https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-russia-ukraine-nato-status/
With its future at stake, it’s time for Ukraine to join NATO
The time has come for a decision on admitting Ukraine to NATO. On Sept. 30, the besieged country applied for fast-track membership to the alliance, following the example set by Finland and Sweden earlier this year.
President Volodymyr Zelensky’s surprise announcement of his country’s bid for NATO membership was clearly designed as a dramatic response to Russia’s illegal annexation of four partially occupied regions of Ukraine. It was also in line with long-standing aspirations held by Ukraine to join NATO, which date from the 1990s and the signing of a Charter on Distinctive Partnership. These intentions were reaffirmed in September, 2020, as part of Ukraine’s national-security strategy. NATO itself, at its summit in Bucharest in April, 2008, set out an “open-door” policy and welcomed the aspirations of both Ukraine and Georgia to eventually join the organization.
Ukraine’s time has arrived. Its future is at stake.
Immediately after Mr. Zelensky’s announcement, nine European NATO members, many of them front-line states (including Poland and the Baltic countries) in the war Russia is waging against Ukraine, signed a joint statement supporting Ukraine’s bid to join NATO. While this is impressive support, it represents only nine of 30 NATO countries. All would need to agree.
Canada’s silence on the NATO application has been deafening – especially for a country that prides itself on its status as a NATO founding member and as a strong supporter and close ally of Ukraine. But the silence is not a complete surprise.
Canada will always have one ear cocked in Washington’s direction, waiting to see how the United States, the lead military power by far in the NATO alliance, will react. An early sign is the cold water poured on the Ukraine bid by U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, who said he thought Ukraine’s application should be taken up “at a different time.”
The Canadian government continues to nervously watch the tides of war in Ukraine, fearing further escalation by Russia, greater unpredictability by Vladimir Putin (who is under increasing pressure from Russian nationalists to shore up support for the war), and the dreaded prospect of Russia resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.
These concerns are likely underpinning an ultracautious approach to Ukraine’s NATO application, for fear of worsening the conflict and even giving support to Mr. Putin’s long-standing claims that NATO and the West threaten the very existence of Russia, and are pulling the strings of the Zelensky regime.
But ultracaution and fear should not rule the Canadian response to Ukraine’s NATO membership application. We jostled to be first in line to welcome Sweden and Finland, and we should do the same for Ukraine.
The reality is that the brutal war in Ukraine will be waged by Mr. Putin’s regime so long as he has munitions and cannon fodder to feed into the conflict, and insofar as he maintains his iron grip on the flow of information to the Russian public. Admitting Ukraine to NATO would not make a whit of difference to the Russian claim that this is a “special military operation.” Mr. Putin will go on spinning his tales of NATO encirclement and aggression to any willing audience. Russian nuclear sabre-rattling will continue no matter what happens to Ukraine’s bid.
Admitting Ukraine to NATO would extend the alliance’s collective security doctrine, as laid out in NATO’s Article 5. But these obligations are easily misunderstood. Article 5 does not mean that NATO would have to be involved directly in combat in Ukraine – responses to aggression are left to each individual NATO member, to take “such action as it deems necessary.”
The reality is that NATO, with Canada included, has in practice already invoked a collective-security-style response to the Russian attack on Ukraine. The alliance and its members are already deeply committed to the defence of Ukraine through a supply of arms, humanitarian aid, diplomatic support, financial assistance and economic sanctions against Russia, a stance reiterated in the strongest terms by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg after Russia stepped up its aerial bombardment of Ukraine’s civil infrastructure this week. U.S. President Joe Biden has urged all countries to stand with the people of Ukraine “for as long as it takes.”
The real benefit of support for Ukraine’s NATO bid would be in the prospect it offers for an enhanced deterrence against any Russian temptation to use nuclear weapons. NATO itself does not possess nuclear weapons, but three NATO member countries do: the United States, Britain and France. So far, efforts at nuclear deterrence have been conveyed by warnings about “severe consequences” through official channels between key NATO countries and the Kremlin, and in public statements by Western leaders. NATO’s annual nuclear-deterrence military exercise, codenamed Steadfast Noon, began this week and will run until Oct. 30. Mr. Biden has openly mused about the world being at its closest point to nuclear “Armageddon” since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
The world, Canada included, could take one step back from that Armageddon by giving Ukraine the long-term security guarantee of NATO membership. That would be a light at the end of the tunnel for an embattled but determined Ukrainian population, and would also be a strong response to Mr. Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions. A senior Russian official has threatened that Ukraine’s NATO membership would lead to “World War III.” Such irresponsible and horrific threats must not be the foundation of NATO’s decision-making process.
https://canadianinquirer.net/2022/10/22/two-new-global-security-doctrines-in-canada-and-the-u-s/
Two new global security doctrines in Canada and the U.S.
If the Freeland doctrine becomes the foundation of future Canadian policy, it will have much in common with the U.S. approach under President Biden, and that will benefit Canada. (Pexels Photo)
The post-Cold War era is over. Is the Cold War back? That is a central question that animates much strategic thinking today in key Western capitals.
As Robert Gates, a former U.S. secretary of defense and CIA director, once said, “one Cold War was quite enough.” The rebuke was aimed, back in 2007, at none other than Vladimir Putin. Obviously, it didn’t stick. But can a global world divided between democracies and authoritarian populist regimes – nuclear-armed and with diminishing respect for the rules-based international order – truly avoid a descent back into the politics of across-spectrum confrontation.
The desire to avoid a return to the Cold War is evident in some Western policies. The brake on such a return will be finding targeted areas of co-operation on key transnational issues such as climate change and economic stability. But the prospects of true co-operation with authoritarian systems are doubtful. If no such mutual co-operation emerges, the world will be plunged back into a Cold War scenario of divided power blocs and persistent global antagonism.
Just in case there is any lingering nostalgia for a return to Cold War-style policies, remember that the geopolitical landscape has changed with the rise of China; with democratic regimes in decline globally and challenged at their heart; and with new technological tools available to states to engage in grey-zone or hybrid warfare, including targeting the minds of democratic societies and interfering in economic and political security.
New statements from both the U.S. administration and Canada’s deputy prime minister wrestle with these issues and propose similar policies, whose alignment cannot be an accident.
On Oct. 12, the Biden administration released its long-delayed national security strategy. This is a congressionally mandated requirement for any presidency and one that successive White House leaders have used to put a strong individual stamp on United States policy in the face of threats at home and abroad. President Biden’s signature policy may be the most consequential update since George W. Bush’s 2002 reshaping of U.S. global policy after the 9/11 attacks.
Canada needs its own Indo-Pacific strategy – not an American copy
The Biden national security strategy highlights two critical trends. It recognizes, but distinguishes between, the threats posed by China and Russia. It also juggles the realities of global competition and confrontation against the need for forms of global co-operation in the face of shared transnational challenges – above all, those posed by climate change.
On China (the “PRC”), the Biden strategy is blunt, yet makes efforts to avoid being provocative or setting the stage for a Cold War-style rematch with Beijing as its main opponent this time. China is defined as “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to advance that objective.” Yet the strategy also emphasizes the possibility of “peaceful co-existence” with the PRC through a three-pronged approach – domestic investment in U.S. capacity; working with allies and like-minded partners; and competing “responsibly.”
The document strikes a different note on Russia, citing it as a menace to regional security in Europe but lacking the “across the spectrum capabilities” of China to be a true global disrupter. There is a subtle note about regime change in Russia, never named as such but captured by the following statement, “it is the Russian people who will determine Russia’s future as a major power capable of once more playing a constructive role in international affairs…The United States will welcome such a future.” The hoped-for future is a Russia without Putin.
But still there is some fudge and a reluctance to fully recognize that Russia is now a full-fledged rogue state. Reluctance to completely give up on the ideas of some co-operative engagement with Russia is expressed in terms of “pragmatic modes of interaction.”
As the United States pursues its new strategy, key tests will include how far it can deepen and strengthen a democratic coalition of states; how U.S. democratic leadership will be perceived globally; and ultimately whether the United States itself can heal its own democratic fissures. Successful competition with autocratic states will be determined by these factors.
Clearly, the U.S. strategy is pinning its hopes of maintaining co-operation in the global sphere in terms of shared transnational challenges on its ability to maintain a working relationship with its main challenger, China. That will be the national security strategy’s biggest test. The good news is that, at least with regard to China, there is no desire for a Cold War-style faceoff. The bad news is that U.S. strategy is dependent on China being willing to pursue a congruent strategic, with its own form of “responsible” competition.
One day prior to the release of the U.S. national security strategy, Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s deputy prime minister and finance minister, travelled to Washington and delivered her own prescription for a new global strategy. Her speech to the Brookings Institute generated lots of Canadian media attention, with some penetrating questions about the extent to which Canadian rhetoric on global security measures is likely to be met by action.
Freeland spent more time in her speech looking back on what has been lost – a three-decade-long conviction about progress towards democracy, globalized economies and peace. All of which has now been brought to a “brutal end.” Her speech pressed, as does the U.S. national security strategy, for a new approach to co-existence, one shorn of naïveté. Freeland advanced three pillars to achieve a new era of co-existence.
The first involves tightened co-operation between democratic partners, including with regard to economic co-operation (“friendshoring,” as a partial remedy to “offshoring”) – a theme that remains largely submerged in the U.S. national security strategy with its greater emphasis on restoring the strength of the U.S. economy.
A second pillar is more ambiguous, raising the question of the extent to which co-operation among democracies can be extended through efforts at trade and other relations to what Freeland calls “in-between countries” – those that might not be full democracies, might not embrace democratic norms, and might look askance at a Western-dominated global system. We have seen this at play in abstentions at the United Nations on motions censuring Russia for its war against Ukraine.
The third pillar of the deputy prime minister nostrums for global security involves the democratic West’s relationship with “the world’s autocrats.” Here, Freeland says there must be a sharp break with the past. However, what this involves in practice may be less “sharp.” Reduced economic and supply chain vulnerabilities will be one feature. Like the U.S. national security strategy, Freeland recognizes the imperatives of “working with Beijing,” even if her approach lacks the vector of “responsible competition” and fails to define what “working with Beijing” might look like.
She goes further than the U.S. strategy in arguing for the possibility of working with authoritarian regimes to “preserve the global commons,” including co-operation on issues such as climate change, arms security, pandemic preparedness and the stability of the international financial system. While Russia under Putin’s leadership is identified as a pariah, the Freeland doctrine stops short of any hint of the need for regime change or indeed any real suggestion that the pariah must be fully treated as such.
If the Freeland doctrine becomes the foundation of future Canadian policy, it will have much in common with the U.S. approach under President Biden, and that will benefit Canada. But the Canadian outlook, for all its talk of friendshoring economic ties, deepening links between democracies, and achieving a complete break with the post-Cold War past continues to demonstrate a lingering fondness for a bygone era, with aspirations for a “global commons.”
There is a touch of that in the U.S. strategy as well, but the U.S. call for an effort to “compete responsibly,” especially with China, sounds more attuned to the times. “Compete responsibly” is set to become the new containment strategy, with its lingering echo of the Cold War. “Containment” posited long-term change in communist regimes – which came to pass. “Compete responsibly” depends on the unknowns of future responses, above all by China.
This article first appeared on Policy Options and is republished here under a Creative Commons license.
