoming Retirement Plan are paying around $900,000 for the same services. Now, wouldn't you think some fund director might say to Alliance, ``Why don't you give us a 10-basis-point price?'' But that apparently hasn't happened. One thing that has been alluded to, but not said expressly--it is in our article; Mr. Spitzer has referred to it previously. Most-favored-nation treatment. Every mutual fund director should require the advisor, if the advisor is selling similar services in the free market, should require the advisor to give the board those prices and to justify the price differential between the prices that are being charged in the open market to the Wyoming Retirement Plan and the prices that are being charged or would be charged to the fund's shareholders. In other words, you want 93 basis points from us to manage $16 billion, but you are only charging them 10 basis point to manage $900 million. You are going to make a lot more money. Would you explain to us why this makes any sense? I could say a lot more. I will reserve my comments for answering questions. Senator Fitzgerald. Well, I can tell this is going to be a lively question and answer session. I appreciate that, Professor Freeman. It was very good. I would like to start with Mr. Stevens. Let's go back to the point that Professor Stevens raised, picking up on something that I said earlier. Mr. Stevens. Professor Freeman. Senator Fitzgerald. I am sorry. Mr. Stevens. I am Stevens. Senator Fitzgerald. I am sorry. Professor Freeman raised this issue, which I alluded to earlier, which is that dues to the ICI are paid by mutual fund companies by deducting money from mutual fund shareholders, and then the ICI gets all this money and, in effect, your interests are really adverse to mutual fund shareholders' in America, aren't they? You are a lobbying group that represents the managers of mutual funds and the mutual fund companies themselves, as opposed to the shareholders. Mr. Stevens. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chance to respond to this. It is almost a point of personal privilege on behalf of my client. The ICI was organized in 1940, essentially at the request of the SEC, because when the 1940 Act was passed, it needed an interlocutor, an industry representative, in order to begin developing the highly complex series of rules that were necessary to implement the Act. At that time, the Institute was organized to represent the interest of funds and their advisors, and it has continued to do so. One premise, though, of the critics of the ICI in this regard is--and I think it has been asserted numerous times today--that advisors' and funds' interests are antithetical across the board. If you think about it for a moment, I think you would realize that is not the case. Certainly they may be antithetical with respect to the price. It is the fund shareholders' interest to get the lowest possible price, and perhaps the manager wants to get a higher one, perhaps even the highest possible. But with respect to many other areas, I think their interests are common. For example, it is obviously in the managers' interest to get the best performance. Why? Not only because it serves the consumers best, but it is the best way that we know in this business of getting more consumers and attracting more assets. They have a joint interest in good shareholder service as well, for exactly the same reasons. Mutual fund investors are highly demanding in terms of the range and quality of the services. And, finally, to a very high degree, there is a common interest with respect to regulatory compliance. Either the fund or the advisor, or both, will pay the consequences if there isn't such compliance. But now let me talk about what the ICI stands for and has stood for in that regard, and I speak from my own personal experience, but I think we could multiply the examples across a whole range. First, for many years, the Institute was up here on behalf of funds and their shareholders and their advisors urging the Senate and House of Representatives to greatly increase appropriations for the Securities and Exchange Commission because of their concern that the growth of funds, the growth of advisors, investor dollars, and investments was far out- stripping anything that the SEC had to bring to bear to inspect, examine, and oversee the industry. Those calls are matters of record, and they went largely unheeded for a long period of time as funds continue to grow. I congratulate the Senate for having appropriated just this week over $800 million to the SEC, and we are catching up and we are giving the regulators the resources they need. That had been a bedrock of the ICI's legislative policy for a long time. But there are several other examples I can give you. One of the things that the SEC and the NASD both are rightly credited for and encouraged about is this notion that there should be point-of-sale disclosure of revenue sharing; that is to say, amounts that a mutual fund advisor out of its profits pays to a broker-dealer in connection with its marketing of the fund. What has never been acknowledged by the SEC or the NASD-- or, for that matter, even in the press--is that in 1996, 8 years ago, that was a regulatory recommendation that the ICI made to the NASD and they never acted on, and I will be happy to provide you information in that regard. Another example--and, by the way, that was from my tenure as general counsel of the ICI. Another example: the compliance rule. Many people here today, including Jack Bogle, have said what a great idea, we need compliance programs that are consistent throughout funds. And we agree, frankly. But the germ of that idea was advanced to the SEC almost 10 years ago by the ICI in a proposal that I personally worked on and was transmitted to the SEC, and the SEC did nothing about it for a long period of time until the current scandals. Now, that is fine. I am not criticizing the SEC, and I am giving Chairman Donaldson all the credit for moving in the direction that he has. But it was an idea that came from the industry through the ICI, and we will provide information in that regard as well. And there are other examples, too: simplified disclosure for fund shareholders and reforms of the prospectus, new standards for personal investing, support for best practices with respect to the governance of funds. These are not proposals that advanced the selfish interests of advisors. They advanced, in fact, the common interests of advisors and funds and their shareholders and were all, as a matter of record, things that the ICI supported. So I reject the notion, frankly--and I kind of resent the ad hominem argument that is involved--that the ICI somehow or other is nefariously accepting some people's monies to advance another's causes. With respect to the issue of dues, as a result of the history of the Institute, it is indeed true that there are different sources of funding. Some are paid by fund shareholders. Some are paid by fund advisors. And those decisions are made at the fund complex level, not at the level of the ICI. Senator Fitzgerald. Professor Freeman, do you think ICI dues should have to be paid out of the advisor's own money as opposed to out of their shareholders' money? Mr. Freeman. Yes, I think that that they are a lobbying organization for the advisors, for fund sponsors, and they ought to take that money and just be straight up about it, and not pretend that they are actually representing the interests of fund shareholders, because I don't see it. Senator