Deputy Prime Minister Announces the Creation of the Advisory Council on National SecurityOTTAWA, August 12, 2005 - The Honourable Anne McLellan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, today announced the appointments of members of the Advisory Council on National Security. The Council will work with the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister to provide advice to the Deputy Prime Minister and the Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies on national security issues. “The Government of Canada will benefit from the advice of external experts in evaluating and improving our security system,” said Minister McLellan. “We are pleased that so many individuals with relevant knowledge and experience have offered their services to Canada and Canadians.” The commitment to appoint an Advisory Council on National Security was made last year when the Government released Canada’s National Security Policy. Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy also included a commitment to establish a Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, whose membership was announced in February 2005. Individuals appointed to the Advisory Council were selected for their expertise and experience on such diverse matters as intelligence, law and policy, human rights and civil liberties, emergency planning and management, public health emergencies, public safety, transportation security, border security and international security. The Honourable Leo Kolber will serve as Chair of the Advisory Council. Other members are
Profiles of Advisory Council members are attached. The Advisory Council’s Terms of Reference and Selection Criteria can be found at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/acns- For more information: Alex Swann Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (613) 991-2863 François Jubinville Privy Council Office (613) 957-5072 BackgrounderAdvisory Council on National Security – BiographiesThe Honourable Leo Kolber, Chair of the Advisory Council, is a lawyer and businessman by profession, as well as the 2003 recipient of the Award of Merit from B’nai Brith Canada. An expert in law and policy, he served in the Senate from 1983 to 2004, during which time he became a long-standing member and Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce. For almost 30 years, Mr. Kolber was President of CEMP Investments, the business arm of the trusts established by the late Sam Bronfman. Senator Kolber has served on many corporate boards and is involved in community, social, cultural and philanthropic activities. Dr. Rachad Antonius is a professor with the Department of Sociology at the Université du Québec à Montréal. An expert on racism and human rights, he is a regular commentator on Middle East politics for CBC, Radio-Canada, and other major Canadian television networks. He recently addressed the judges of the Human Rights Tribunal of Quebec concerning racism and contributed to Foreign Affairs Canada’s symposium on human rights and democracy promotion in a context of terrorism. Dr. Sami Aoun is a full professor with the University of Sherbrooke’s Department of History and Political Science. An analyst of political violence discourse and international security issues, he appears regularly on both Canadian (Radio-Canada and RDI) and foreign media networks as a commentator on the situation in the Middle East and on Canadian foreign policy issues. Dr. Aoun is the Director of Research ( Middle East) for the Raoul-Dandurand Chair in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the Université du Québec à Montréal. The Honourable Perrin Beatty is President and Chief Executive Officer of Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters and the Chair of the Coalition for a Secure and Trade-Efficient Border. He is an expert on both trade and security issues, with extensive experience in both government and the private sector. Mr. Beatty has served Canada in the past in several Cabinet portfolios, including Secretary of State for External Affairs, Minister of National Defence, Minister of National Revenue and Solicitor General. Dr. David Bercuson is Director of the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. An expert on Canadian foreign and defence issues, he is also Director of Programs of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and a regular columnist for Legion Magazine. Between 1997 and 2003, Dr. Bercuson was a member of the Minister of National Defence’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence. Mr. James Bertram is Director of Public Safety for the Greater Toronto Airports Authority. An expert on public safety and aviation security issues, he is also Chair of the Canadian Airports Council Security Committee. Between 1988 and 1997, Mr. Bertram was the Deputy Chief of Police for the Peel Regional Police Force; as part of his larger responsibilities, he coordinated a three-tier government committee to design, build and implement a multi-agency emergency service involving police, fire and ambulance personnel. Dr. David Charters is a professor of Military History at the University of New Brunswick and former director of the university’s Centre for Conflict Studies. An expert on defence, national and international security issues, Professor Charters has taught, researched and published extensively in the field of low-intensity conflict studies, with a particular focus on terrorism, intelligence and military operations. Mr. John Dalzell is Vice-President, Risk Management, for the Canadian National (CN) Railway Company. An expert on transportation security and public safety issues, he is also a member of both the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and the Executive Security Working Group of the American Association of Railroads. Between 1997 and 1999, Mr. Dalzell was Chief of CN Police, and from 1990 to 1997, he was Assistant Director of the Montreal Urban Community Police Service. Dr. Pierre Duplessis is Secretary General and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Red Cross Society and has significant experience in managing crises at the national and international levels. An expert in public health and emergency planning and management, he is also Vice-President of the Coordinating Committee of Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies. Dr. Duplessis is a physician and a former public health practitioner who has also taught and published at McGill University and the Université de Montréal. Mr. Brian Flemming completed his term as Chair of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) on March 31, 2005. An expert in transportation security, he helped set up CATSA and was its initial Chief Executive Officer. Mr. Flemming is a former senior partner at Stewart, McKelvey, Stirling and Scales, where he practised both maritime and corporate law. Mr. Flemming has also taught courses on international and maritime law at Dalhousie University. Mr. Norman Inkster is President of Inkster Group and a partner at Gowlings Consulting Incorporated, where his practice is focused on advising private sector companies on addressing issues of risk in the aftermath of 9/11. Prior to assuming his current duties, he was an advisor to the Government of Ontario on security matters. An expert in public safety, Mr. Inkster was formerly the President of Interpol and the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Mr. James Clifford Mackay is President and CEO of the Air Transport Association of Canada. An expert on aviation security issues, he is also a former chair and director of the Air Transport Security Corporation. Prior to assuming his current responsibilities, Mr. Mackay served as President of the Inverness Group (1997), a company specializing in providing strategic and business advice and analysis to aerospace and defence companies. He has also held several other senior executive positions in the private (aerospace) and public sectors. Dr. Lindsay Nicolle is a professor in the departments of Internal Medicine and Medical Microbiology at the University of Manitoba and a consultant in adult infectious diseases at the Winnipeg Health Sciences Centre and the Winnipeg Regional Health Authority. She has served as a consultant for both federal and provincial health departments. An expert in infectious diseases, she is Editor-in-Chief of the Canadian Journal of Infectious Diseases and Medical Microbiology and a member of Health Canada’s Advisory Committee on Chemical, Biological and Radio-Nuclear Safety, Security and Research. Mr. Bud Streeter is Vice-President and Operations Manager, Great Lakes and Atlantic Canada, for Lloyd’s Register North America Inc. Before taking on his present responsibilities, he was the Director General for Marine Safety at Transport Canada. An expert in transportation (maritime) security, Mr. Streeter has also held senior positions with Marine Atlantic, Inc. and with the Canadian Coast Guard. Dr. Wesley Wark is a professor of History and International Relations at the University of Toronto. An expert in security and intelligence issues, he serves as a frequent writer and commentator on security issues for Canadian and international media. Dr. Wark’s most recent academic publications include an edited volume on the future of intelligence and a special issue of the International Journal devoted to security and terrorism. He is the President of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies. Securing an Open Society : Canada's National Security PolicyApril 2004 Table of ContentsNational Library of Canada cataloguing in publication data Message from the Prime Minister Executive Summary Chapter 1 - Canada's Approach to National Security Chapter 2 - Building an Integrated Security System Chapter 3 - Intelligence Chapter 4 - Emergency Planning and Management Chapter 5 - Public Health Emergencies Chapter 6 - Transportation Security Chapter 7 - Border Security Chapter 8 - International Security Message from the Prime MinisterSecurity issues are not new to Canada. They were influential in the decision to create our country in order to provide peace, order and good government for Canadians. Throughout our history, we have managed a wide range of threats to our society - from the influenza epidemic of 1918-19 to the risk posed by Soviet bombers that led to the creation of NORAD. And we have a proud history of contributing to international peace and security, including the supreme sacrifice made by our citizens in places like Vimy Ridge and Afghanistan. We have addressed these threats to our society in a way that has strengthened the open nature of our country - open to immigrants from around the world and respectful of differences among us. Our prosperity is directly linked to this openness and to our ability to flourish in an increasingly interdependent world. The horrific events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated how individuals could exploit such openness to commit acts of terrorism that attempt to undermine the core values of democratic societies. Those events were a stark reminder to Canadians of the tragic loss of 329 lives aboard Air India flight 182 in 1985. The recent SARS outbreak and the 2003 electrical blackout showed how our interconnectedness to events originating elsewhere can have a major impact on the health and economic well-being of Canadians. And we continue to face more longstanding threats, such as organized crime and natural disasters. The Government of Canada has taken important steps to respond to this increasingly complex and dangerous threat environment. In the past few years, it has funded over $8 billion in additional investments to address our key security gaps. On my first day as Prime Minister, I announced important organizational changes that will further strengthen the capacity of the Government to deal with this new environment. But we need to do more. Working to prevent attacks like the one launched against commuter trains in Madrid requires a more integrated approach to national security - integrated inside the Government of Canada and with key partners. Such an approach will also help us to develop a long-term strategic framework to more effectively prevent and respond to other types of security threats. In short, we need to take the historic step of issuing Canada's first-ever comprehensive statement of national security policy which provides an integrated strategy for addressing current and future threats to our country. Securing an Open Society articulates core national security interests and proposes a framework for addressing threats to Canadians. It does so in a way that fully reflects and supports key Canadian values of democracy, human rights, respect for the rule of law, and pluralism. It outlines the integrated security system the Government of Canada will build. This system will be supported by $690 million in new initiatives to address priority gaps in the Government's areas of responsibility. The Government is moving forward deliberately with this plan, but recognizes the seriousness of the challenge and the sustained nature of the effort required. Addressing many of these threats requires a co-ordinated approach with other key partners - provinces, territories, communities, the private sector and allies. In these areas, the policy sets out processes for engaging those partners in developing co-ordinated plans to support the overall framework. It recognizes that we need to build a dynamic system that is able to continually evolve to address emerging threats and that will rely heavily on contributions from all stakeholders. The fact that this is Canada's first-ever comprehensive statement of our National Security Policy makes it particularly important that we engage Canadians on its content. We are tabling the policy with Parliament so that it can facilitate that added dialogue. This policy puts us on a long-term path to enhancing the security of our country. The measures announced in it will address important gaps in our system, but the project cannot end here. The Government is determined to build a system that works to continually enhance the security of Canadians and contribute to the creation of a safer world. Prime Minister Paul Martin Executive SummaryThere can be no greater role, no more important obligation for a government, than the protection and safety of its citizens. But as all Canadians know, we live in an increasingly interconnected, complex and often dangerous world. The increase in terrorist acts and the threat of rapid, globalized spread of infectious disease all challenge our society and the sense of security that is so critical to our quality of life. Canadians understand this new reality. They know that the threats to security and public safety are not just the problems other nations face. We too are touched by, and face, similar challenges. Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy is a strategic framework and action plan designed to ensure that Canada is prepared for and can respond to current and future threats. The focus is on events and circumstances that generally require a national response as they are beyond the capacity of individuals, communities or provinces to address alone. The first-ever policy of its kind in Canada, Securing an Open Society adopts an integrated approach to security issues across government. It employs a model that can adapt to changing circumstances over time. It has been crafted to balance the needs for national security with the protection of core Canadian values of openness, diversity and respect for civil liberties. The National Security Policy focusses on addressing three core national security interests:
It contains several measures to help build a more integrated security system in a way that is consistent with the goals of the policy:
The National Security Policy also includes chapters on six key strategic areas. Each chapter builds on important steps already taken, addresses specific security gaps, and sets out the principles upon which the policy will be implemented and evolve. Several specific new measures have spending implications. New investments in these measures total $690 million and will be funded from the security contingency reserves in Budget 2001 and Budget 2003, and most recently supplemented by Budget 2004. Highlights of Key MeasuresIntelligence
Emergency Planning and Management
Public Health
Transport Security
Border Security
International Security
Chapter 1 - Canada's Approach to National SecuritySecurity and ValuesThere is no conflict between a commitment to security and a commitment to our most deeply held values. At their heart, both speak to strengthening Canada. Canadians have built a remarkable country shaped by a deep attachment to democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and pluralism. Our way of life is based on an openness to ideas and innovations, and to people from every part of the world - a commitment to include every individual and every community in the ongoing project that is Canada - and a steadfast rejection of intolerance, extremism and violence. A core responsibility of the Government of Canada is to provide for the security of Canadians. The right to life, liberty and security of the person is enshrined in our Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A clear and effective approach to security is not just the foundation of our prosperity - it is the best assurance that future generations will continue to enjoy the very qualities that make this country a place of hope in a troubled world. We have always faced threats to our national security. As we move forward into the 21st century, we face new and more complex ones. Today, individuals have the power to undermine our security in a way that only hostile states were once able to accomplish. The September 11, 2001, attacks were a powerful example of this. Terrorism is a global challenge that has been recognized by the United Nations as a crime against humanity. Canada is not immune to this threat. For example, the 1985 bombing of an Air India jet departing Toronto killed 329 individuals - most of them Canadians. But the threats we face are not limited to terrorism. The SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak demonstrated the power of individuals to unintentionally transmit threats around the globe at the speed of air travel. The Government is determined to pursue our national security interests and to be relentless in the protection of our sovereignty and our society in the face of these new threats. The new and more complex security environment requires Canada to deal frankly with the reality that in an open society, tensions can develop among communities. There is a risk that the seeds of conflict and extremism can take root even in the most tolerant of settings. Canadians stand together in reaffirming that the use of violence to pursue political, religious or ideological goals is an affront to our values and must be met with a determined response by Canadians and by their governments. Our commitment to include all Canadians in the ongoing building of this country must be extended to our approach to protecting it. We reject the stigmatization of any community and we do not accept the notion that our diversity or our openness to newcomers needs to be limited to ensure our security. No one better appreciates the need to protect our society than those who chose this country as a place to build a better life or who fled the consequences of instability and intolerance in other parts of the world. The A deep commitment of Canadians to mutual respect and inclusion helps to mitigate extremism in our society. The Government needs the help and support of all Canadians to make its approach to security effective. Therefore, it will introduce new measures to reach out to communities in Canada that may feel caught in the "front lines" of the struggle against terrorism.
To this end, the Government is creating a Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, which will be comprised of members of ethno-cultural and religious communities from across Canada. It will engage in a long-term dialogue to improve understanding on how to manage security interests in a diverse society and will provide advice to promote the protection of civil order, mutual respect and common understanding. It will be a partnership with all communities to work to ensure that there is zero tolerance for terrorism or crimes of hate in Canada. The roundtable will work with the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of Justice. Our knowledge and experience in the hard tasks of fostering democracy, pluralism and the rule of law are also a means for Canada to play a significant role in the struggle against terrorism. They provide us with a rich set of assets we can deploy in failed or failing states to assist in removing the conditions for extremists to operate and gather support. Our security interests and our international policy goals work hand in hand. Canadians have proved themselves willing to put in place important measures to address extraordinary threats. The Anti-Terrorism Act was carefully crafted by parliamentarians to provide such measures in a way that was consistent with our Charter of Rights and Freedoms and with our core values. Given the nature of the measures adopted by the Government, we are committed to their legislative review at the end of this year to ensure that the balance struck was appropriate. We also need to ensure that there are effective mechanisms for oversight and review so that, in protecting an open society, we do not inadvertently erode the very liberties and values we are determined to uphold. The Scope of the National Security PolicyNational security deals with threats that have the potential to undermine the security of the state or society. These threats generally require a national response, as they are beyond the capacity of individuals, communities or provinces to address alone. National security is closely linked to both personal and international security. While most criminal offences, for example, may threaten personal security, they do not generally have the same capacity to undermine the security of the state or society as do activities such as terrorism or some forms of organized crime. Given the international nature of many of the threats affecting Canadians, national security also intersects with international security. At the same time, there are a growing number of international security threats that impact directly on Canadian security and are addressed in this strategy. The middle circle in the chart above delineates the focus of the national security strategy. The security environment includes a wide range of often interrelated threats. While all threats ultimately impact on individuals, threats to national security have the capacity to seriously impair the security of Canada. A growing number of international security threats impact directly on the national security of Canada. The type of response required also differs as one moves along the continuum. Individuals have a primary role in taking responsibility for their personal security. Their efforts can be amplified when they work in communities to address challenges in their midst. As threats become more significant, they may require the assistance of the local police, a provincial government, a national government or the wider international community to address them effectively. While the Government has a role to play in all three areas of security, this policy focusses on national security threats. National Security InterestsAlthough threats to Canada will change, our security interests are enduring. The Government believes that there are three core national security interests that Canada needs to advance. 1. Protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroadCanada's foremost national security interest is to protect Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad. This requires the Government to protect the physical security of Canadians, our values, and our key institutions. In addition, the Government has a responsibility to be able to defend against threats to Canadian sovereignty, ranging from illegal entry to incursions into our territorial waters. The Government also has an obligation to offer assistance to Canadians working or travelling abroad. Canada's international presence can also be a target and it is imperative that we take appropriate security measures to protect our diplomats, aid workers and other personnel representing Canada abroad. 2. Ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our alliesOur second national security interest is to ensure that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies. Just as Canada expects other governments countries to control activities in their countries that might have an impact on Canada and Canadians, we have a responsibility to manage threats to the security of our allies. The interconnected nature of the modern world makes it impossible to isolate Canada from the effects of any serious threatening event or activity. The September 11 attacks demonstrated the profound effect an event in the United States could have on Canadians and the need to work together to address threats. Canada is committed to strengthening North American security as an important means of enhancing Canadian security. 3. Contributing to international securityCanada has a long tradition of contributing to international security, even where our direct security interests are not affected. But the changing nature of the world has increased the number of international threats that can impact on Canada's national security. Failed and failing states can provide a haven for terrorists, which can pose risks to the security of Canadians. Canadian security will be increasingly dependent on our ability to contribute to international security. This may require the deployment of military assets to protect against direct threats to international peace and security or the provision of development assistance to strengthen public institutions in weak or failing states. It will certainly require Canada to continue to play a leading role in strengthening and modernizing international institutions so that they can contribute to international security. Current ThreatsThe world is a dangerous place, even if the relative safety of life in Canada sometimes obscures just how dangerous it is. As recent events have highlighted, there is are is a wide range of threats facing Canada from pandemics to terrorism. These threats can have a serious impact on the safety of Canadians and on the effective functioning of our society. Terrorism. The bombings of commuter trains in Madrid in March of 2004 provided a stark reminder of the risks of terrorism and the vulnerability of open, democratic societies to it. The Bali bombing of October 2002 and the attacks of September 11 are part of the same phenomenon. In a taped message released on November 12, 2002, Osama bin Laden identified Canada as a target for attack. Terrorism may be motivated by a variety of causes. Broadly speaking, four key types affect Canada, though they can be intermingled:
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their delivery systems, poses a risk to Canadians. Evidence exists that terrorist organizations and states with troubling international records have sought and experimented with such weapons - an example being the foiling of a planned attack using the deadly chemical ricin in 2003 in the United Kingdom. Whether or not Canada was the primary target of such an attack, the impact on our security could be immense. The physical effects of such attacks would not respect borders and would have a significant impact on the global economy. Failed and failing states. The growing number of failed or failing states is one of the most disturbing of recent security developments. These states contribute to spreading instability and can be a haven for both terrorists and organized crime groups that exploit weak or corrupt governing structures to pursue their nefarious activities. These activities have had consequences far beyond their borders, including for Canada. Foreign espionage. Foreign espionage against Canada did not stop with the end of the Cold War. As a highly advanced industrial economy, Canada is subject to foreign espionage which that seeks to steal Canadian industrial and technical secrets for gain. Economic espionage can impact on our prosperity by undermining the competitiveness of Canadian companies. Though Canada may not face the same level of military threat from foreign states as during the Cold War, some countries remain interested in our defence and security plans, particularly as they relate to our defence co-operation with the United States and other allies. Natural disasters. Many regions of Canada have been subject to severe natural disasters in recent years which have taken lives and caused extensive property damage. Critical infrastructure vulnerability. The August 2003 electrical blackout that affected Ontario and eight U.S. states demonstrated how dependent we are on critical infrastructure and how vulnerable we are to accidents or deliberate attack on our cyber and physical security. Cyber-attacks are a growing concern that have the potential to impact on a wide range of critical infrastructure that is connected through computer networks. Organized crime. Organized crime in Canada is increasingly becoming part of a globalized network that supports the narcotics trade, migrant smuggling and the trafficking in persons, weapons smuggling, money laundering, theft (including identity theft), commercial fraud and extortion. A number of terrorist movements have advanced their activities by developing links with organized crime. Elements of organized crime are also increasing their attempts to undermine our justice system. Pandemics. The SARS epidemic demonstrated how accelerated international travel patterns have amplified the risk of pandemics and related health threats to the security of Canadians. It demonstrated the devastating physical and economic impact these threats can have on communities in Canada. All of these threats pose a real security challenge for Canada. Often, they do not exist in isolation from one another. For example, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a problem in itself, but when terrorism is involved, the threat increases dramatically. The danger of pandemics is amplified if groups seek to spread disease deliberately. The complex threat environment we are facing evolves continuously. Therefore, the system we build needs to be capable of responding proportionately to existing threats while adapting quickly to meet new threats that may emerge. While we strive to eliminate these threats, this is not always possible. Strengthening our security is also about managing and reducing risks. The Government is determined to work with our partners and with all Canadians to meet the new risk environment and to build a more effective national security system. The next chapter describes the integrated system that the Government will develop to meet this requirement. Chapter 2 - Building an Integrated Security SystemThe increasing complexity of the threats facing Canada requires an integrated national security framework to address them. It is critical for our key security instruments to work together in a fully integrated way to address the security interests of Canadians. The lack of integration in our current system is a key gap that has been recognized by the Auditor General of Canada. The Government of Canada agrees that the key to providing greater security for Canadians and to getting the most out of our security expenditures is to co-ordinate and better integrate our efforts. The Government is committed to providing the leadership, resources and structures necessary to build a fully integrated and effective security system. On December 12, 2003, the Prime Minister announced a series of organizational changes that help facilitate more effective integration, including:
The Government is building a fully integrated security system that ensures that we can more effectively respond to existing threats and quickly adapt to new ones. The evolving nature of threats to Canadians requires a fully integrated government approach that ensures that issues and information do not fall between the different parts of our security system. This system needs to be fully connected to key partners - provinces, territories, communities, first line responders, the private sector and Canadians. The diagram below articulates the integrated security system that we are developing. It will help to ensure that all of the necessary government resources are brought to bear in a more co-ordinated way to ensure the security of Canadians. The system begins with a comprehensive threat assessment. It provides both tactical and strategic information about risks to Canada. This threat information is used to structure and trigger proportionate, integrated capabilities to prevent or mitigate the effects of the threat. When an event occurs, an integrated system for managing its consequences is triggered. In order to ensure the continuous improvement of the system, effective evaluation and review are conducted. This system is capable of responding to both intentional and unintentional threats. It is as relevant in securing Canadians against the next SARS-like outbreak as it is in addressing the risk of a terrorist attack. Above all, it is a flexible system that continually evolves to learn from past experiences and to respond to emerging threats. Threat AssessmentEffective threat assessment allows the Government to objectively and continuously assess the risks to Canadians based on all available information. This assessment is grounded in intelligence and trend analysis, and evaluates both the probability and potential consequences of threats.