Fitzgerald. Mr. Plunkett, do you have a thought on that? Mr. Plunkett. To the best of my knowledge, we don't have a position on this. I think Mr. Stevens raises an interesting point---- Senator Fitzgerald. I thought you were going to recommend that we pass a law imposing a one one-thousandth of a basis point fee on all mutual fund shareholders and give it to the Consumer Federation of America. Mr. Plunkett. Oh, it wouldn't have to go to us. It could go to a shareholder directed organization. I think the point that there are economic--that interests do diverge at the basic economic level means that public policy-wise, the ICI and consumer interests often diverge. They don't always diverge but often do. And I think that is an important point to note since we are talking about public policy here. Mr. Stevens. Mr. Chairman, if I could just respond. Senator Fitzgerald. Do you have any fund shareholders on your board, Mr. Stevens, at the ICI as opposed to fund advisors? Mr. Stevens. We have independent fund directors on the board. We do not have fund shareholders who are representatives on the board. Senator Fitzgerald. OK. Mr. Stevens. But, Mr. Chairman, if I could just say, I think in order to resolve this issue of what the ICI stands for, you have to ask yourself in specific cases: What was the position that they took? I have offered to provide you the additional evidence, I suppose, of the public policy positions that the ICI has stood for. It is also, I think, fairly clear in this current crisis, post-September 3, 2003, where the ICI has stood with respect to a whole range of issues. There has been no blinking there and no trying to log roll with respect to protecting advisors, much less ones who have fallen afoul of the law. It is the Institute, for example, who has recommended the hard 4 o'clock close, for which it has been criticized by many other participants in the industry for prescribing medicine that is simply too strong. We also have recommend--and the SEC, I am pleased, is considering this--that there be a mandatory redemption fee for mutual fund investors who come in and out of a fund within a 5- day period to make it very clear that this is not a short-term transactional vehicle, it is for longer-term shareholders, and to put a friction cost in place that would prevent their being abused. We have recommended stronger regulations with respect to the investments by fund insiders in their own shares so that there is oversight, so there is transparency in that regard. And, most fundamentally, we have said loudly and clearly from the very beginning, if any member, any participant in this industry has violated the law, they should have the book thrown at them. We make no apologies for that whatsoever and supported General Spitzer and Chairman Donaldson in the most aggressive enforcement activities that they are undertaking with respect to the industry. Senator Fitzgerald. Senator Akaka. Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, I want to add my praise to you for holding this hearing. Mr. Plunkett, in addition to improving the governance structure of mutual fund companies and increasing meaningful, relevant, and understandable disclosures, what should be done to improve the financial and economic literacy of investors? I ask this of you because you represent the Consumer Federation of America and what we want to do is help the consumers of this country. Mr. Plunkett. Well, thank you, Senator Akaka, for the question. We have spent a lot of time on questions of investor education and financial literacy. The key here is to examine the experience of less sophisticated investors when developing educational programs. We know that a portion of investors are making sound decisions, either because they have the sophistication to do it on their own or because they are getting good financial advice from financial professionals. That is fine. In looking at how to improve investor education, however, and how to improve disclosures in particular, we need to start by looking at the experience of those many investors who are making poor decisions. I am thinking here of the investor who winds up in an S&P 500 index fund with a 2-percent expense ratio, for example. We need to know what sources of information they are relying on and how they make decisions before we can educate them to make better decisions. And we believe any efforts in this area should start from a study of those issues. Mr. Lackritz. Senator Akaka, could I intervene? I would say that improving investor education and financial literacy is one of the top priorities of our organization. We have a website that provides first-class investor education without selling anything, and describes the basic things people should know. It is available free to anyone. It is called siainvestor.org. We also have a foundation for investor education, and we run a program in schools, an exercise in schools, that involves economic education that teaches kids from middle school through high school about the differences between saving and consumption, about interest rates, about compounding, about the difference between equities and debt, all that kind of thing. Currently, we have 550,000 kids every year that engage in this program, and we are trying to expand it. We have, I think, a program active in Hawaii, too. We would be happy to talk to you about that and see if we could help you see a demonstration of the program in a school. Senator Akaka. I am glad that you brought this up, and I will ask others to comment on this. Let me ask Mr. Stevens the same question I asked Mr. Plunkett. You are representing another side. What do you believe must be done to improve the financial and economic literacy among investors? Mr. Stevens. Well, It is a daunting challenge, Senator, I grant you that, and the Institute has many programs supporting investor education initiatives that are similar to those in the Securities Industry Association. And I grant you that in many respects mutual funds are complex products, so they are hard to know, hard to understand. Our appetite as a government--and I am thinking now of the regime that the SEC administers--has been to devise a disclosure document, the prospectus, and as Jack Bogle said, throw everything including the kitchen sink in it and hope that people will read it and understand it. The challenge is not so much making sure the information is out there. I grant you, it should be out there, and it should be accessible. But, beyond that, with respect to a more complex financial product, crafting a set of information which covers the key points that an investor needs to know, this was one of the things that we worked on extensively when I was at the ICI. It was called the profile prospectus. It was eventually adopted in the SEC rules in another way as the front end or summary of existing prospectuses, and it tried to select all the key information. Much of what we are talking about here, by the way, it seems to me, while it is information that ought to be out there, I would agree with Mr. Bogle it is not necessarily information that is so key that an investor has to know it beforehand. Let me give you one example. There has been a lot of emphasis on improved disclosure of transaction costs, and there is complexity about that, and the issue becomes how do you do that, because it is not just commission dollars. It is market impact. It is spreads on debt instruments. And so there is a big challenge in getting the information out there. But all of the costs that are implicit in funds transaction in portfolio securities are already reflected in the performance information that an investor gets. It is all net of that because it is built into that number. Now, ask yourself the question: In order to make a good mutual fund investment, do I have to know all of the details with respect to the transaction costs? Maybe not. Maybe there is a shorthand way of providing it. But if we begin putting hurdles like that in front of mutual fund investors, what I am afraid is we make it preternaturally more difficult to make good investing decisions. That is the challenge: Getting the information out, but also crafting it in a way that it is meaningful and communicates effectively with the investor public. Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, may I? Let me ask Mr. Keil, it is quite clear that investors need to have additional information about the transaction costs of their mutual funds because the expense ratios fail to include them, and the brokerage commissions are buried in the statement of additional information, which investors are only given upon request. It is a lengthy and complicated document that does not easily facilitate comparison among funds. Mr. Keil, in your statement you mentioned that trying to fully quantify brokerage costs in total, given every trading scenario, is ``similar to attempting to nail''--and I wanted to say this--``Jell-O to a wall.'' What do you recommend to improve the disclosure of transaction costs in a meaningful, understandable way to investors? Mr. Keil. Well, let me make the point that I still stand behind my statement that you cannot quantify every last brokerage scenario to the satisfaction of most academics. But I think that the scenario, the way it exists today, is thoroughly inadequate. There is no way for an investor to quantify what they are paying in brokerage. There is just no way to do it. The aggregate dollars, as you point out, are shown in the SAI, but let's face it, if it is a challenge to get the investors to read the prospectus cover to cover, they are going to go nowhere near the SAI. It is an ineffective document as far as disclosure is concerned. I would make the statement that there are ways to quantify the different types of brokerage. Whether you segment them or put them in one number is another issue. But I would not recommend that once you take those dollars, you put them in the form of a ratio so that they are the same basis as an expense ratio. That should be included in the total expense ratio. We are really talking about apples and orange--total expense ratio, which is focused on operating expenses, or brokerage is truly transaction costs. So from my perspective, the investor needs to be able to make the judgment call whether what they are paying in the brokerage costs is reasonable given the returns that they are being given by the fund itself. Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Senator Fitzgerald. Well, thank you. We are going to have to wrap up because I have been informed that a vote began at 2:30, and apparently the weather, as bad as it was this morning, I am told that it has deteriorated to the point that the Federal Government is going to be shutting down at 3 p.m. today. The Office of Personnel Management has put that advisory out. But I did not want to conclude this hearing without going back to the point on the Federal Thrift Savings Plan. I have met with the executive director and others of the TSP. The back-office expenses for separating people's accounts and so forth, those are all included in the expense ratios for the TSP fund. In fact, that is most of the expense. The advisors' fee, I am not allowed to tell you how low it is because it is a confidential fee that was subject to bidding. At least that is my understanding. The fee is exceedingly low. Most of the expense ratio is for the cost of paying employees of the Agriculture Department down in Louisiana to do all the back-room functions. And I guess there are well over 100 of those people, and those costs are being paid by the fund shareholders, and they are paying full Federal Government benefits to those Agriculture Department employees, including Federal health insurance, sick leave, other leave, the TSP expenses for those Agriculture Department employees and so forth, which are probably much more expensive than the private sector. It may be that the TSP fund could get their expenses even lower by not using the Agriculture Department and bidding out those back-room operations. The only things that may be taken care of internally by the Department--for example, I am a Member of the Senate. There is a Senate Financial Office that every year sends me a brochure and tells me how to contact the TSP, and they forward a form from the TSP to change your withholding amount. But I would think that most companies, if you work at IBM, the personnel office at IBM is going to be giving a similar transmittal to their employees, and then the employees will fill out that form, and it will actually go to a Hewitt and Associates or some company that does the back-room operations for IBM, and then it will be invested. And I do think in my opening statement I was careful to make the comparison between the expense ratios of the TSP fund, which I noted were index funds, and I compared them to the average expense ratios as reported by Lipper for S&P 500 stock index funds. And last year, the TSP expense ratio was 11 basis points, and the average for all mutual funds was 63 basis points. That is just an enormous difference. And so I think my point is valid, that we have created two regimes for investing--one for ourselves and one for the whole rest of the world--and I am not sure that is right. On the 12b-1 fees, I do want to ask a question about that. A lot of investors think they need to get into a no-load mutual fund. They want to avoid a front-end load and they want to avoid a back-end load, and then they go into a fund that advertises no load, but that fund may have a 12b-1 fee, which is basically, as I understand it, a load paid over time. It is really compensation paid over time to the broker who put them into that fund. And I think, Mr. Keil, your report showed that 95 percent of 12b-1 fees wind up getting paid to the brokers who are distributing the funds. Mr. Keil. Well, let me give credit where credit is due. That actually is an ICI statistic where they did a survey of the fund companies themselves. There is not disclosure sufficient for us to quantify exactly how 12b-1 fees are used. It is not a disclosure requirement at this time. Mr. Stevens. Mr. Chairman, if I could clarify, my understanding is that under the NASD's rules--and the NASD is sort of the keeper of what you can and cannot call a no-load fund. If you have asset-based charges not in excess of 25 basis points, even if they are adopted under a Rule 12b-1 plan--and there are some advantages to doing so. Even if they are not under a Rule 12b-1 plan, you can still describe yourself as a no-load fund. The point of the 25 basis points---- Senator Fitzgerald. Isn't that misleading? Because if you are essentially paying a load over time--in fact, you may be paying more of a load over time than you would just to pay the 500 bucks, or whatever it is, up front. Mr. Stevens. I think the NASD rule got to that point years ago because the 25 basis points typically is used to defray the cost of shareholder services, often recordkeeping, which would be a cost the fund would have to bear in many instances no matter what. It is not a classic sales charge, and they cut it off there, and they said anything more than that we will regard as a sales charge. And certainly any front-end sales charge, back-end sales charge, or level load, as it is called in the business, you could not be a no-load fund. But the thinking of the NASD at that time was, as long as that asset-based charge is 25 basis points or less, that would be consistent with calling yourself a no-load because that would not be regarded as a sales load. Mr. Plunkett. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that we do think it is a deceptive practice, and as investors have become increasingly reluctant to pay front loads, brokers began looking for ways to offer funds that looked like no-load funds. That is how we got Class B shares. The broker still got his up- front commission paid out of fund company assets, and the fund company got the money back over time through 12b-1 fees. That is exactly what is happening here. Mr. Freeman. Mr. Chairman, just very quickly, 12b-1 is a monument to the law of unintended consequences. It came in to try to help funds advertise and sell and get the word out. What it became in the 1980's and ever since is a mechanism used to sell Class B shares, to sell shares that have a load as if they were no-loads and to unfairly compete against no-load shares. That is how it is being used to a great extent out in practice, which is deceptive. Senator Fitzgerald. And isn't it true when the SEC promulgated Rule 12b-1 to allow funds to charge a fee to compensate brokers for distributing their funds and to pay for advertising, the theory was that if the funds got bigger, expenses as a percentage of the assets would go down. Is there any evidence that fund expenses have gone down in the 24 years we have had Rule 12b-1? Mr. Freeman. There is no proof that you can spend your way to economies. All the evidence is that 12b-1 fees, insofar as they are supposed to generate savings, are a dead weight cost and don't do it. Senator Fitzgerald. Mr. Stevens, do you want to comment? You have got to be brief. Mr. Stevens. This is a long tale, but the bottom line is if you look at trends in distribution costs since the inception of Rule 12b-1, it has introduced a degree of flexibility in the way that these kinds of costs can be paid. That has put downward pressure on sales charges. It is true, many funds have adopted 12b-1 fees, but if you add the sales charges to the costs under Rule 12b-1, distribution costs experienced by individual shareholders have trended downward. Now, that is what the ICI research indicates, and I think, Mr. Chairman, what may seem counterintuitive to you about this is that those costs covered by 12b-1 are going to be paid for some way because of the nature of the costs themselves. They represent the costs of the broker-dealer in terms of its marketing. They represent shareholder services. In many instances, they represent recordkeeping. If you were to abolish Rule 12b-1 tomorrow, you would not abolish the expenses; you would not abolish the fees. You would merely transfer them to some other place. Now, maybe that is a good idea, maybe it isn't. Mr. Plunkett here has said perhaps all of that should be taken out of the fund and put on the distributor, and that is certainly one way you could look at the problem. But 12b-1 pays for things that are going to be paid for no matter what. It provides a degree of flexibility in the way that they are paid for and transparency--it appears in the fee table, the 12b-1 charges--and oversight because the fund boards have got to superintend those costs under the SEC's rules. Senator Fitzgerald. Professor Freeman, final comment. Mr. Freeman. Very quickly, we do not have transparency. What we have is revenue sharing to the tune of $2 billion a year to get push money to the brokers, and that is coming out of the advisory fee, and it is coming out of overcharges. We have got directed brokerage, which is, I believe, illegal because the way to pay for sales activity is through a 12b-1 plan. We have a lot of funds that are already maxed out on that. Then they are using brokerage commissions to accomplish the same thing, double dipping and I think treating shareholders unfairly. Senator Fitzgerald. Well, you have been a wonderful panel, and we appreciate it. All of you have been very articulate and vigorous spokesmen for your point of view. That concludes our questions. I want to emphasize that the record will be kept open for additional materials until the close of business this Friday, January 30. So if you have any further submissions you would like to make available to the Subcommittee, we would appreciate it. Thank you all very much. This hearing is adjourned. 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Is the SEC Covering Up Wall Street Crimes?
Matt Taibbi: A whistle blower says the agency has illegally destroyed thousands of documents, letting financial crooks off the hook.
Imagine a world in which a man who is repeatedly investigated for a string of serious crimes, but never prosecuted, has his slate wiped clean every time the cops fail to make a case. No more Lifetime channel specials where the murderer is unveiled after police stumble upon past intrigues in some old file – “Hey, chief, didja know this guy had two wives die falling down the stairs?” No more burglary sprees cracked when some sharp cop sees the same name pop up in one too many witness statements. This is a different world, one far friendlier to lawbreakers, where even the suspicion of wrongdoing gets wiped from the record.
That, it now appears, is exactly how the Securities and Exchange Commission has been treating the Wall Street criminals who cratered the global economy a few years back. For the past two decades, according to a whistle-blower at the SEC who recently came forward to Congress, the agency has been systematically destroying records of its preliminary investigations once they are closed. By whitewashing the files of some of the nation’s worst financial criminals, the SEC has kept an entire generation of federal investigators in the dark about past inquiries into insider trading, fraud and market manipulation against companies like Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and AIG. With a few strokes of the keyboard, the evidence gathered during thousands of investigations – “18,000 … including Madoff,” as one high-ranking SEC official put it during a panicked meeting about the destruction – has apparently disappeared forever into the wormhole of history.
Under a deal the SEC worked out with the National Archives and Records Administration, all of the agency’s records – “including case files relating to preliminary investigations” – are supposed to be maintained for at least 25 years. But the SEC, using history-altering practices that for once actually deserve the overused and usually hysterical term “Orwellian,” devised an elaborate and possibly illegal system under which staffers were directed to dispose of the documents from any preliminary inquiry that did not receive approval from senior staff to become a full-blown, formal investigation. Amazingly, the wholesale destruction of the cases – known as MUIs, or “Matters Under Inquiry” – was not something done on the sly, in secret. The enforcement division of the SEC even spelled out the procedure in writing, on the commission’s internal website. “After you have closed a MUI that has not become an investigation,” the site advised staffers, “you should dispose of any documents obtained in connection with the MUI.”