Although many individual federal departments and agencies conduct threat assessments, there has been no comprehensive and timely central government assessment that brings together intelligence about potential threats from a wide range of sources to allow better and more integrated decision-making. Consequently, the Government is creating an Integrated Threat Assessment Centre to facilitate the integration of intelligence into a comprehensive threat assessment, which will be made available to those who require it. The integrated approach that the Government is taking will help to reduce the risk that information held by one part of Government will fail to be provided in a timely fashion to those who can utilize it. Protection and Prevention CapabilityThis integrated threat assessment must be connected to an effective, tactical capability to deploy resources in proportionate response to specific situations, and communicate relevant information to first line responders such as the law enforcement community. These new threat assessment capabilities will allow the Government to more effectively co-ordinate activities in response to specific threat information to prevent or mitigate threats. The Government will ensure that its own systems are structured to better share information on threats. For example, threat information needs to be provided on a timely basis to border services agents so they can act on that information to prevent people who represent a known threat from entering Canada. A key objective is to strengthen our watch list system to ensure that it is fully integrated and updated on a real-time basis. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness will have clear responsibility for the integration of watch list information across the Government. This is a complex project that requires the integration of many different information systems and will be undertaken in a way that respects the privacy rights of Canadians. The department will also be responsible for reviewing alert and warning systems across government to ensure that they are structured to respond effectively to threats.
It is not, however, enough to connect activities within the federal government. We need to better connect our threat information to first line responders, law enforcement officials, critical infrastructure providers, and provincial, territorial and other governments. The department has such a system to respond to terrorism. It will expand its capacity to ensure full connectivity on a wider range of threats and respond to create a truly national system of protection and prevention. Consequence ManagementWhile much of our national security effort is directed at preventing events from occurring, our system needs to be able to respond to incidents and their consequences. This can range from providing emergency medical assistance to prosecuting individuals for committing security offences. The measures identified below in Chapter 4: Emergency Planning and Management help to strengthen the Government's capacity to meet its core responsibilities and build a national emergency management system with key partners.
While that national strategy is being collectively developed, there are important tangible steps that can be taken immediately to enhance co-operation. To this end, the Government is working to co-locate federal, provincial, territorial and municipal emergency operations centres to ensure that officials build strong practices of collaboration and can operate seamlessly during emergencies. Evaluation and OversightAn effective national security framework must, of necessity, be a continual work in progress. We need to continuously evaluate the success of the system by testing its effectiveness. The Government believes that it is essential to benchmark our progress against appropriate standards including the systems adopted by other countries. While the Auditor General and parliamentary committees will continue to play an important role in reviewing our performance, we are committed to building a more systematic approach within Government to testing and improving on the effectiveness of our systems.
To this end, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness will be given responsibility for strengthening the testing and auditing of key capabilities and conducting assessments of other departments. This will include a review of the plans of federal departments to ensure their ability to continue operating during emergencies. The Government will also enhance its live testing of federal security systems to assess their effectiveness. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies, supported by the National Security Advisor, will ensure the development and implementation of the security system described above. The Government also believes that it can benefit from the advice of security experts from outside the Government in evaluating and improving our system. To this end, it will create the National Security Advisory Council to advise the Government on the implementation of this policy framework. This integrated national security system will help ensure that the six key security activities described in the following chapters work together more effectively in meeting the security needs of Canadians:
Chapter 3 - IntelligenceHighlights
ContextIntelligence is the foundation of our ability to take effective measures to provide for the security of Canada and Canadians. To manage risk effectively, we need the best possible information about threats we face and about the intentions, capabilities and activities of those who would do us harm. The best decisions regarding the scope and design of security programs, the allocation of resources and the deployment of assets cannot be made unless decision makers are as informed as possible. Canada has a long and distinguished record in the field of intelligence collection and assessment. Our history in this area goes back to important contributions Canada made during the Second World War. Agencies like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment are recognized by our allies as highly effective professional organizations. They contribute significantly to our own security as well as that of the global community. Intelligence is important not only for Canada's security but also for sound international, military and economic policy. Unlike a number of our closest allies, Canada does not have a single agency dedicated solely to collecting foreign intelligence abroad. However, a number of Canadian departments and agencies gather information in Canada and abroad relating to a wide range of interests. In circumstances where it is required for the protection of Canada from security threats, this can include operations abroad by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. The threats we face do not respect national or international boundaries. Terrorist organizations, for example, raise money, recruit and train operatives and plan and carry out operations around the world. This has been clearly demonstrated in the terrible attacks of September 11, 2001, and in subsequent attacks in Bali and most recently in Madrid. Other threats, such as weapons proliferation, pandemics, failed and failing states and organized crime, have transboundary implications. The nature of intelligence is that we rarely, if ever, have complete information. Rather, intelligence reporting and assessments are based on fragmented and sometimes contradictory information. It is therefore essential to bring together information on threats to Canada from all available sources and properly assess it in order to provide as accurate and complete a picture as possible. It is also critically important that the resulting product be conveyed in a timely, accurate and usable manner to those whose actions or decisions depend on it. Progress to DateThe Government of Canada significantly enhanced its security and intelligence sector in the wake of the events of September 11. This included a 30 percent increase in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) budget and a 25 percent increase in the budget of the Communications Security Establishment. The new Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada allows us to identify, assess and track suspicious transfers of money that could indicate support for terrorist activity or money laundering. Funding has also been provided to increase intelligence capacity in a number of other departments and agencies, such as the Canada Border Services Agency and Transport Canada. Our analytical capacity has been significantly enhanced by doubling the size of the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat within the Privy Council Office, which provides government departments and agencies with assessments on international issues. The Government has made important legislative changes to ensure that we can better respond to evolving threats, while maintaining the balance between collective interests and the rights and freedoms of Canadians. The Communications Security Establishment has been placed on a legislative basis for the first time. The Government has proposed further clarifications and enhancements in the proposed Public Safety Act, 2002 to a number of legal authorities that impact the security and intelligence community. Structurally, the Government has made key changes to better enable it to integrate and act upon intelligence on threats to Canada. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness brings together key departments and agencies under one ministerial roof, including CSIS, the RCMP, Emergency Management, the Canada Border Services Agency and others. Complementing this change, the National Security Advisor, located within PCO, briefs the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister on national security from an integrated government-wide perspective. The Way ForwardThe Government believes that additional resources need to be allocated to enhance intelligence collection and assessment capabilities. Important initiatives have also been proposed in relation to accountability and review. Therefore, we are committing an additional $167 million in this area. Increase Capabilities and FocusNo changes to the current mandates and structures of Canada's security and intelligence agencies are being proposed at this time. However, in order to combat elusive threats and address other risks to our security, intelligence collection and assessment capabilities will be increased. Given the security threats facing Canada and our allies, we will devote a greater proportion of our efforts to security intelligence. Working with Our AlliesA part of our ability to access intelligence derives from our intelligence alliances and relationships. For many years Canada has exchanged intelligence with key allies. To effectively meet the security and intelligence challenges we face, Canada has also developed important new relationships. These relationships focus on a variety of issues, such as anti-terrorism, non-proliferation, new and emerging health concerns and the protection of our armed forces personnel deployed abroad. These relations are enormously beneficial to our country. Canada alone could not replicate the benefits gained through these international arrangements. But we are also a significant contributor of intelligence. These contributions are recognized and appreciated by our allies. Many of our key allies are moving ahead to enhance their intelligence collection capabilities, including making use of, and adapting to, new and evolving technology. We will keep pace with our allies and with the evolving security environment. Integrated Threat AssessmentClose allies such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia have all recognized that the current scope of threat assessment requirements exceeds the capacity of any one organization and have moved to integrated models. The United Kingdom has created the Joint Threat Assessment Centre. The United States has created its Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the Terrorist Screening Center to ensure that threat related information reaches all levels of government. Australia has also developed its National Threat Assessment Centre. All these efforts have brought together both intelligence and expertise from across the respective governments to give the most accurate and timely picture of possible threats. As an ally, Canada will benefit from those decisions. We will follow suit in order to improve our capacity to protect Canadians and to contribute more significantly to international efforts. We need to ensure that we have the ability to assess information on threats to Canada and Canadian interests. Departments and agencies must co-operate closely and, wherever appropriate, share relevant information with each other. In addition, a structure must exist to ensure that the results of integrated analysis can be quickly transmitted to those who need them in order to take action. We cannot allow organizational silos to inhibit our ability to identify and respond to threats to the security of Canada. As highlighted in Chapter 2: Building an Integrated Security System, Canada will create a new Integrated Threat Assessment Centre. It will be supported by, and staffed with, representatives of a broad range of departments and agencies including Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, CSIS, the RCMP, the Communications Security Establishment, the Department of National Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Privy Council Office, Transport Canada, and the Canada Border Services Agency. It will also be able to draw on expertise from other departments and agencies, as required, including Health Canada, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada and Environment Canada. Though housed within CSIS, which is accountable to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the new centre will be a community-wide resource working in conjunction with the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister. The centre will do a comprehensive analysis of all available information on potential threats to Canada and make the results of that analysis available to all who require them. Systems and procedures will be developed and implemented, within a framework that provides for appropriate safeguards on the dissemination of information, to ensure the collaboration and sharing upon which fully integrated threat assessments depend. Review MechanismsThe nature of intelligence is such that much of our effort is not known to the general public. A primary reason that we engage in security and intelligence activities is to protect Canadians and the society we have built together, based on democratic principles, the rule of law and respect for human rights. It is therefore fundamentally important that safeguards be in place to ensure that the exercise of authorities and the activities of our agencies are completely appropriate and are in compliance with Canadian law and policy. A number of effective mechanisms are already in place for review of security and intelligence activities. These include the Security Intelligence Review Committee and the Inspector General for CSIS, the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment and the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP. Beyond these structures, the Government has put in place other safeguards, including the recently established protocol with the United States concerning the treatment of Canadian citizens. As the legal authorities and activities of our security and intelligence agencies evolve to respond to the current and future security environment, it is vitally important that we ensure that review mechanisms keep pace. In this context, the budget of the Security Intelligence Review Committee has recently been increased to enable it to continue to effectively review an expanded CSIS. The Government has also made two significant new proposals. The first is to create an arm's-length review mechanism for the RCMP's activities relating to national security. The Deputy Prime Minister has asked Mr. Justice Dennis R. O'Connor to provide advice to the Government on how best to proceed with this important initiative. Second, the Prime Minister has proposed the creation of a National Security Committee of Parliamentarians. The Deputy Prime Minister recently tabled a discussion paper on the proposal in Parliament. Committees of the House of Commons and of the Senate have been asked to consider the mandate and structure of such a committee and to make recommendations to the Government. As part of the ongoing evaluation and oversight described in Chapter 2, the Government will monitor progress in relation to enhanced intelligence collection and assessment as well as development and implementation of expanded review mechanisms relating to national security. This will help to determine whether further adjustments are required in this critically important area. Chapter 4 - Emergency Planning and ManagementHighlights