Many of the destroyed files involved companies and individuals who would later play prominent roles in the economic meltdown of 2008. Two MUIs involving con artist Bernie Madoff vanished. So did a 2002 inquiry into financial fraud at Lehman Brothers, as well as a 2005 case of insider trading at the same soon-to-be-bankrupt bank. A 2009 preliminary investigation of insider trading by Goldman Sachs was deleted, along with records for at least three cases involving the infamous hedge fund SAC Capital.
The widespread destruction of records was brought to the attention of Congress in July, when an SEC attorney named Darcy Flynn decided to blow the whistle. According to Flynn, who was responsible for helping to manage the commission’s records, the SEC has been destroying records of preliminary investigations since at least 1993. After he alerted NARA to the problem, Flynn reports, senior staff at the SEC scrambled to hide the commission’s improprieties.
As a federally protected whistle-blower, Flynn is not permitted to speak to the press. But in evidence he presented to the SEC’s inspector general and three congressional committees earlier this summer, the 13-year veteran of the agency paints a startling picture of a federal police force that has effectively been conquered by the financial criminals it is charged with investigating. In at least one case, according to Flynn, investigators at the SEC found their desire to bring a case against an influential bank thwarted by senior officials in the enforcement division – whose director turned around and accepted a lucrative job from the very same bank they had been prevented from investigating. In another case, the agency farmed out its inquiry to a private law firm – one hired by the company under investigation. The outside firm, unsurprisingly, concluded that no further investigation of its client was necessary. To complete the bureaucratic laundering process, Flynn says, the SEC dropped the case and destroyed the files.
Much has been made in recent months of the government’s glaring failure to police Wall Street; to date, federal and state prosecutors have yet to put a single senior Wall Street executive behind bars for any of the many well-documented crimes related to the financial crisis. Indeed, Flynn’s accusations dovetail with a recent series of damaging critiques of the SEC made by reporters, watchdog groups and members of Congress, all of which seem to indicate that top federal regulators spend more time lunching, schmoozing and job-interviewing with Wall Street crooks than they do catching them. As one former SEC staffer describes it, the agency is now filled with so many Wall Street hotshots from oft-investigated banks that it has been “infected with the Goldman mindset from within.”
The destruction of records by the SEC, as outlined by Flynn, is something far more than an administrative accident or bureaucratic fuck-up. It’s a symptom of the agency’s terminal brain damage. Somewhere along the line, those at the SEC responsible for policing America’s banks fell and hit their head on a big pile of Wall Street’s money – a blow from which the agency has never recovered. “From what I’ve seen, it looks as if the SEC might have sanctioned some level of case-related document destruction,” says Sen. Chuck Grassley, the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, whose staff has interviewed Flynn. “It doesn’t make sense that an agency responsible for investigations would want to get rid of potential evidence. If these charges are true, the agency needs to explain why it destroyed documents, how many documents it destroyed over what time frame and to what extent its actions were consistent with the law.”
How did officials at the SEC wind up with a faithful veteran employee – a conservative, mid-level attorney described as a highly reluctant whistle-blower – spilling the agency’s most sordid secrets to Congress? In a way, they asked for it.
On May 18th of this year, SEC enforcement director Robert Khuzami sent out a mass e-mail to the agency’s staff with the subject line “Lawyers Behaving Badly.” In it, Khuzami asked his subordinates to report any experiences they might have had where “the behavior of counsel representing clients in… investigations has been questionable.”
Khuzami was asking staffers to recount any stories of outside counsel behaving unethically. But Flynn apparently thought his boss was looking for examples of lawyers “behaving badly” anywhere, including within the SEC. And he had a story to share he’d kept a lid on for years. “Mr. Khuzami may have gotten something more than he expected,” Flynn’s lawyer, a former SEC whistle-blower named Gary Aguirre, later explained to Congress.
Flynn responded to Khuzami with a letter laying out one such example of misbehaving lawyers within the SEC. It involved a case from very early in Flynn’s career, back in 2000, when he was working with a group of investigators who thought they had a “slam-dunk” case against Deutsche Bank, the German financial giant. A few years earlier, Rolf Breuer, the bank’s CEO, had given an interview to Der Spiegel in which he denied that Deutsche was involved in übernahmegespräche – takeover talks – to acquire a rival American firm, Bankers Trust. But the statement was apparently untrue – and it sent the stock of Bankers Trust tumbling, potentially lowering the price for the merger. Flynn and his fellow SEC investigators, suspecting that investors of Bankers Trust had been defrauded, opened a MUI on the case.
A Matter Under Inquiry is just a preliminary sort of look-see – a way for the SEC to check out the multitude of tips it gets about suspicious trades, shady stock scams and false disclosures, and to determine which of the accusations merit a formal investigation. At the MUI stage, an SEC investigator can conduct interviews or ask a bank to send in information voluntarily. Bumping a MUI up to a formal investigation is critical, because it enables investigators to pull out the full law-enforcement ass-kicking measures – subpoenas, depositions, everything short of hot pokers and waterboarding. In the Deutsche case, Flynn and other SEC investigators got past the MUI stage and used their powers to collect sworn testimony and documents indicating that plenty of übernahmegespräche indeed had been going on when Breuer spoke to Der Spiegel. Based on the evidence, they sent an “Action Memorandum” to senior SEC staff, formally recommending that the agency press forward and file suit against Deutsche.
Breuer responded to the threat as big banks like Deutsche often do: He hired a former SEC enforcement director to lobby the agency to back off. The ex-insider, Gary Lynch, launched a creative and inspired defense, producing a linguistic expert who argued that übernahmegespräche only means “advanced stage of discussions.” Nevertheless, the request to proceed with the case was approved by several levels of the SEC’s staff. All that was needed to move forward was a thumbs-up from the director of enforcement at the time, Richard Walker.