ContextThe diverse array of emergencies in Canada in recent years - September 11, 2001, SARS, BSE, Hurricane Juan, the B.C. forest fires, floods, the Ontario blackout, and avian influenza - shows the importance of transforming our national emergency management system to meet the challenges of protecting modern Canadian society from the effects of increasingly complex emergencies. This increased complexity is a function of several factors:
Canada's current approach to emergencies dates back to the Cold War era. The system is based on a highly decentralized and distributed division of responsibilities among first line responders, provinces and territories, and lead departments at the federal level. There is currently an urgent need for a more modern, integrated national support system for first line responders, and there remains a system-wide question about the adequacy and sufficiency of resources for key players across the country, particularly in the context of sustained and operationally intense emergency situations. Interoperability of policies, systems and personnel is also a major national challenge that must be tackled. And there is undoubtedly a need for clear national leadership - both on the ground and in communications - on emergencies of national importance. Effective emergency management comprises several phases, including mitigation, prevention, preparedness, detection, response, recovery, and evaluation. In all of these phases, our national capacity must be bolstered, and our policies and operations made seamless across jurisdictions. In saying this, the Government of Canada recognizes that first line responders lie at the heart of our emergency management system and that the federal Government will often play only a supporting role in emergency management to provinces and territories, communities and the private sector. The Government has identified two important elements for modernizing Canada's approach to emergency management:
Progress to DateSince September 11, 2001, the Government has taken steps to bolster its performance and capacity to effectively manage complex emergencies:
The Canadian Forces have also figured prominently in the consequence management of national emergencies, helping civilian authorities respond, over the last several years, to floods in Quebec and Manitoba; the ice storm in eastern Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick; the aftermath of the Swiss Air crash off the coast of Nova Scotia; the Y2K transition; forest fires in British Columbia; and Hurricane Juan in Nova Scotia in 2003. Since 2001, the Government has taken specific measures aimed at bolstering the capabilities of the Canadian Forces in emergency preparedness and support. These measures have included:
In December 2003, the Government also announced:
The Way ForwardBuilding on the measures taken to date, the Government will take immediate steps to put the federal house in order by addressing the highest-priority gaps in its capacity to manage emergencies in the areas of overall strategic co-ordination, critical infrastructure protection and cyber-security. We are committing an additional $105 million to address these gaps. Strategic Co-ordinationThe Government will build a centralized Government Operations Centre to provide stable, round-the-clock co-ordination and support across government and to key national players in the event of national emergencies. The Operations Centre will be housed in the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and will provide leadership in emergencies of national importance. A seamless national emergency management system requires a comprehensive, modern legislative foundation, informed by consultations with provinces, territories, communities, first line responders, and industry. To this end, the overall statutory framework for the Government's emergency management activities - in particular the Emergency Preparedness Act - will be reviewed and modernized to reflect the emerging requirements of emergency management. These requirements cover the areas of mitigation programs, critical infrastructure protection, cyber-security, information-sharing between federal departments, agreements with international and private sector partners, and protection of sensitive private sector information. Recent events in Canada such as SARS have called into question the effectiveness of existing disaster financial assistance arrangements to deal quickly and effectively with response and recovery. The need for consistency of application, improvement of federal-provincial-territorial co-operation, and a comprehensive federal response is driving the development of a framework for responsive disaster recovery assistance. As part of this, the Government will complete an ongoing review of the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements, develop guiding principles for other federal instruments to complement these arrangements for situations such as public health and animal health emergencies, and examine the inventory of existing national programs and legal tools to enhance their applicability to emergency response and recovery. Major emergencies require extremely close co-operation between the federal government, provinces and territories, communities, first line responders and the private sector. National emergency co-ordination currently suffers from the absence of both an effective federal-provincial-territorial governance regime, and from the absence of commonly agreed standards and priorities for the national emergency management system. The Government will therefore invite provinces and territories to establish a permanent, high-level forum on emergencies in order to allow for regular strategic discussion of emergency management issues among key national players. The Government is also committed to moving ahead on the co-location of federal, provincial and territorial emergency operations centres. To this end, it will work with its provincial and territorial partners to put this in place where practical. The Government needs to be able to continue to provide core services to Canadians during emergencies. Building on existing work in this regard, federal departments will ensure that they can continue to serve Canadians regardless of circumstances by strengthening their continuity planning processes and requiring regular exercises to test these plans. Critical Infrastructure and Cyber-securityCritical infrastructure protection is one of the main challenges of modern emergency management. Most of our critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector or other levels of government, and much of it is connected to international networks. To establish a basis for the federal, provincial and territorial governments and the private sector to meet critical infrastructure protection challenge, the Government will release a position paper setting out the key elements of the proposed Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy for Canada this summer. The Government will consult senior-level provincial, territorial and private sector leaders to inform this strategy. Key international partners such as the United States will be part of this consultation process. The Government will work with provinces, territories and the private sector to drive forward a national process that prioritizes substantial improvement of our national capabilities in critical infrastructure protection. Cyber-security is at the forefront of the transborder challenge to Canada's critical infrastructure. The threat of cyber-attacks is real, and the consequences of such attacks can be severe. To achieve a more proactive cyber-security posture and to keep pace with the efforts of key allies, the Government will strengthen its capacity to predict and prevent cyber-attacks. To this end, the Government will substantially improve threat and vulnerability analyses for its systems, and strengthen its ability to defend its systems and respond to cyber-incidents. The Government will also convene a high-level national task force, with public and private representation, to develop the National Cyber-security Strategy to reduce Canada's vulnerability to cyber-attacks and cyber-accidents. Bringing Key Players to the TableThe federal Government is often not a lead player in emergency management. Consequently, the Government will initiate a process with its partners in the provinces and territories to bring key emergency management actors from across the country to the table. This includes communities, first line responders and the private sector. The objective will be to collectively assess the requirements of the entire national emergency management community to better position the country to meet the increasingly complex security environment that we face. The Government will work with provinces and territories at key meetings of federal, provincial and territorial security ministers and deputy ministers this summer. The Government will propose four strategic areas as national priorities:
Chapter 5 - Public Health EmergenciesHighlights
ContextA robust public health system is a critical line of defence in protecting Canadians against many current and emerging threats, including contamination of our food and water, major disease outbreaks such as SARS, natural disasters, major accidents like chemical spills, and even the terrorist threat of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack. The complex, multijurisdictional nature of such threats also speaks to the necessity for Canada's approach to public health emergencies to be more than strictly local or national in its orientation, and to proactively contribute to the building of a more resilient international public health architecture. This approach must also seek to continuously include the public health dimension in the ongoing national security debate. Indeed, the SARS outbreak in 2003 highlighted a number of challenges to the national management of public health emergencies. These challenges include:
The Government of Canada has moved to respond to these challenges. This document sets out measures to fill prominent gaps in our public health emergency readiness, and reaffirms the multi-party process already laid out to modernize our public health emergencies system. Progress to DateA number of key accomplishments should be noted as the Government works with key partners - provinces, territories, communities, first line responders, industry and international partners - to build a more resilient national public health emergencies system.
The Way ForwardThe Government will continue to enhance the coherence and capacity of the national public health emergency management system, and will continue its efforts to address key strategic challenges with its partners. To these ends, Budget 2004 committed an additional $665 million over the next three years. Strategic Co-ordinationThe new Public Health Agency of Canada is being established to strengthen Canada's public health and emergency response capacity, and to develop national strategies for managing infectious diseases and chronic diseases. The new agency will be based upon a distributed model that builds on existing offices across Canada - in Ottawa, Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto, Guelph, Montreal and Halifax. The work of the Agency will be carried out in all jurisdictions through its regional offices, through the Pan-Canadian Public Health Network, and through the new Centres of Public Health. The agency will be led by the new Chief Public Health Officer for Canada, who will be charged with providing timely, objective and evidence-based advice on all matters pertaining to public health and national readiness to deal with public health threats, providing leadership in advancing Canada's interests in international agencies focussed on public health matters, and helping to co-ordinate the national public health response during public health disasters and emergencies. International co-ordination and capacity will be strengthened by linking the new Public Health Agency to an international network for disease control and emergency response, alongside the World Health Organization, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other agencies in Europe and Asia. Building National CapacityHealth emergency response capacity will be increased by establishing health emergency response teams, made up of health professionals across the country. These professionals will continue to work in various health care settings, but will be available to come together and assist local authorities in an emergency situation. The National Emergency Services Stockpile System will be replenished with the necessary supplies (portable hospitals, mini-clinics, blankets, etc.) and the national inventory of drugs will be updated. The Canadian Field Epidemiology Program - a federally sponsored and run program for public health graduates - will be expanded to address human resources shortages in this important area. Funding will be provided for fellowships, bursaries, chairs and community-based public health apprenticeships. Public health surveillance will be enhanced through work with the provinces and other stakeholders to develop and implement improved data collection standards to facilitate sharing of public health information on a national basis. Budget 2004 provided an additional $100 million to Canada Health Infoway to support the development and implementation of a national public health surveillance system. Funding will be provided to establish regional centres of excellence in public health to advance understanding and action on key priority areas, for example, communicable disease epidemiology. Laboratory capacity will be enhanced at the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg and the Laboratory for Foodborne Zoonoses in Guelph, including acquisition of new equipment. Support will be provided for a new emergency operations centre at the National Microbiology Laboratory and laboratory networks will be strengthened. Increased funding will also be provided to support laboratory-based research to increase Canada's diagnostic capacity. Budget 2004 makes $300 million available to the provinces and territories over the next three years in support of the National Immunization Strategy to assist with the introduction of new and recommended childhood and adolescent vaccines. Budget 2004 also makes $100 million available to help the provinces and territories relieve stresses on their public health systems and to address immediate gaps in capacity. Building on MomentumGoing forward, the Government intends to take all necessary measures to fully integrate its approach to public health emergencies with the national security agenda. As indicated previously, the public health dimension will figure prominently in the Government's integrated threat assessments, and the new Public Health Agency of Canada will be launched as a matter of priority. To ensure that the new Public Health Agency is able to take its place among the best public health agencies in the world, key international partners such as the World Health Organization, the Pan American Health Organization, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Health Protection Agency in the United Kingdom will be engaged during its development so that Canada may benefit from their expertise. The Government is also working, and will continue to work, with the provinces and territories to address vulnerabilities and build on existing public health strengths across Canada. To this end, the Minister of State (Public Health) is consulting with stakeholders across the country to discuss how to improve intergovernmental collaboration on public health and to seek their guidance on how the federal agency and the Chief Public Health Officer should function. Chapter 6 - Transportation SecurityHighlights