But then a curious thing happened. On July 10th, 2001, Flynn and the other investigators were informed that Walker was mysteriously recusing himself from the Deutsche case. Two weeks later, on July 23rd, the enforcement division sent a letter to Deutsche that read, “Inquiry in the above-captioned matter has been terminated.” The bank was in the clear; the SEC was dropping its fraud investigation. In contradiction to the agency’s usual practice, it provided no explanation for its decision to close the case.
On October 1st of that year, the mystery was solved: Dick Walker was named general counsel of Deutsche. Less than 10 weeks after the SEC shut down its investigation of the bank, the agency’s director of enforcement was handed a cushy, high-priced job at Deutsche.
Deutsche’s influence in the case didn’t stop there. A few years later, in 2004, Walker hired none other than Robert Khuzami, a young federal prosecutor, to join him at Deutsche. The two would remain at the bank until February 2009, when Khuzami joined the SEC as Flynn’s new boss in the enforcement division. When Flynn sent his letter to Khuzami complaining about misbehavior by Walker, he was calling out Khuzami’s own mentor.
The circular nature of the case illustrates the revolving-door dynamic that has become pervasive at the SEC. A recent study by the Project on Government Oversight found that over the past five years, former SEC personnel filed 789 notices disclosing their intent to represent outside companies before the agency – sometimes within days of their having left the SEC. More than half of the disclosures came from the agency’s enforcement division, who went to bat for the financial industry four times more often than ex-staffers from other wings of the SEC.
Even a cursory glance at a list of the agency’s most recent enforcement directors makes it clear that the SEC’s top policemen almost always wind up jumping straight to jobs representing the banks they were supposed to regulate. Lynch, who represented Deutsche in the Flynn case, served as the agency’s enforcement chief from 1985 to 1989, before moving to the firm of Davis Polk, which boasts many top Wall Street clients. He was succeeded by William McLucas, who left the SEC in 1998 to work for WilmerHale, a Wall Street defense firm so notorious for snatching up top agency veterans that it is sometimes referred to as “SEC West.” McLucas was followed by Dick Walker, who defected to Deutsche in 2001, and he was in turn followed by Stephen Cutler, who now serves as general counsel for JP Morgan Chase. Next came Linda Chatman Thomsen, who stepped down to join Davis Polk, only to be succeeded in 2009 by Khuzami, Walker’s former protégé at Deutsche Bank.
This merry-go-round of current and former enforcement directors has repeatedly led to accusations of improprieties. In 2008, in a case cited by the SEC inspector general, Thomsen went out of her way to pass along valuable information to Cutler, the former enforcement director who had gone to work for JP Morgan. According to the inspector general, Thomsen signaled Cutler that the SEC was unlikely to take action that would hamper JP Morgan’s move to buy up Bear Stearns. In another case, the inspector general found, an assistant director of enforcement was instrumental in slowing down an investigation into the $7 billion Ponzi scheme allegedly run by Texas con artist R. Allen Stanford – and then left the SEC to work for Stanford, despite explicitly being denied permission to do so by the agency’s ethics office. “Every lawyer in Texas and beyond is going to get rich on this case, OK?” the official later explained. “I hated being on the sidelines.”
Small wonder, then, that SEC staffers often have trouble getting their bosses to approve full-blown investigations against even the most blatant financial criminals. For a fledgling MUI to become a formal investigation, it has to make the treacherous leap from the lower rungs of career-level staffers like Flynn all the way up to the revolving-door level at the top, where senior management is composed largely of high-priced appointees from the private sector who have strong social and professional ties to the very banks they are charged with regulating. And if senior management didn’t approve an investigation, the documents often wound up being destroyed – as Flynn would later discover.
After the Deutsche fiasco over Bankers Trust, Flynn continued to work at the SEC for four more years. He briefly left the agency to dabble in real estate, then returned in 2008 to serve as an attorney in the enforcement division. In January 2010, he accepted new responsibilities that included helping to manage the disposition of records for the division – and it was then he first became aware of the agency’s possibly unlawful destruction of MUI records.
Flynn discovered a directive on the enforcement division’s internal website ordering staff to destroy “any records obtained in connection” with closed MUIs. The directive appeared to violate federal law, which gives responsibility for maintaining and destroying all records to the National Archives and Records Administration. Over a decade earlier, in fact, the SEC had struck a deal with NARA stipulating that investigative records were to be maintained for 25 years – and that if any files were to be destroyed after that, the shredding was to be done by NARA, not the SEC.
But Flynn soon learned that the records for thousands of preliminary investigations no longer existed. In his letter to Congress, Flynn estimates that the practice of destroying MUIs had begun as early as 1993, and has resulted in at least 9,000 case files being destroyed. For all the thousands of tips that had come in to the SEC, and the thousands of interviews that had been conducted by the agency’s staff, all that remained were a few perfunctory lines for each case. The mountains of evidence gathered were no longer in existence.
To read through the list of dead and buried cases that Flynn submitted to Congress is like looking through an infrared camera at a haunted house of the financial crisis, with the ghosts of missed prosecutions flashing back and forth across the screen. A snippet of the list:
PARTY | MUI # | OPENED/CLOSED | ISSUE |
Goldman Sachs | MLA-01909 | 6/99 – 4/00 | Market Manipulation |
Deutsche Bank | MHO-09356 | 11/01 – 7/02 | Insider Trading |
Deutsche Bank | MHO-09432 | 2/02 – 8/02 | Market Manipulation |
Lehman Brothers | MNY-07013 | 3/02 – 7/02 | Financial Fraud |
Goldman Sachs | MNY-08198 | 11/09 – 12/09 | Insider Trading |
One MUI – case MNY-08145 – involved allegations of insider trading at AIG on September 15th, 2008, right in the middle of the insurance giant’s collapse. In that case, an AIG employee named Jacqueline Millan reported irregularities in the trading of AIG stock to her superiors, only to find herself fired. Incredibly, instead of looking into the matter itself, the SEC agreed to accept “an internal investigation by outside counsel or AIG.” The last note in the file indicates that “the staff plans to speak with the outside attorneys on Monday, August 24th [2009], when they will share their findings with us.” The fact that the SEC trusted AIG’s lawyers to investigate the matter shows the basic bassackwardness of the agency’s approach to these crash-era investigations. The SEC formally closed the case on October 1st, 2009.
The episode with AIG highlights yet another obstacle that MUIs experience on the road to becoming formal investigations. During the past decade, the SEC routinely began allowing financial firms to investigate themselves. Imagine the LAPD politely asking a gang of Crips and their lawyers to issue a report on whether or not a drive-by shooting by the Crips should be brought before a grand jury – that’s basically how the SEC now handles many preliminary investigations against Wall Street targets.
The evolution toward this self-policing model began in 2001, when a shipping and food-service conglomerate called Seaboard aggressively investigated an isolated case of accounting fraud at one of its subsidiaries. Seaboard fired the guilty parties and made sweeping changes to its internal practices – and the SEC was so impressed that it instituted a new policy of giving “credit” to companies that police themselves. In practice, that means the agency simply steps aside and allows companies to slap themselves on the wrists. In the case against Seaboard, for instance, the SEC rewarded the firm by issuing no fines against it.
According to Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC, the Seaboard case also prompted the SEC to begin permitting companies to hire their own counsel to conduct their own inquiries. At first, he says, the process worked fairly well. But then President Bush appointed the notoriously industry-friendly Christopher Cox to head up the SEC, and the “outside investigations” turned into whitewash jobs. “The investigations nowadays are probably not worth the money you spend on them,” Turner says.
Harry Markopolos, a certified fraud examiner best known for sounding a famously unheeded warning about Bernie Madoff way back in 2000, says the SEC’s practice of asking suspects to investigate themselves is absurd. In a serious investigation, he says, “the last person you want to trust is the person being accused or their lawyer.” The practice helped Madoff escape for years. “The SEC took Bernie’s word for everything,” Markopolos says.
At the SEC, having realized that the agency was destroying documents, Flynn became concerned that he was overseeing an illegal policy. So in the summer of last year, he reached out to NARA, asking them for guidance on the issue.
That request sparked a worried response from Paul Wester, NARA’s director of modern records. On July 29th, 2010, Wester sent a letter to Barry Walters, who oversees document requests for the SEC. “We recently learned from Darcy Flynn… that for the past 17 years the SEC has been destroying closed Matters Under Inquiry files,” Wester wrote. “If you confirm that federal records have been destroyed improperly, please ensure that no further such disposals take place and provide us with a written report within 30 days.”
Wester copied the letter to Adam Storch, a former Goldman Sachs executive who less than a year earlier had been appointed as managing executive of the SEC’s enforcement division. Storch’s appointment was not without controversy. “I’m not sure what’s scarier,” Daniel Indiviglio of The Atlantic observed, “that this guy worked at an investment bank that many believe has questionable ethics and too cozy a Washington connection, or that he’s just 29.” In any case, Storch reacted to the NARA letter the way the SEC often does – by circling the wagons and straining to find a way to blow off the problem without admitting anything.
Last August, as the clock wound down on NARA’s 30-day deadline, Storch and two top SEC lawyers held a meeting with Flynn to discuss how to respond. Flynn’s notes from the meeting, which he passed along to Congress, show the SEC staff wondering aloud if admitting the truth to NARA might be a bad idea, given the fact that there might be criminal liability.
“We could say that we do not believe there has been disposal inconsistent with the schedule,” Flynn quotes Ken Hall, an assistant chief counsel for the SEC, as saying.
“There are implications to admit what was destroyed,” Storch chimed in. It would be “not wise for me to take on the exposure voluntarily. If this leads to something, what rings in my ear is that Barry [Walters, the SEC documents officer] said: This is serious, could lead to criminal liability.”
When the subject of how many files were destroyed came up, Storch answered: “18,000 MUIs destroyed, including Madoff.”
Four days later, the SEC responded to NARA with a hilariously convoluted nondenial denial. “The Division is not aware of any specific instances of the destruction of records from any other MUI,” the letter states. “But we cannot say with certainty that no such documents have been destroyed over the past 17 years.” The letter goes on to add that “the Division has taken steps… to ensure that no MUI records are destroyed while we review this issue.”
Translation: Hey, maybe records were destroyed, maybe they weren’t. But if we did destroy records, we promise not to do it again – for now.
The SEC’s unwillingness to admit the extent of the wrong doing left Flynn in a precarious position. The agency has a remarkably bad record when it comes to dealing with whistle-blowers. Back in 2005, when Flynn’s attorney, Gary Aguirre, tried to pursue an insider-trading case against Pequot Capital that involved John Mack, the future CEO of Morgan Stanley, he was fired by phone while on vacation. Two Senate committees later determined that Aguirre, who has since opened a private practice representing whistle-blowers, was dismissed improperly as part of a “process of reprisal” by the SEC. Two whistle-blowers in the Stanford case, Julie Preuitt and Joel Sauer, also experienced retaliation – including reprimands and demotions – after raising concerns about superficial investigations. “There’s no mechanism to raise these issues at the SEC,” says another former whistle-blower. Contacting the agency’s inspector general, he adds, is considered “the nuclear option” – a move “well-known to be a career-killer.”