ContextCanada relies on its transportation network of roads, railways, pipelines, shipping and airlines to move people and goods between communities within Canada as well as between Canada and our trading partners in North America and around the world. Terrorists' use of aircraft as weapons of mass destruction and subsequent terrorist attacks on commuters - most recently in Madrid, Spain - have offended our sense of security and have sparked a reassessment of the vulnerabilities of the Canadian transportation system. Canada has a responsibility to contribute to the security of the North American transportation system by working jointly with our neighbours to manage the security of our skies, our surface routes, and our waters, by encouraging stringent, consistent regulatory standards, and by collaborating in our efforts to better detect, assess, and respond to threats. Canada must also do its part to secure the international transportation system by working bilaterally and through multilateral institutions with our international partners to raise transportation security standards, and to increase international co-ordination. Progress to DateCanada has long been recognized as having one of the most safe and secure aviation systems in the world - including through the objective assessment of the International Civil Aviation Organization. The tragic loss in 1985 of an Air India jet after departing Canada prompted the Government to implement measures such as searches of passengers and their carry-on baggage, matching baggage with passengers, and conducting background checks on airport workers. Following the events of September 11, 2001, we took further steps to build on these efforts to secure the air transportation system. The Government committed $2.2 billion to enhance Canada's aviation security. Of these funds, more than $1 billion was allocated to acquire and operate advanced explosives detection systems at Canadian airports. The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority was created to provide a professional corps of well-trained security officers to screen passengers and their baggage, to screen non-passengers entering restricted areas at airports, and to implement an enhanced restricted-area pass system at Canadian airports. To protect aircraft in flight, the Government required the fortification of cockpits through the installation of reinforced cockpit doors, and we played a leading role at the International Civil Aviation Organization to have this requirement adopted internationally. Furthermore, the Government established the Air Carrier Protective Program, placing specially trained, armed RCMP undercover officers on selected flights. Since 1985, Transport Canada, with the support of the RCMP and Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, has conducted comprehensive background checks on airport workers. To further enhance our security clearance system at airports, the Government is moving to screen individuals for links to organized crime and other criminal associations. In recognition of our shared responsibility for our common air space, Canada and the United States have been formal partners since 1958 in its defence and security through NORAD. Since September 11, NORAD has adapted to the new threat environment by increasing its operational readiness and by addressing threats within and outside North America. Canada and the United States have also further enhanced North American defence and security co-operation through the creation of the Bi-National Planning Group located at Colorado Springs, Colorado. This group, among other things, is working to improve marine security co-operation, protecting North America from marine threats. The Government has allocated additional funds for marine security to better track vessels operating in Canadian waters, increase surveillance, protect marine infrastructure, and improve domestic and international coordination. Key measures include long-range detection technologies; enhanced screening of ships' passengers and crews; advanced reporting requirements to improve the assessment of potential risks posed by vessels, their passengers and cargo; and measures to intercept vessels of concern before they arrive on our shores. The Government has taken steps to strengthen security at marine facilities. For example, the RCMP has established National Ports Enforcement Teams at Vancouver, Halifax and Montreal. Canada also played a leading role at the International Maritime Organization to develop a comprehensive international marine security regime set to enter into force in July 2004. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code now require security assessments and plans for ships and marine facilities, including the designation of security officers on ships. The amendments to the convention require ships to be fitted with transponder systems that automatically transmit the vessel's identity, type, position, course, speed, navigational status and other safety-related information to shore stations, other ships, and aircraft. Intermodal cargo containers, which can be moved intact between trucks, trains, and ships, serve as the backbone of the international system for the trade in goods. Over 2.5 million 20-foot equivalent units move through our ports every year - many of them destined for the United States. Along with enhanced electronic screening capability, the federal government is invoking mandatory advanced notice requirements and automated targeting systems to identify and target inspections on high-risk cargo. Canada has partnered with the United States to jointly position customs officers at key North American ports. Technology investments such as gamma-ray systems, ion mobility spectrometers, and trace detection systems, permit effective and unobtrusive screening of containers for explosive, chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological devices. The Way ForwardThe Government will work with our international partners, bilaterally and through multilateral forums, to enhance the security of our skies, our waters, and surface routes for the movement of people and commerce. With the United States, we will work to develop stringent, consistent regulatory standards, and we will collaborate more closely to better detect, assess, and respond to threats. We will work with other countries to strengthen international standards for transportation security, build confidence in one another's security standards, and where this has been accomplished, mutually recognize them. Aviation security remains a primary concern and further steps will be taken in this area. The proposed Public Safety Act, 2002 would, among other things, clarify and strengthen authorities for the RCMP, CSIS, and Transport Canada to request passenger information to assess threats to transportation security, and for other limited purposes. In partnership with the private sector and our international partners, we will identify strategies to enhance the security of air cargo. These strategies should build on programs pioneered by Canada for the movement of cargo by truck. This would include building on programs such as the Partners in Protection program for identifying trusted shippers, filing advance notice of cargo being shipped by air, and automated targeting systems to identify high-risk cargo for closer inspection. We will work with the United States and with our G8 partners to develop further security measures, including co-operation on threat and vulnerability assessment methodology. This will be used, for example, to assess risks and effective countermeasures for potential attacks from shoulder-fired missiles. The Government will implement a six-point plan to strengthen marine security, and invest $308 million from the security reserve set aside in Budget 2004. First, we are clarifying and strengthening accountability for marine security amongst the various portfolios that have a role to play in securing our waters. As a result of changes implemented the day the new government took power, the Minister of Transport has lead responsibility for marine safety and security policy co-ordination and regulation. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness will continue to have lead responsibility for enforcement and policing. The Minister of National Defence will be the lead minister for the co-ordination of on-water response to a marine threat or a developing crisis in our Exclusive Economic Zone and along our coasts. Second, we are establishing Marine Security Operations Centres. Headed by Canadian Forces Maritime Command, the centres will include staff from the CBSA, Transport Canada, the RCMP, and the Canadian Coast Guard. Reflecting the approach the Canadian Forces and Canadian Coast Guard take to carry out search and rescue operations, these Marine Security Operations Centres will have the authority and capacity, through interagency staffing, to bring to bear all civilian and military resources necessary to detect, assess, and respond to a marine security threat. Marine Security Operations Centres will be networked with the Coast Guard's vessel traffic and communications systems, and with the new Government Operations Centre in Ottawa. Third, we are increasing on-water patrols to better position the RCMP, Coast Guard and the Canadian Forces Maritime Command to intervene, interdict, and board ships that may pose threats to Canada. As well, the Government is increasing the Department of Fisheries and Ocean's aerial surveillance activities. Combined with Canadian Forces aerial surveillance activities, these programs detect, track and classify vessels in our waters. Fourth, the Government will implement secure communications technologies that will enhance the ability of our civilian and military fleets to communicate with each other and with the Marine Security Operations Centres. Fifth, Canada and the United States will work more closely to protect and defend our coasts and our territorial waters. Given that we share responsibility for our contiguous waters, we will work with the United States to pursue enhanced marine security cooperation, including encouraging mutually high and compatible rules, standards and operations, among other measures. Canada will propose collaborating more closely in the enhancement of the security of our ports and vessels by conducting of common threat, vulnerability and risk assessments, and through security audit programs. Canada will also strive to closely co-ordinate our Marine Security Operations Centres with the U.S. Coast Guard Operations Centres. Working together, these centres would provide a comprehensive picture of vessels operating in our contiguous waters. They could systematically share information on vessels, crew and cargo that may pose a threat to our shared security, and we would propose that they co-ordinate efforts to target and intercept these threats. Sixth, the Government will strengthen security at ports and other marine facilities, such as locks in the St. Lawrence Seaway. We are implementing mandatory regulatory standards for marine facilities that will require operators by July 1, 2004, to have in place plans that address security vulnerabilities. The Government has a range of programs that require security background checks for transportation workers, for example, for those working in restricted areas at airports and for commercial truck drivers crossing the Canada-United States border. The Government has committed to introducing similar requirements at marine ports. We will explore expanding the requirements for background checks to a broader range of transportation workers. Canada will work with the United States to improve the security of intermodal cargo containers. Our aim is to deepen our existing co-operation by partnering in the Container Security Initiative. We will explore the deployment of customs officers at overseas ports to verify inspections of high-risk containers before they are loaded on vessels destined for North America. Given the integrated nature of North American shipping, we will increase the compatibility of our systems for automated targeting of high-risk cargo at seaports, and we will establish protocols for sharing information on such cargo. We will work with our international partners to identify and implement new technologies, such as electronic seals, global positioning system tracking, and embedded computer chip technology, to signal breaches of the physical integrity of shipping containers - whether at a port, or on a truck, ship or train. With our G8 partners and the World Customs Organization, we will work to establish an integrated container security regime that enhances the level of security of intermodal containers globally. It is important to do more to protect our critical transportation infrastructure. This will require collaboration with provincial and municipal governments, and with independent operators responsible for key parts of our transportation system. For example, rail operators own the track that carries passengers and freight across Canada. Pipelines that are privately owned and operated carry oil and gas resources to our urban centres and to the United States. Bridge and tunnel operators are responsible for key trade corridors to the United States. NavCanada owns and operates Canada's air navigation system on which Canadians rely for continued safe operation of our air space. Airport and marine port authorities are responsible for the gateways connecting Canadians and the Canadian economy with the rest of the world. As described in Chapter 4: Emergency Planning and Management, the Government will work with provinces, territories and the private sector to define the Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy for Canada. This will include the protection of Canada's critical transportation infrastructure. Chapter 7 - Border SecurityHighlights
ContextEffective border management requires governments to treat the border as more than a single line at which threats can be intercepted. Well before the events of September 11, 2001, Canada had taken significant steps to enhance border security - recognizing that a modern border requires, as much as possible, that screening activities should take place before a traveller or cargo arrives at our ports of entry. Management of our borders is in keeping with the need to facilitate trade and travel, while preventing high-risk travellers and cargo from entering Canada through air, land, and marine ports. Progress to DateBorder management became even more urgent in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The Government of Canada took immediate steps to enhance the security of our borders by allocating $646 million in Budget 2001 to initiatives including equipping and deploying more intelligence, investigative, and front-line personnel. The Government also provided funds to improve the screening of immigrants, refugee claimants and visitors and to enhance the capacity to detain and remove anyone posing a risk to Canada. This permits the Government to better identify individuals posing a threat to Canada while facilitating the flow of those who do not. The Government created the Immigration Intelligence Branch, currently located in the Canada Border Services Agency, to better support screening of persons suspected of terrorism, organized crime and war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Government also improved the screening of visa applicants abroad and began to security screen all refugee claimants immediately after a claim is made. Canada also introduced the new Permanent Resident Card, which has been recognized as one of the most secure identity documents in the world. Criminals and other persons who pose security threats will sometimes try to use forged documents to gain access to other countries. A Canadian approach that has been successfully adopted by other countries, including the United States, is to place migration integrity officers abroad to combat illegal migration, including people smuggling and trafficking. Working with partners, these officers work to identify and stop high-risk travellers before they can board planes bound for Canada. They also train local airline and airport authorities to identify false and altered travel documents. In the past six years, these officers have stopped more than 40,000 people with improper documents from boarding planes for North America. In 2001, Parliament passed the Government's new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which provides more tools to address security threats. The Act contains more stringent penalties for people using or selling forged or false documents and it allows the Government to deny individuals who are confirmed as security threats access to our refugee determination process. The Act also provides additional tools to prevent access to Canada by members of foreign-based organized crime groups. New provisions include grounds of inadmissibility for persons involved in people smuggling and trafficking, money laundering and trans-border offences related to the possession of illegal substances. There are stronger and new offences for counterfeiting and for people smuggling and trafficking; and there are reduced appeal opportunities for organized crime members who are ordered deported. The Government also imposed new visa requirements on 10 countries, as well as on seafarers, to allow for the screening abroad of potential security risks. We quickly implemented an advance passenger information/passenger name record system to obtain information on travellers destined for Canada. This data is used to identify high-risk individuals before they arrive at Canadian ports of entry. To strengthen our ability to verify the identity of individuals seeking to enter Canada, the Government deployed LiveScan digital fingerprint machines at major border offices. These machines capture fingerprints, biographical information and photographs of all refugee claimants and individuals whose identity may be in doubt. This data is sent electronically to the RCMP for further checks. To help meet the challenges posed by international terrorism, the RCMP set up integrated national security enforcement teams in key locations. The integrated national security enforcement team members collect, analyse and share intelligence about national security among partners. Working together, they are better able to enforce the law and they improve partner agencies' capacity to manage national security threats and meet specific mandate responsibilities. Integrating intelligence and enforcement, from the very early stages of criminal activity or organized crime, has proven to be a highly effective model for successful prosecution. As part of the structural changes announced in December 2003, the Government created the Canada Border Services Agency. This agency brings together the border security and intelligence functions formerly with the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. To better link these efforts with the policing and broader intelligence community, the agency was brought into the new Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness - which includes the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the RCMP. These actions are helping us to better integrate our intelligence and law enforcement officials with those responsible for making risk-based decisions on the flow of people and goods at our borders. Smart Borders Discussions with the United StatesCanada took the lead in proposing to the United States a comprehensive smart borders strategy that would enhance North American security and prosperity. The Smart Borders Declaration, signed with the United States on December 12, 2001, supports a detailed 32-point Action Plan to enhance the security of the flow of goods and people and the transportation system, and to strengthen intelligence and law enforcement co-operation. The Smart Borders initiatives make both countries partners in systems and programs that expedite the flow of low-risk goods and people while increasing the information that is needed to screen higher-risk flows. Examples of progress in the Smart Borders discussions include:
The Way ForwardCanada has made considerable progress on improving border security. However, we need to continue building a 21st-century border that demonstrates to the world that security and prosperity can be simultaneously pursued effectively. The Government is taking a comprehensive approach to enhancing the measures taken to secure our borders, including:
In support of domestic border security initiatives, we are also committing to spending an additional $110.1 million in this area. Domestic Border Security InitiativesWe will continue to study emerging technologies that could significantly improve our ability to screen passengers and goods destined for Canada. We are examining the possibility of implementing a program to permit us to screen passengers while they are making their flight reservations abroad. This would allow us to stop known risks from boarding a flight destined for Canada. The international community is increasingly using new technologies, including biometrics, to facilitate low-risk travellers and interrupt the flow of higher-risk travellers. Canada has worked with the International Civil Aviation Organization to develop globally interoperable security standards for travel documents. In May 2003, the organization announced that facial recognition would be the international biometric standard for travel documents. Canada will begin issuing a biometrically enabled smart chip passport in early 2005. There will be no change in the way that Canadians apply for a passport. However, the photo that they submit will be digitized and stored on a chip imbedded in the passport. Given the critical role that biometrics increasingly play in authenticating the identity of travellers, the Government will also work toward a broader use of biometrics. In accordance with international standards, Canada will examine how to use biometrics in our border and immigration systems to enhance the design and issuance processes of travel and proof-of-status documents and to validate the identity of travellers at our ports of entry. The RCMP is responsible for fingerprint identification and criminal record activities on behalf of Canada's law enforcement, criminal justice and public safety communities. The Auditor General's Report in 2004 criticized the Government for not yet implementing the RCMP Real Time Identification project, an automated process for electronic fingerprint screening. To achieve this system, the Government has allocated funds from Budget 2004 to complete the project. This system will allow fingerprints to be electronically recorded, transmitted and instantly verified against broader databases. It will also permit the RCMP to avoid future backlogs and to modernize criminal record and fingerprint identification processes. Canada's openness to refugees is a reflection of our international commitments and humanitarian tradition. As announced in December 2003, the Government is developing strategies to reform the refugee determination process to create a more streamlined system. This includes a reformed appointment process to ensure the quality and effectiveness of the Immigration and Refugee Board. As an initial step, on March 16, 2004, the Government announced strengthened criteria for individuals being considered for appointment to the board and an increased role for parliamentarians in the nomination process. The Government will table new measures in the coming months to better provide protection to those genuinely in need and to more efficiently identify and remove those individuals who may be attempting to abuse our refugee and immigration system. The Government continues to examine ways to enhance our capacity to detain and remove individuals who are inadmissible to Canada. Investigations and removals of high-risk individuals are integral to our overall border management strategy. Without these key activities, the integrity of our immigration system would be severely undermined. Completing the Smart Borders Action PlanWe will follow through on our commitment to complete the initiatives identified in the 32-point Action Plan. We will implement the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Party Agreement signed in December 2002 to better manage the flow of refugee claimants across the land border. We will also implement the agreement with the United States to automatically share advance passenger information/passenger name record data on high-risk travellers destined to either country. Under the Canada-U.S. Cross-Border Crime Forum, the two countries are finalizing a joint threat assessment to identify high-level organized crime priority targets that pose a threat to both countries and are updating the 2001 Canada-U.S. Border Drug Threat Assessment and have begun work on a bilateral action plan to combat trafficking. Developing a Next Generation Smart Borders AgendaWe will build on the success of the existing Canada-U.S. Smart Borders process to develop a next generation smart borders agenda with the United States and Mexico that will allow us to further enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians. Detailed discussions on this initiative, already underway, will seek to strengthen strategies to reduce the transactions that are required at the border. This agenda would both deepen and broaden the existing Smart Borders Action Plan and include new areas such as food safety, cyber-security, public health, marine and transport security. Applying Smart Borders Principles InternationallyFinally, building on Canada's history of international co-operation, we have the opportunity to contribute to the security of the international system of trade and travel by working with our international partners. Through institutions such as the G8, the World Customs Organization, the International Maritime Organization, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum, we will seek to enhance international standards and to internationalize our Smart Borders programs. Chapter 8 - International SecurityHighlights
ContextCanada's national security will be one of the top priorities in our International Policy Review. The international policy that results from this review - particularly in the security realm - will also reflect our increasingly integrated approach to defence, diplomacy and development (the "3Ds"). National security is a key driver of Canadian defence policy. The primary obligation of the Canadian Forces is to defend Canada and Canadians, particularly from external military threats. They also play a key role in protecting Canadians from internal threats to their security, both accidental and intentional. Our diplomatic pursuit of international peace and security is also driven, in large part, by our national security interests. Our security was the paramount rationale for our activism in the shaping of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and for our contributions to arms control and disarmament initiatives during the Cold War. More recently, national security concerns have influenced the types of assistance we provide to certain failing and failed states in crisis. The International Policy Review will make important recommendations regarding the Government of Canada's diplomatic, defence and development agenda, as well as the structure of the Canadian Forces. Without prejudging the final shape of these recommendations, the Government has identified a number of security priorities in this area. Progress to DateSince September 11, the Government has reaffirmed Canada's commitment to both NATO and the United Nations and has engaged on several fronts to counter threats to our national security. Based on the current threat environment, we have placed the highest priority on countering international terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, assisting failed and failing states, and defusing intra- and interstate conflicts that threaten our national security. International TerrorismIn response to the attacks of September 11, Canada was actively involved in NATO's decision to invoke Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which provides for the collective defence of an ally who is attacked. From the outset, Canada was an active participant in the military campaign against both al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that had sheltered and supported this terrorist network. Canada deployed significant ground, air and naval forces. The Government also announced in Budget 2001 that it would enhance the capacity of JTF2, our military's special forces, to counter terrorism both at home and abroad. At the United Nations, Canada played a key role in negotiating the implementation of that organization's 12 international terrorism conventions. In addition, we acted quickly and decisively to freeze terrorist assets through both the UN Suppression of Terrorism regulations and the Canadian Criminal Code. We enhanced our counter-terrorism capacity-building efforts in developing states. For a number of years, Canadian experts across the Government have provided assistance to these states to enable them to prevent and respond to terrorist activity in accordance with international norms and standards, including those related to human rights. Weapons of Mass DestructionCanada has played a leading role in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Under the Canadian presidency in 2002, the G8 created the Global Partnership Program aimed at preventing the acquisition, by terrorists or those who shelter them, of materials and expertise associated with weapons of mass destruction. Early in 2004, Canada became a full partner in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims to deter and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. This security initiative contributed to Libya's important decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction program. In support of our international commitments, the Government is further strengthening Canada's licensing and import/export controls on materials that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. Budget 2001 funded the creation of a dedicated nuclear, biological, and chemical response unit to support first line responders in a domestic situation, if requested, and to support deployed operations abroad. Finally, Canada is discussing the possibility of participating in the U.S. ballistic missile defence system to increase the security of North America. Our final decision on participation will be consistent with our long-standing opposition to the weaponization of space. Failed and Failing States and Intra- and Interstate ConflictsCanada has also been actively engaged in international efforts to prevent conflict, as well as to keep and build the peace in failed, failing and post-conflict states. Our diplomats, aid workers and armed forces are currently deployed around the globe in a variety of peace efforts. On the peacebuilding front alone, Canada is involved in Haiti, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. In Afghanistan, Canada is playing a critical role to help restore peace, stabilize the country, and rebuild democratic institutions. In 2003-04, Canada provided the largest contingent to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force. Canada has pledged $600 million over seven years to help Afghans rebuild their lives and their institutions. This is our single largest bilateral aid program ever. Canadian aid workers and diplomats are working with Afghan leaders and civil society to help build a representative and democratic government. The Way ForwardThe Canadian ForcesThe government recognizes that the Canadian Forces constitute an essential national security capability. The vital role they play in responding to emergencies has been referred to in Chapter 4. Our forces must also be able to defend Canada, help secure North America, and address threats to our national security as far away from our borders as possible. Indeed, getting the right balance between domestic and international security concerns will be an important consideration in determining the roles and force structure of the Canadian Forces. In this increasingly unstable international threat environment, Canada must have armed forces that are flexible, responsive and combat-capable for a wide range of operations, and that are able to work with our allies. This government recognizes, however, that the Canadian Forces are more than a national security capability. When Canada engages internationally to protect human rights, for example, it needs to be able to call on both diplomatic efforts and military power. We must be selective and strategic when considering the deployment of our armed forces. Key questions need to be examined, including: Which efforts would be of greatest relevance to our national security interests? Do we have the capacity to meaningfully contribute to a successful outcome? Peace, Order and Good GovernmentAssisting failed and failing states is one area where the links with both our national security and our capacity to contribute are clear. Failed and failing states are potential havens for international terrorists and organized criminal networks. Terrorist and criminal networks are already co-operating in money laundering and other illicit activities, all of which bodes ill for these host states and the rest of the world. Our preferred approach is to help states avoid slipping into conflict and fragile situations. Canada's international development cooperation program already devotes significant resources to this end and these efforts will be enhanced. However, when states do fail, Canada's expertise must also be brought to bear to re-establish security and to rebuild institutions. Canadians have built a bilingual, multicultural federal state whose system of government and public service is respected around the world. We have an excellent reputation in international capacity building and in peace support operations. The Government will therefore enhance Canada's capacity for helping restore peace, order and good government in failed and failing states. Beyond offsetting direct threats to Canada, the assistance we provide to these countries is an expression of our values. One of our initiatives in this area will be to ensure we have greater military-civilian capacity. We will provide military and police forces to secure the peace and civilian expertise to help build democratic institutions. On the civilian side, we will facilitate contributions from across the Government, as well as from provinces, territories, communities, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and the Canada Corps. We are also allocating funds from the International Assistance Envelope towards counter-terrorism capacity building in developing states; these funds will be managed by the Department of Foreign Affairs. We expect to provide additional funding for broader capacity-building programs in failed and failing states in the future. Details will be provided in the International Policy Review. Our efforts to build peace, order and good government will involve greater integration of our defence, development and diplomatic assets. The impact will the simultaneous advancement of our national security interests, international peace and stability, and human rights. Other Specific Areas of ActionAs part of the fight against international terrorism, Canada will maintain its military presence in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf. When our current commitment ends in August 2004, we will send a new rotation of ground troops and air personnel to support the NATO mission in Afghanistan. We will continue to play an important role in efforts to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In September 2004, for example, Canada is expected to chair the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency. During our one-year term, we will seek to strengthen nuclear safeguards and to build international consensus for responding to the dangerous nuclear activities of Iran and North Korea. Finally, we will do our part in defusing intra- and interstate conflicts that threaten our national security. In consultation with our allies, we will determine where Canada can best make a difference in the advancement of peace. Engaging the International CommunityWe recognize that Canada's national security interests are well served by working with like-minded countries to ensure the continued and enhanced relevance of both NATO and the United Nations. The former is our best insurance policy in an increasingly dangerous and unpredictable threat environment. The meaningful reform of the latter is our best hope for a truly global peace. We recognize the importance of broadening international consensus on dealing with threats. Canada has been particularly active in highlighting a security agenda at the G8 and will continue to do so. We will continue to pursue a coherent security agenda with key international partners and other relevant multilateral organizations. We are ready to engage in any new forums for dialogue that will broaden international consensus around our security priorities. A state worthy of the name has no friends - only interests.- French President Charles de Gaulle, 1962, paraphrasing Britain's Lord Palmerston, 1848