In Flynn’s case, both he and Aguirre tried to keep the matter in-house, appealing to SEC chairman Mary Schapiro with a promise not to go outside the agency if she would grant Flynn protection against reprisal. When no such offer was forthcoming, Flynn went to the agency’s inspector general before sending a detailed letter about the wrongdoing to three congressional committees.
One of the offices Flynn contacted was that of Sen. Grassley, who was in the midst of his own battle with the SEC. Frustrated with the agency’s failure to punish major players on Wall Street, the Iowa Republican had begun an investigation into how the SEC follows up on outside complaints. Specifically, he wrote a letter to FINRA, another regulatory agency, to ask how many complaints it had referred to the SEC about SAC Capital, the hedge fund run by reptilian billionaire short-seller Stevie Cohen.
SAC has long been accused of a variety of improprieties, from insider trading to harassment. But no charge in recent Wall Street history is crazier than an episode involving a SAC executive named Ping Jiang, who was accused in 2006 of enacting a torturous hazing program. According to a civil lawsuit that was later dropped, Jiang allegedly forced a new trader named Andrew Tong to take female hormones, come to work wearing a dress and lipstick, have “foreign objects” inserted in his rectum, and allow Jiang to urinate in his mouth. (I’m not making this up.)
Grassley learned that over the past decade, FINRA had referred 19 complaints about suspicious trades at SAC to federal regulators. Curious to see how many of those referrals had been looked into, Grassley wrote the SEC on May 24th, asking for evidence that the agency had properly investigated the cases.
Two weeks later, on June 9th, Khuzami sent Grassley a surprisingly brusque answer: “We generally do not comment on the status of investigations or related referrals, and, in turn, are not providing information concerning the specific FINRA referrals you identified.” Translation: We’re not giving you the records, so blow us.
Grassley later found out from FINRA that it had actually referred 65 cases about SAC to the SEC, making the lack of serious investigations even more inexplicable. Angered by Khuzami’s response, he sent the SEC another letter on June 15th demanding an explanation, but no answer has been forthcoming.
In the interim, Grassley’s office was contacted by Flynn, who explained that among the missing MUIs he had uncovered were at least three involving SAC – one in 2006, one in 2007 and one in 2010, involving charges of insider trading and currency manipulation. All three cases were closed by the SEC, and the records apparently destroyed.
On August 17th, Grassley sent a letter to the SEC about the Flynn allegations, demanding to know if it was indeed true that the SEC had destroyed records. He also asked if the agency’s failure to produce evidence of investigations into SAC Capital were related to the missing MUIs.
The SEC’s inspector general is investigating the destroyed MUIs and plans to issue a report. NARA is also seeking answers. “We’ve asked the SEC to look into the matter and we’re awaiting their response,” says Laurence Brewer, a records officer for NARA. For its part, the SEC is trying to explain away the illegality of its actions through a semantic trick. John Nester, the agency’s spokesman, acknowledges that “documents related to MUIs” have been destroyed. “I don’t have any reason to believe that it hasn’t always been the policy,” he says. But Nester suggests that such documents do not “meet the federal definition of a record,” and therefore don’t have to be preserved under federal law.
But even if SEC officials manage to dodge criminal charges, it won’t change what happened: The nation’s top financial police destroyed more than a decade’s worth of intelligence they had gathered on some of Wall Street’s most egregious offenders. “The SEC not keeping the MUIs – you can see why this would be bad,” says Markopolos, the fraud examiner famous for breaking the Madoff case. “The reason you would want to keep them is to build a pattern. That way, if you get five MUIs over a period of 20 years on something similar involving the same company, you should be able to connect five dots and say, ‘You know, I’ve had five MUIs – they’re probably doing something. Let’s go tear the place apart.'” Destroy the MUIs, and Wall Street banks can commit the exact same crime over and over, without anyone ever knowing.
Regulation isn’t a panacea. The SEC could have placed federal agents on every corner of lower Manhattan throughout the past decade, and it might not have put a dent in the massive wave of corruption and fraud that left the economy in flames three years ago. And even if SEC staffers from top to bottom had been fully committed to rooting out financial corruption, the agency would still have been seriously hampered by a lack of resources that often forces it to abandon promising cases due to a shortage of manpower. “It’s always a triage,” is how one SEC veteran puts it. “And it’s worse now.”
But we’re equally in the dark about another hypothetical. Forget about what might have been if the SEC had followed up in earnest on all of those lost MUIs. What if even a handful of them had turned into real cases? How many investors might have been saved from crushing losses if Lehman Brothers had been forced to reveal its shady accounting way back in 2002? Might the need for taxpayer bailouts have been lessened had fraud cases against Citigroup and Bank of America been pursued in 2005 and 2007? And would the U.S. government have doubled down on its bailout of AIG if it had known that some of the firm’s executives were suspected of insider trading in September 2008?
It goes without saying that no ordinary law-enforcement agency would willingly destroy its own evidence. In fact, when it comes to garden-variety crooks, more and more police agencies are catching criminals with the aid of large and well-maintained databases. “Street-level law enforcement is increasingly data-driven,” says Bill Laufer, a criminology professor at the University of Pennsylvania. “For a host of reasons, though, we are starved for good data on both white-collar and corporate crime. So the idea that we would take the little data we do have and shred it, without a legal requirement to do so, calls for a very creative explanation.”
We’ll never know what the impact of those destroyed cases might have been; we’ll never know if those cases were closed for good reasons or bad. We’ll never know exactly who got away with what, because federal regulators have weighted down a huge sack of Wall Street’s dirty laundry and dumped it in a lake, never to be seen again.
Editor’s Note: The online version of this article has been amended from the print version to reflect that the SEC’s case against Deutsche Bank proceeded beyond a Matter of Inquiry to a full-blown investigation.
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