The agency's name is absent from the address board in the lobby. But on the fifth floor of an unassuming office tower at Ottawa's Billings Bridge Plaza - right beside a local Zellers - are several sub-offices of the Communications Security Establishment, Canada's most secret and least-accountable spy service. "Communications Security Establishment?" asks an Ottawa directory assistance operator. "We don't have a telephone listing under that name." The faxes that the CSE sends do not carry a return fax number. Its letterhead address is the anonymous sounding P.O. Box 9703. In fact, the CSE's main headquarters in the Sir Leonard Tilley Building at 719 Heron Rd. houses most of the agency's 875 civilian employees. Many sit for hours under headphones, gazing at computer screens at desks that are grouped according to the regions of the world whose airwaves they monitor electronically. Here, mathematicians and linguists, political scientists and engineers collect and analyse foreign signals intelligence - known as SIGINT - for the CSE's "clients": the Prime Minister, the department of foreign affairs and international trade and other government departments. Set up in 1941 to decode enemy telegraphy and radar, the service's technology has now evolved to cover cellular telephones, faxes and even emissions from computer screens or electric typewriters. "There isn't a thing that's radiating that they can't get," says Mike Frost, a former undercover agent with the service. While most Canadians are aware of the domestic security activities of the 12-year-old CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, few had heard of the foreign-focused CSE before 1994, when Frost published his Cold War memoir of 19 years at the agency. Then, last November, former CSE linguist Jane Shorten revealed on national television that Canada had, since 1990, also spied on friendly nations Japan and South Korea for economic reasons, as well as on free-trade partner Mexico during negotiations leading up to the 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement. "My colleagues who were Spanish linguists were working really hard at that, doing extra hours," remembers Shorten. Indeed, the CSE has, in one guise or another, conducted electronic eavesdropping on a global basis since the Second World War, with virtually no parliamentary oversight. The first time the government publicly acknowledged the agency's existence was in 1983. Shorten and Frost are the only former employees who have risked breaking their pledge under the Official Secrets Act to speak publicly about the surveillance agency. Lawyers correctly predicted that the CSE would rather ride out a few days of bad publicity than face more information coming out during a trial. Although the two support Ottawa's involvement in intelligence-gathering, both came to believe that the CSE's activities cross the line of what is acceptable. "It was going into the privacy of Canadians' communications," Shorten says. "I was getting physically sick over it. It was so stressful." Frost says he was coming out of an alcoholism recovery program when the agency retired him six years ago - his office already cleaned out and locks changed before he even heard his fate. All prospective CSE employees undergo an exhaustive security check before joining the agency. Once hired, they are not allowed to talk about their work, to travel abroad without filing an itinerary or to move in with a romantic partner without reporting it to superiors. Frost says his family life suffered from his clandestine work +setting up signal-collection stations at Canadian embassies around the world - among them Moscow, Bucharest, Caracas and New Delhi. In his book Spyworld: How C.S.E. Spies on Canadians and the World, co-written with Michel Gratton, a former spokesman for former prime minister Brian Mulroney, Frost also describes more dubious operations: eavesdropping on Margaret Trudeau in 1975 to find out if she smoked marijuana; monitoring two of former prime minister Margaret Thatcher's dissenting cabinet ministers in London on behalf of Britain's secret service; and collecting information about Quebec separatism - chiefly by tapping into the Parti Québécois government's communications with France and other countries - in a section known as "the French Problem." CSE has roundly denied the Quebec claims, a rare departure; otherwise, it has issued a terse "no comment" to assertions by Frost and others. Allegations are virtually impossible to confirm independently, since every operation the agency carries out is known only to those who work on it. Says Shorten: "The person down the hall, you don't know what they're doing. It's all on a need-to-know basis." Citing policy and national security, the CSE declined a Maclean's request for interviews and said it had chosen not to respond to any of the 32 questions the magazine submitted by fax. For Shorten, the moment of truth came in 1991, some time after she transferred from the Russian section to N2, or "rest of the world." Her job was to translate South Korean "intercept" as part of a project code-named Aquarian. At first, Shorten scanned diplomatic communications - Korean reaction to meetings with Canadian trade officials about the CANDU nuclear reactor, for example. Then, her tasks changed to include monitoring all telephone and fax traffic in and out of the South Korean Embassy in Ottawa, which included conversations of locally hired Canadian staff. "That's where I drew the line," says Shorten. "I said 'Look, this is Canadian content now,' because anyone could phone up the South Korean Embassy and I would have it on tape." Shorten says she clashed with her supervisor when she expressed discomfort with the work and asked for guidelines on what to report. One of the first things Shorten heard was a conversation between a Canadian woman and her doctor about gynecological problems. "I was just appalled. I talked to the senior linguist and said, 'I can't believe this, it's outrageous, I shouldn't be listening to this.' " Ultimately, after a prolonged leave of absence, Shorten was officially dismissed in 1994. Frost, who now travels the country speaking to luncheon groups about Canadian intelligence issues, insists it was a sense of ethics that moved him to disclose the questionable CSE capers that he knew of. "If the taxpayers are paying three quarters of a million dollars a day for it, Canadians have a right to know," he says. The CSE's official budget, buried within the defence department's financial figures, is $116.8 million this year. But the military provides an additional 1,100 people and much equipment, bringing CSE's employee count to within about 100 of CSIS's 2,077 and its total expenditure - estimated at nearly $250 million - to 1 ½ times the current CSIS outlay. The CSE's formidable resources include a Cray supercomputer, which at the time of purchase in 1985 was the most powerful data-cruncher in the country. After upgrades and maintenance, CSE had, by 1994, spent more than $34 million on that machine alone. Despite the end of the Cold War and government belt-tightening, a $35-million, windowless extension to the main CSE building was completed in 1992, creating what is known in spy circles as a "Tempest-proof" structure, impenetrable to outside surveillance equipment. Connected by an underground tunnel is yet another smaller building where experts on codes and ciphers work on securing all Canadian government communications against interception. That division, known as INFOSEC, accounts for about 20 per cent of the CSE's total operations, officials have said in the past. It is impossible to know the current budget breakdown. Unlike CSIS, which was set up under an act of Parliament and is answerable to an independent review committee, the CSE has no mandate beyond one paragraph in a 1975 cabinet order. It also had no system of review until Defence Minister David Collenette appointed a watchdog commissioner in June, after years of outside pressure. The agency's current chief, Stewart Woolner, answers to Margaret Bloodworth, deputy clerk of the Privy Council Office, on matters of policy, and to Collenette on its budget. But defence ministers - some by their own admission - have most often been outside the loop. "In theory, the minister of national defence is accountable to the House of Commons for the money. But on a day-to-day basis, he or she would never be involved in the operations," says Derek Lee, Liberal MP for Scarborough/Rouge River, one of those who has pushed for an accountability mechanism. Now, former Quebec chief justice Claude Bisson has just set up an office in downtown Ottawa with three newly hired staffers to help him in his part-time position as CSE commissioner. Bisson, who has a budget of $500,000, is to report annually to Collenette, who will in turn report to Parliament. A veteran of three judicial inquiries, Bisson is supposed to make sure the CSE stays within the law and does not abuse its considerable power. But already critics have complained that the new measure does not go far enough. "I don't have high hopes," says Shorten. "If something is in the interest of national security, it may not all be reported. They always get out of it with 'national security.' " Bisson confirmed he must first vet his reports with Bloodworth, who acts as deputy minister for CSE, before he submits them, but he insists he does have some clout. "Everything is supposed to be open to me," Bisson says, adding that he will alert the attorney general if there is something that concerns him. Bill Robinson, a researcher at the disarmament group Project Ploughshares in Waterloo, Ont., complains that the commissioner's status is not enshrined in law, that the job is carried out by one individual rather than an arm's-length panel, and that his mandate is merely to check legality. "You can do a significant amount of invading privacy that is legal but isn't appropriate," says Robinson. "There could be much better safeguards in place against spying on Canadians." Government agencies must get a court warrant to tap into telephone calls, faxes or other "private" communications within Canada. But under long-existing laws, the CSE needs no court order to monitor text or radio messages that begin or end outside Canada. The legality of cross-border telephone eavesdropping is less clear. Another wrinkle is that, even inside Canada's borders, cellular telephones can legally be intercepted - although certain uses of gleaned material is unlawful. The privacy of electronic mail has yet to be legally tested. Further, even if the CSE operates entirely within the law on Canadian soil, its close relationship to spy organizations in the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand can still allow it to circumvent the rules. Frost, for one, says CSE has carried out missions for both London and Washington that they deemed too delicate domestically to be handled by their own intelligence agencies. "Why not the reverse, especially in the case of Quebec?" he asks. He also says the CSE purchased Scandinavian interceptions of French communications to gain information about Quebec separatists. Commissioner Bisson, who had hardly heard of the CSE before being asked to accept his three-year appointment, says this is the type of issue he intends to examine. "They cannot do indirectly what they are forbidden to do directly," he asserts. In a rare 1995 appearance before the standing committee on national defence, Bloodworth reiterated the organization's standard response to such questions. "CSE does not in any part of its collection target Canadians, or the communications of Canadians," she said. "A fundamental part of the agreements we have with our close allies is that we do not target each other and we do not ask each other to target our own citizens either." Still, the practice of exchanging material goes back decades. Until recently, the CSE functioned as a virtual branch office of Washington's National Security Agency, which has 38,000 people on its payroll. One large satellite dish stationed outside the CSE's Ottawa headquarters is dedicated exclusively to messages to and from NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Md. Numerous CSE employees have done training there. For years, Canada got a lot more than it gave to the partnership, until increasing pressure from the NSA, along with bountiful financial and technical inducements, persuaded the CSE to take a more activist role. By the late 1980s, Canada had become a major player. During the last few years of the Soviet regime, says Frost, the CSE even took over the interception of all Moscow-based signals on behalf of the United States and Britain, whose listening operations in the capital had been jammed by Soviet intelligence experts. Ottawa's move to the big leagues may have come in the nick of time. Since the collapse of the Soviet Bloc six years ago, a higher priority has been placed on economic intelligence - a sphere where even the best political allies never give away their secrets. "A few years ago, the CSE had recruitment ads for university students in psychology and humanities. Now, they are looking for graduates in economics, commerce and business. Five to 10 years ago, that wouldn't have figured into it," says Reg Whitaker, a political science professor at Toronto's York University. Whitaker points out that Shorten's reports of economic spying surfaced at a time when the government is putting top priority on trade. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien will make his third "Team Canada" deal-making mission to Asia early next year, this time to the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea. But in the absence of an obvious enemy like nuclear-armed Soviet communism, the ethics of modern-day spying are far less clear-cut, as Shorten found. Today, she remains unemployed and is considering going back to school, to put her CSE years behind her. "All I wanted to do was show Canadians what the CSE was all about, and that it is dangerous," she says of her decision to speak out. "Somebody should be looking over their shoulders." To be sure, the agency has become slightly more open in recent years. Its budget has been cut by about 10 per cent since the heady Cold War days, chief Woolner testified to a parliamentary committee last year. In an effort to raise funds, the INFOSEC side has begun consulting to the private sector on how to secure corporate communications. Yet there is no sign - and no reason to expect - that CSE will curb its increasingly complex operations at a time when many experts believe the world has in fact become less secure. Terrorists, organized criminals and money launderers have discovered that Canada is a choice base from which to run international operations. And, as Woolner confirmed in his testimony, trade has become a prime component of the new national interest. "Knowledge is power," says MP Lee. "When we as Canadians sit down with another country to negotiate an agreement, our negotiators must be possessed of as much knowledge as they can get their hands on. There isn't a country in the world that wouldn't do that." But whether that information should be obtained meticulously from open sources or gleaned clandestinely is a matter of debate. To Lee, "Canadians have a sense of morality. They don't want to be bad guys." He believes they want their spies to obtain "as much information as they could covertly without breaking major rules or embarrassing anyone." Perhaps too, many are just as happy that the CSE, with its troubling tactics, is as secret as it is. See also INTELLIGENCE AND ESPIONAGE. Maclean's September 2, 1996 Author NOMI MORRIS Rapporteur Bill Robinson 85 Britannia Avenue London, Ontario, Canada N6H 2J3 519 433-6432 | |||||||||||||||
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